Abstract. Motivated by the work of Fleming [5], we shall provide the general framework to associate inf-sup type values with the Isaacs equations. We shall show that upper and lower bounds for the generators of inf-sup type are upper and lower Hamiltonian in differential games respectively. In particular, lower (resp.upper) bound corresponds to progressive (resp. strictly progressive) strategy. Under Dynamic Programming Principle and identification of the gener-ator, we can prove that the inf-sup type game is characterized as the unique viscosity solution of the Isaacs equation. We also discuss about the Isaacs equation with Hamiltonian of convex combination between lower and upper Hamiltonians.
AbstractA zero-sum differential game of infinite horizon is considered. Positive switching costs are...
We characterize invariance of time-varying domains with respect to differential games with time-meas...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
We apply a modification of the viscosity solution concept introduced in [8] to the Isaacs equation d...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated the connections between the dynamic programmi...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
We study differential game problems in which the players can select different maximal monotone opera...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
Recent work by the authors [this Journal, 23 (1985), pp. 566-583], has demonstrated the con-nections...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
AbstractA zero-sum differential game of infinite horizon is considered. Positive switching costs are...
We characterize invariance of time-varying domains with respect to differential games with time-meas...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
We apply a modification of the viscosity solution concept introduced in [8] to the Isaacs equation d...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
Recent work by the authors and others has demonstrated the connections between the dynamic programmi...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
We study differential game problems in which the players can select different maximal monotone opera...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
Recent work by the authors [this Journal, 23 (1985), pp. 566-583], has demonstrated the con-nections...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
AbstractA zero-sum differential game of infinite horizon is considered. Positive switching costs are...
We characterize invariance of time-varying domains with respect to differential games with time-meas...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...