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A central puzzle discussed within contemporary philosophy of mind is the problem of mental causation, which raises the question of how is it possible that our mind constitutes the ultimate cause of behaviour, given that certain brain states seem to be causally sufficient for the production of the same behaviour. This problem found its contemporary canonical form in the work of Jaegwon Kim (Kim, 1998) and is known as the “causal exclusion problem”. I shall argue in this paper (section 1) that the causal exclusion problem turns out to be an argument in favour of the token identity solution to the problem of the nature of the mind/brain relation. Since ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, I shall present (section 2) the Esfeld-Sachse model of inter-theoric reduction by means of functionally defined sub-concepts. Using an example from neuropsychology (section 3), I will then show how it should be applied to the mind in order to establish systematic links between psychological and neuropsychological descriptions (section 4). For the same reason I will discuss a