Add to ORKGWe have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of the properties we may wish a social preference structure to have relate to social welfare. This concept can be used, for instance, to assess the quality of an allocation of resources to agents. Today will be an introduction to this area: • Ordinal and cardinal preferences of individual agents • Introduction to the fairness-efficiency dilemma • Social welfare orderings and collective utility function
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocat...
This paper explores the feasibility of an individualistic and equity-concerned aggregation of ration...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
Arrow’s celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individ-uals ’ preferences into a social or...
This version: November 2000 (First Version: January 2000)Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the a...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
We introduce the concept of a universal social ordering, de\u85ned on the set of pairs of an allocat...
International audienceIn a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which dep...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocat...
This paper explores the feasibility of an individualistic and equity-concerned aggregation of ration...
We have already seen that preference aggregation is a difficult, if not impossible business. Some of...
Preference aggregation is difficult when preferences are modelled as linear orders: intuitively appe...
Arrow’s celebrated theorem shows that the aggregation of individ-uals ’ preferences into a social or...
This version: November 2000 (First Version: January 2000)Arrow's celebrated theorem shows that the a...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
We introduce the concept of a universal social ordering, de\u85ned on the set of pairs of an allocat...
International audienceIn a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which dep...
We study the construction of social ordering functions in a multidimensional allocation problem wher...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
International audienceWe develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on infor...
We reconsider the problem of aggregating individual preference orderings into a single social orderi...
We propose the concept of a universal social ordering, defined on the set of pairs of an allocation ...
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable p...
We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocat...
This paper explores the feasibility of an individualistic and equity-concerned aggregation of ration...