Add to ORKGWe reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social ordering when alternatives are lotteries and individual preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type. Relative egalitarianism ranks alternatives by applying the leximin ordering to the distributions of (0-1) normalized utilities they generate. We propose an axiomatic characterization of this aggregation rule and discuss related criteria
This Version June 2004Bibliography: p. 27-29We examine the possibility of constructing social orderi...
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened ve...
We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society ha...
We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over the space of allocations in...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
We widen both the domain and codomain of Arrovian social choice, towards respectively profiles of ex...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of altern...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
This Version June 2004Bibliography: p. 27-29We examine the possibility of constructing social orderi...
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
In a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened ve...
We analyze the preference aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society ha...
We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over the space of allocations in...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
We widen both the domain and codomain of Arrovian social choice, towards respectively profiles of ex...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of altern...
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characteri...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
This Version June 2004Bibliography: p. 27-29We examine the possibility of constructing social orderi...
Winner selection by majority, in elections between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with ...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...