Abstract: This paper presents a Live Sequence Chart (LSC) to automata trans-formation algorithm that enables the verification of communication protocol imple-mentations. Using this LSC to automata transformation a communication protocol implementation can be verified using a single verification run as opposed to pre-vious techniques that rely on a three stage verification approach. The novelty and simplicity of the transformation algorithm lies in its placement of accept states in the automata generated from the LSC. We present in detail an example of the trans-formation as well as the transformation algorithm. Further, we present a detailed analysis and an empirical study comparing the verification strategy to earlier work to show the bene...
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) is a notation used in practice by protocol designers and system engin...
AbstractMessage sequence charts (MSCs) are an attractive visual formalism widely used to capture sys...
On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting...
This paper presents a Live Sequence Chart (LSC) to automata transformation al-gorithm that enables t...
The need for a formal verification process in System on Chip (SoC) design and Intellectual Property ...
AbstractThe need for a formal verification process in System on Chip (SoC) design and Intellectual P...
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are a widely used scenario notation. However, we believe that this la...
We give a precise semantics to Message Sequence Charts (MSCs), by interpreting MSC specifications by...
An efficient and mathematically rigorous translation from Live Sequence Charts (LSCs) to temporal lo...
AbstractMessage sequence charts is a notation used in practice by protocol designers and system engi...
AbstractAn efficient and mathematically rigorous translation from Live Sequence Charts (LSCs) to tem...
A problem with most runtime verification techniques is that the monitoring specification formalisms ...
AbstractThis paper presents a rewriting strategy for the analysis and the verification of communicat...
Message sequence charts (MSC) are a graphical notation standardized by the ITU and used for the desc...
Message sequence charts (MSCs) are an attractive visual formalism widely used to capture system requ...
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) is a notation used in practice by protocol designers and system engin...
AbstractMessage sequence charts (MSCs) are an attractive visual formalism widely used to capture sys...
On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting...
This paper presents a Live Sequence Chart (LSC) to automata transformation al-gorithm that enables t...
The need for a formal verification process in System on Chip (SoC) design and Intellectual Property ...
AbstractThe need for a formal verification process in System on Chip (SoC) design and Intellectual P...
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) are a widely used scenario notation. However, we believe that this la...
We give a precise semantics to Message Sequence Charts (MSCs), by interpreting MSC specifications by...
An efficient and mathematically rigorous translation from Live Sequence Charts (LSCs) to temporal lo...
AbstractMessage sequence charts is a notation used in practice by protocol designers and system engi...
AbstractAn efficient and mathematically rigorous translation from Live Sequence Charts (LSCs) to tem...
A problem with most runtime verification techniques is that the monitoring specification formalisms ...
AbstractThis paper presents a rewriting strategy for the analysis and the verification of communicat...
Message sequence charts (MSC) are a graphical notation standardized by the ITU and used for the desc...
Message sequence charts (MSCs) are an attractive visual formalism widely used to capture system requ...
Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) is a notation used in practice by protocol designers and system engin...
AbstractMessage sequence charts (MSCs) are an attractive visual formalism widely used to capture sys...
On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting...