A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivity conditions, the upper and lower value functions are characterized as the unique viscosity solutions to the corresponding upper and lower Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations, respectively. Consequently, when the Isaacs\u27 condition is satisfied, the upper and lower value functions coincide, leading to the existence of the value function of the differential game. Due to the unboundedness of the controls, the corresponding upper and lower Hamiltonians grow super linearly in the gradient of the upper and lower value functions, respectively. A uniqueness theorem of viscosity solution to Hamilton-Jacobi equations involving such kind of Hamiltonian...
In this paper, we study the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation of zerosum differential games with disco...
We study two-player zero-sum differential games of finite duration in a Hilbert space. Following the...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
A zero-sum differential game with an unbounded control and no coercivity assumptions is investigated...
In this paper, we study the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation of zerosum differential games with disco...
We study two-player zero-sum differential games of finite duration in a Hilbert space. Following the...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under proper coercivi...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
A two-person zero-sum differential game with unbounded controls is considered. Under prope...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
International audienceWe consider a two player, zero sum differential game with a cost of Bolza type...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and t...
7 pagesInternational audienceThe value of a zero-sum differential games is known to exist, under Isa...
A zero-sum differential game with an unbounded control and no coercivity assumptions is investigated...
In this paper, we study the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation of zerosum differential games with disco...
We study two-player zero-sum differential games of finite duration in a Hilbert space. Following the...
AbstractIt is demonstrated that the upper and lower values of a two-person, zero-sum differential ga...