Comparability, Functionalism and the Scope of Comparative Law MOUSOURAKIS George＊ Introductory

Law may be perceived as consisting, ontologically, of a reflective relationship between two elements: norm and behaviour. Legal norms are set forth by human behaviour; their content is composed of models of behaviour. Norms are interpreted together with a real or imagined behaviour. But behaviour is also interpreted or assessed by reference to norms. This‘ontological dualism’of law cannot be disconnected, even though the different elements of law can, to a certain extent, be considered separately. Norms must refer to some form of behaviour, otherwise norms cannot be understood at all. On the other hand, behaviour that cannot be interpreted on the basis of legal norms is, strictly speaking, legally irrelevant. It is evident that law can be studied from different angles. One can stress the norm-element to such an extent that a discourse on valid law becomes equivalent to that on valid legal norms. In this case the formal validity of law is emphasized － the fact that a norm has been legally prescribed and has not been abolished or fallen in abeyance. On the other hand, one may allude to law as behaviour. In this case ＊ I would like to thank the participants in the Symposium o