Add to ORKGThis paper finds that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed-fee licensing for the patent-holding firm when the cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic. The reason for this result is that the patent-holding firm enjoys a cost advantage over the licensee under royalty licensing while the two firms compete on equal footing under fixed-fee licensing. Ó 199
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a \u85xed fee when her...
We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee h...
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing ...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
We consider a symmetric homogeneous Cournot duopoly operating under increasing marginal costs. One o...
This note studies the transfer of a cost-reducing innovation from an independent patent-holder to an...
Abstract: Incorporating a durable-good monopoly model, this paper reexamines the argument on fee ver...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
June 13, 2008This paper analyzes how an inventor should fix the licensing terms to license a standar...
This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city...
We depart from the standard framework and study optimal patent licensing under Cournot duopoly where...
We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee h...
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing t...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
This paper considers the allocation of essential patents by a pro\u85t maximiz-ing monopoly. Using a...
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a \u85xed fee when her...
We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee h...
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing ...
In this paper, we consider a Cournot duopoly market in which the patent-holding firm negotiates with...
We consider a symmetric homogeneous Cournot duopoly operating under increasing marginal costs. One o...
This note studies the transfer of a cost-reducing innovation from an independent patent-holder to an...
Abstract: Incorporating a durable-good monopoly model, this paper reexamines the argument on fee ver...
Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to licensing by...
June 13, 2008This paper analyzes how an inventor should fix the licensing terms to license a standar...
This paper compares three licensing regimes in a symmetric duopoly model situated on a circular city...
We depart from the standard framework and study optimal patent licensing under Cournot duopoly where...
We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee h...
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing t...
In this Note we consider an economy composed by two firms; a leader and a follower, that invest in R...
This paper considers the allocation of essential patents by a pro\u85t maximiz-ing monopoly. Using a...
This paper explores a licensors choice between charging a per-unit royalty or a \u85xed fee when her...
We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee h...
Incorporating patent litigation into a durable-good duopoly model, we revisit the optimal licensing ...