Providing public goods is hard, because providers are best off free-riding. Is it even harder if one group’s public good is a public bad for another group or, conversely, gives the latter a windfall profit? We experimentally study public goods provision embedded in a social context and find that in the absence of explicit norms externalities have almost no effect. With an endogenously formed provision norm positive as well as negative externalities dampen provision as compared to no externalities. We explain the surprisingly low provision under positive externalities by the providers ’ increased risk of inequity and stress the importance of institutions sustaining condi-tional cooperation
Abstract: Sen’s libertarian paradox is ascribed to the inevitable conflict between the Pareto criter...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributio...
Some policy problems pit the interests of one group against those of another group. One group may, f...
The under-provision of public goods under voluntary contributions is well understood as the result o...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, b...
When a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is un...
We show that a seemingly paradoxical result is possible—an increase in one's wage can reduce one's w...
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it opt...
A fundamental but underappreciated truth is that positive and negative externalities are actually mi...
When people know a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may chan...
onlineWe study optimal government policy in a reference model (Rege, 2004, Journal of Public Economi...
This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities by representative ...
Abstract: Sen’s libertarian paradox is ascribed to the inevitable conflict between the Pareto criter...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributio...
Some policy problems pit the interests of one group against those of another group. One group may, f...
The under-provision of public goods under voluntary contributions is well understood as the result o...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
Experimental studies have compared cooperation across different nonmarket social dilemma settings, b...
When a single public good is provided at positive levels by private individuals, its provision is un...
We show that a seemingly paradoxical result is possible—an increase in one's wage can reduce one's w...
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it opt...
A fundamental but underappreciated truth is that positive and negative externalities are actually mi...
When people know a public good is to be privately provided in the future, economic behavior may chan...
onlineWe study optimal government policy in a reference model (Rege, 2004, Journal of Public Economi...
This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities by representative ...
Abstract: Sen’s libertarian paradox is ascribed to the inevitable conflict between the Pareto criter...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...