Philosophical foundations of norms of legal method

Legal method is about identifying and applying the law in a particular legal system. Norms of legal method regulate that activity. They are about, among other things, sources of law, legal interpretation and conflicts of law. The thesis asks questions regarding their philosophical foundations, that is questions that are not limited to any particular legal system but concern law in general. The questions are, firstly, about the norms themselves: What do they do? How many norms can there be? Are any of them necessary? Of what kind are they? What is their normative character? What is their function? Then the thesis addresses questions about the norms’ significance for some central issues in jurisprudence, namely legal validity and legal systems. It is claimed that understanding norms of legal method together philosophically is important to elucidate them as well as some questions or problems in jurisprudence. What are the answers? Very briefly speaking, the norms have diverse roles and can be categorised accordingly. Norms of recognition and change address the issue of existence. Norms of interpretation address the issue of content. Norms of applicability address the issue of applicability. Norms of subsumption address the issue of application and norms of institutional decision-making address issues of institutional considerations and powers. The norms are united by sharing the overall role of identifying and applying the law. While there can be many (ultimate) norms in each category in a legal system, there must be at least one norm of recognition. Some of the norms are legal norms but others are so-called interpretive norms. While some norms are duty-imposing, permission-granting and power-conferring, others are so-called qualifying norms. The norms partly constitute the law. The norms are also important for legal validity and the structure and foundations of a legal system.