Add to ORKGwww.uni-erfurt.de/mikrooekonomie Team leaders often provide incentives for cooperation. A challenging question is how different incentive schemes and their actual choice by the leader shape the team’s culture and contribute to the team’s success. To shed light on this issue we investigate how a leader chooses between rewards or punishment in an experimental team setting and how teammates’ contributions are influenced by this choice. Leaders show a clear initial preference for rewards, which diminishes over time in some teams. Leaders who observe more free-riders in their teams tend to switch to punishment incentives. A change from rewards to negative incentives results in an immediate and enduring increase in contributions. On the other han...
A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group coopera...
This thesis consists of three independent chapters investigating behavioural mechanisms of cooperati...
Abstract: We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team product...
Team leaders often provide incentives for cooperation. A challenging question is how different incen...
Leading by example and the provision of incentives are considered as two important means to influenc...
In a public goods experiment, leaders with reward or punishment power induce higher team cooperation...
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a...
From the early literature on the role of firm managers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) to the industrial ...
We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment wit...
In this dissertation, I investigate leadership in the context of a social dilemma using economic exp...
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across...
Over the past few decades, team-based incentives are used by more and more organizations to motivate...
This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the mos...
We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under ...
We examine how self-selection of workers depends on the power of incentive schemes and how it affect...
A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group coopera...
This thesis consists of three independent chapters investigating behavioural mechanisms of cooperati...
Abstract: We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team product...
Team leaders often provide incentives for cooperation. A challenging question is how different incen...
Leading by example and the provision of incentives are considered as two important means to influenc...
In a public goods experiment, leaders with reward or punishment power induce higher team cooperation...
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance and how a...
From the early literature on the role of firm managers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) to the industrial ...
We study how leader compensation affects public goods provision. We report from a lab experiment wit...
In this dissertation, I investigate leadership in the context of a social dilemma using economic exp...
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across...
Over the past few decades, team-based incentives are used by more and more organizations to motivate...
This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the mos...
We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under ...
We examine how self-selection of workers depends on the power of incentive schemes and how it affect...
A growing body of evidence suggests that punishment effectively increases and sustains group coopera...
This thesis consists of three independent chapters investigating behavioural mechanisms of cooperati...
Abstract: We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team product...