A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing
A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who v...
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across...
This is the database for the article Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. A team contest entails...
This is the database for the article Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. A team contest entails...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
Both group competition and altruistic punishment have been put forward as explanations for sustained...
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group memb...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
Abstract We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by ...
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group mem...
This paper develops a theoretical model to show the effects of simultaneously having both a competit...
In this dissertation I examine group contests for both endogenous and exogenous public goods. Three ...
A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who v...
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...
A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across...
This is the database for the article Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. A team contest entails...
This is the database for the article Reward and Punishment in a Team Contest. A team contest entails...
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a publi...
Both group competition and altruistic punishment have been put forward as explanations for sustained...
We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group memb...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
In this experimental study we analyze one individual and three collective punishment rules in a publ...
Abstract We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by ...
We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group mem...
This paper develops a theoretical model to show the effects of simultaneously having both a competit...
In this dissertation I examine group contests for both endogenous and exogenous public goods. Three ...
A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who v...
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence...
This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members h...