Add to ORKGThis paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announced inflation target to an instrument-independent central bank, but retains the discretion to revise the inflation target after wages have been set. We argue that since this arrangement is transparent, it solves Canzoneri's private information problem, ensures perfect monitoring of the government, and makes reputational forces more effective. Cases are characterized in which, for this reason, inflation targeting mitigates the inflationary bias of monetary policy
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
This paper proves that a higher inflation target unanchors expectations, as feared by Fed Chairman B...
Inflation targeting anchors inflation expectations, which are not within the sphere of control of th...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal ...
There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal ...
More than a monetary policy strategy, we interpret inflation targeting as a framework for communicat...
In this paper, I show that accountability for inflation target will improve so-cial welfare when the...
Inflation target regimes (like those of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom)...
We analyze the optimal incentive scheme for central banks when there exists an inflation-ary bias an...
We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, inc...
We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the gover...
This paper argues that the success of inflation targeting is principally the result of having a clea...
First we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization trade-off will remain ...
Inflation targeting, Transparency and Expectations - a review of recent literature This paper survey...
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
This paper proves that a higher inflation target unanchors expectations, as feared by Fed Chairman B...
Inflation targeting anchors inflation expectations, which are not within the sphere of control of th...
This paper considers an institutional arrangement in which the government assigns a publicly-announc...
There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal ...
There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal ...
More than a monetary policy strategy, we interpret inflation targeting as a framework for communicat...
In this paper, I show that accountability for inflation target will improve so-cial welfare when the...
Inflation target regimes (like those of Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom)...
We analyze the optimal incentive scheme for central banks when there exists an inflation-ary bias an...
We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, inc...
We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the gover...
This paper argues that the success of inflation targeting is principally the result of having a clea...
First we modify the Barro-Gordon model so that a credibility-stabilization trade-off will remain ...
Inflation targeting, Transparency and Expectations - a review of recent literature This paper survey...
Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparenc...
This paper proves that a higher inflation target unanchors expectations, as feared by Fed Chairman B...
Inflation targeting anchors inflation expectations, which are not within the sphere of control of th...