Add to ORKGWe analyze the optimal incentive scheme for central banks when there exists an inflation-ary bias and the monetary authorities ’ preferences are private information. In the mechanism proposed the government designs a menu of contracts so that the central bank’s choice re-veals its type. Therefore, this arrangement removes the extraneous noise that asymmetric information introduces into monetary policy. We conclude that the inflationary bias is elim-inated for the type of central bank with the high valuation of the financial reward. However, if this valuation is low this bias is reduced only partially unless the transfer is not costly for the government
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context...
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
Inflation target regimes (like those of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom)...
We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the gover...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a useful framework for interpretin...
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central ...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a use-ful framework for interpreti...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely...
When central bank preferences are uncertain, delegation implemented by inflation or exchange rate ta...
This paper adopts a principal-agent framework to determine how a central banker's incentives should ...
How much information should a Central Bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operationa...
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context...
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context...
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
Inflation target regimes (like those of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom)...
We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the gover...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a useful framework for interpretin...
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central ...
Approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problem provides a use-ful framework for interpreti...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
Should central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely...
When central bank preferences are uncertain, delegation implemented by inflation or exchange rate ta...
This paper adopts a principal-agent framework to determine how a central banker's incentives should ...
How much information should a Central Bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operationa...
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context...
Excessive inflation is usually attributed to the lack of central bank’s credibility. In this context...
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
Inflation target regimes (like those of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom)...