An elected politician’s decision to delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats is an inherently risky one. On the one hand, politicians who successfully delegate receive the benefit of bureaucrats ’ expertise on often complicated policy matters, with the result that the finally implemented policy is of a higher quality than if it had been solely designed by the politicians. This is good for the citizens and also good for the delegating politician – voters show their appreciation for good policy by re-electing politicians, not by increasing bureaucrats ’ salaries. Conversely, however, delegated authority can work against the delegating politician, either if the bureaucrats have preferences distinct from those of the delegating politician, o
This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it...
A model of legislative-bureacratic interaction is developed and used to show how legislators can cre...
Public bureaucracy finds itself in a strange place at the intersection of political science and publ...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates \u85rst the no...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates first the norm...
This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elec...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria t...
A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in...
Critics of legislative delegation to the bureaucracy worry that delegation diminishes electoral acco...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the normative ...
Politicians typically do not know what policies are best for achieving their broad objectives, so re...
We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes t...
The idea of a clear separation between policymaking and implementation is difficult to sustain for p...
We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a t...
If there is no expert but bureaucracy in a policy area, expertise may be sufficient for an agency to...
This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it...
A model of legislative-bureacratic interaction is developed and used to show how legislators can cre...
Public bureaucracy finds itself in a strange place at the intersection of political science and publ...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates \u85rst the no...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates first the norm...
This paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elec...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria t...
A. Farazmand identifies three approaches towards relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in...
Critics of legislative delegation to the bureaucracy worry that delegation diminishes electoral acco...
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the normative ...
Politicians typically do not know what policies are best for achieving their broad objectives, so re...
We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes t...
The idea of a clear separation between policymaking and implementation is difficult to sustain for p...
We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a t...
If there is no expert but bureaucracy in a policy area, expertise may be sufficient for an agency to...
This paper studies how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it...
A model of legislative-bureacratic interaction is developed and used to show how legislators can cre...
Public bureaucracy finds itself in a strange place at the intersection of political science and publ...