Add to ORKGWe study the problem of learning from disagreeing demonstrators. We present a model that suggests how it might be possible to design an incentive-compatible mechanism that combines demonstrations from human agents who disagree on the evaluation of the demonstrated task. Apart from comonotonicity of preferences over atomic outcomes, we make no assumptions over the preferences of our demonstrators. We then suggest that a reputation mechanism is sufficient to elicit cooperative behavior from otherwise competitive human agents
Social norms can help solving cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indi...
Descriptors: coordination, autonomy, actions, beliefs Distributing authority among autonomous agents...
We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evo-lutionary environment. Agents make n...
The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural ...
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly ...
Abstract—We consider a distributed multi-user system where individual entities possess observations ...
The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to a...
In this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on co...
In two studies, we explored whether the influence of an opponent's reputation on cooperative behavio...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, pro-vide opportunit...
This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in the form of agent-based models (ABMs...
In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number o...
In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number o...
Cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature that has also been a cornerstone in the development...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
Social norms can help solving cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indi...
Descriptors: coordination, autonomy, actions, beliefs Distributing authority among autonomous agents...
We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evo-lutionary environment. Agents make n...
The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural ...
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly ...
Abstract—We consider a distributed multi-user system where individual entities possess observations ...
The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to a...
In this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on co...
In two studies, we explored whether the influence of an opponent's reputation on cooperative behavio...
Agent reporting systems, such as reputation systems and crowdsourcing platforms, pro-vide opportunit...
This paper examines lessons obtained by means of simulations in the form of agent-based models (ABMs...
In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number o...
In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make a number o...
Cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature that has also been a cornerstone in the development...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
Social norms can help solving cooperation dilemmas, constituting a key ingredient in systems of indi...
Descriptors: coordination, autonomy, actions, beliefs Distributing authority among autonomous agents...
We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evo-lutionary environment. Agents make n...