We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good contributors. In steady state, larger economies have more contributors. If the public good is normal, then its quantity increases in population size in the open-loop equilibrium, but not necessarily in the feedback equilibrium. If both private and public goods are normal, then the open-loop equilibrium exhibits greater steady-state public provision than the feedback equilibrium. If private consumption is inferior the opposite is true. Interpreting individuals as countries, our findings suggest that all countries over time will become contributors toward a global public good.private provision, public goods, dynamic, intertemporal, differential...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...
One strand of the literature on endogenous growth concerns models in which pub-lic infrastructure a¤...
International audienceWe study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contrib...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good c...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
This is a completely revised version of Discussion Paper #2005-10 "Accumulation of Public Goods and ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
I study an environment in which individuals compete for status through the provision of public goods...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...
One strand of the literature on endogenous growth concerns models in which pub-lic infrastructure a¤...
International audienceWe study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contrib...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good c...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
This is a completely revised version of Discussion Paper #2005-10 "Accumulation of Public Goods and ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
We introduce a dynamic public goods game, where an individual's investment in the public good at a g...
I study an environment in which individuals compete for status through the provision of public goods...
In finitely repeated laboratory public goods games contributions start at about 40 to 60 percent of ...
One strand of the literature on endogenous growth concerns models in which pub-lic infrastructure a¤...
International audienceWe study a finitely repeated public goods game (based on the voluntary contrib...