Islamistic Terror, the War on Iraq and the Job Prospects of Arab Men in Britain: Does a Country’s Direct Involvement matter? University of Lüneburg Working Paper Series in Economics No. 70 December 2007 www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers ISSN 1860 - 5508 by Nils Braakmann Islamistic Terror, the War on Iraq and the Job Prospects of Arab Men in Britain: Does a Country’s Direct Involvement Matter? Nils Braakmann∗ Leuphana University Lüneburg This version: December 20, 2007 Abstract This paper examines whether the labor market prospects of Arab men in England are inﬂuenced by recent Islamistic terrorist attacks and the war on Iraq. We use data from the British Labour Force Survey from Spring 2001 to Winter 2006 and treat the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11th, 2001, the Madrid train bombings on March 11th, 2004 and the London bombings on July 7th, 2005, as well as the beginning of the war on Iraq on March 20th, 2003, as natural experiments possibly having led to a change in attitudes toward Arab or Muslim men. Using treatment group deﬁnitions based on ethnicity, country of birth, current nationality, and religion, evidence from regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators indicates that the real wages, hours worked and employment probabilities of Arab men were unchanged by the attacks. This ﬁnding is in line with prior evidence from Europe. Keywords: Discrimination, September 11th, Islamistic terror, employment, wages JEL Classiﬁcation: J71, J79 ∗Empirical Economics, Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, braak- mann@uni.leuphana.de, Tel.: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2303, Fax: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2026 The author would like to thank Joachim Wagner for helpful hints and overall support. All calcu- lations were performed using Stata 9.2 SE (StataCorp 2005). All do-ﬁles are available from the author on request. 11 Introduction Following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 a number of studies have been concerned with the (economic) causes (e.g. Krueger and Malečková 2003, Abadie 2006, Piazza 2006, Krueger and Laitin 2007) or consequences (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, 2007, Abadie and Dermisi 2006, Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2007) of terrorism. In that literature a small but growing number of papers have been concerned with the economic consequences of the 9/11-attacks for Arabs or Muslims living in western countries.1 Directly after the attacks a number of reports collected by various organizations suggested a rise in discrimination and hostility toward persons perceived to be Arabs or Muslim (see Allen and Nielsen (2002) for Europe and the Arab American Insti- tute (2003) and the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (2003) for the US). Up to today, four studies have investigated whether this anecdotal evidence was accompanied by observable changes in the labor market prospects of Arabs or Muslims. A short overview of these studies can be found in table 1, a detailed description is provided in the following paragraphs. (Table 1 about here.) For the US, Dávila and Mora (2005) use data from the American Community Surveys and focus on the wages of younger men between 25 and 40 years of age. Using linear and quantile regression as well as decomposition techniques, they ﬁnd that the wages of men from Middle Eastern countries have been harmed most by the attacks, while less of an impact could be found for African Arabs and other Arabs relative to US-born non-Hispanics. Also focusing on the US, Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007) use regression- adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimates on Current Population Survey data to asses changes in job prospects and mobility for persons from predominantly Muslim / Arab countries relative to natives and other migrants. Their results indicate that the real wages and weekly earnings of Arab men were reduced by an amount of 9-11% as a consequence of the attacks, though this eﬀect seems to have been temporarily with a signiﬁcant rebound noted in 2005. Furthermore, they ﬁnd hints that intrastate mobility of Arab men was also reduced by the 9/11-attacks, while employment and hours worked seem to have been relatively uninﬂuenced by the attacks. For Europe, Åslund and Rooth (2005) focus on exits from unemployment for men in Sweden. They use diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators on administrative labor market data and look at the development of employment prospects of those from the Middle East relative to a number of control groups. Their ﬁndings indicate that 1There has also been some interest in the question whether other immigrant groups have been harmed in the aftermath of the 9/11-attacks, see Orrenius and Zavodny (2006). 2there has been no signiﬁcant drop in re-employment probabilities for persons from the Middle East compared to natives, people from the Nordic countries and from former Yugoslavia, Western and Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans that could be attributed to the 9/11-attacks. In a similar study for Germany, Braakmann (2007) also uses regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators on administrative data from the Federal Employ- ment Agency and Social Security. He uses various treatment and control group def- initions as well as a number of robustness checks. His ﬁndings conﬁrm the results from the study by Åslund and Rooth (2005), namely that the employment prospects of Arabs do no seem to have been harmed by the attacks. Unfortunately, the picture that emerges from these studies is far from clear. At a ﬁrst glance, there seems to be a diﬀerence between the US and Europe. However, the factors driving the diﬀerent results from these studies are not entirely obvious. A ﬁrst possible explanation is that the diﬀerences between Europe and the US might reﬂect genuine diﬀerences in the respective population’s change in attitudes towards Arabs or Muslims. The apparently stronger reaction of the US population to the attacks could then be related to the fact that the US were the direct target of the 9/11-attacks. While this explanation seems intuitively appealing, there might be other explanations: Firstly, there might be intervening factors like diﬀerences in labor market institutions. Both Sweden and Germany are highly regulated and institutionalized labor markets which would be expected to weaken the impact of a possible change in attitudes. Secondly, one might raise the question whether a diﬀerence between the US and Europe in fact exists: Both European studies focus only on employment probabilities – a variable where Kaushal, Kaestner and Reimers (2007) could also not ﬁnd an impact for the US. This study attempts to address these issues by using British labor market data for the years 2000 to 2006. First, we will look at the same labor market outcomes as Kaushal, Kaestner and Reimers (2007) – real weekly and hourly wages, hours worked and the probability of being employed – thus providing better comparative evidence between Europe and the US. Secondly, to test the idea that a country’s direct involvement in terrorist attacks might matter for explaining changes in the job prospects of Arabs or Muslims, we will use the fact that Britain was hit directly by a terrorist attack on July 7th, 2005. Finally, looking at evidence from one country over time allows us to rule out the possibility that diﬀerences in labor market institutions interfere with the results. More speciﬁcally, we will use the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11th, 2001, the Madrid train bombings on March 11th, 2004 and the London bombings on July 7th, 2005, as well as the beginning of the war on Iraq on March 20th, 2003, as natural experiments and use regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators to assess the change in the four labor market outcomes outlined above. The data used comes from the British Quarterly Labour Force Survey from Spring 2001 to Winter 2006 and allows us to gain further insight into the (possible) discrimination mechanism at work as it provides the possibility to use diﬀerent deﬁnitions for 3the treatment and control groups based on self-assessed ethnicity, country of birth, current nationality and (beginning in 2002) religion. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some background information on the events from September 2001 to July 2005. The data used is described in section 3 along with some descriptive information on the sample used. Section 4 contains a description on the econometric model whose results are found in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 2 Background This section presents a short chronological review of the events relevant in the con- text of this paper. Note that this paper does not attempt to provide an in-depth description of the time following the 9/11-attacks and in particular does not attempt to deal with the highly controversial questions surrounding the war on Iraq and the Madrid train bombings. Since this paper focuses on the impact of these events in England, we will try to provide speciﬁc information for this country where possible. The timeline starts at September 11th, 2001 when three airplanes were ﬂown into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with a fourth crashing on a ﬁeld in Pennsylvania.2 In the months directly following the attacks British media reported a rise in violent acts against Muslims and Mosques. British politicians and other public persons, including Prime Minister Tony Blair, the Prince of Wales and the Archbishop of Canterbury, issued calls for calm, tolerance, and diﬀerentiation. An exemption from these calming voices was the right-wing British National Party that launched an islamophobic campaign after the 9/11-attacks that displayed Christian- ity as being threatened by Islam. Media response seems to have been mixed with rather much time being devoted to more radical Muslims (see Allen and Nielsen 2002, pp. 29-30 for further details). In a retrospective study conducted among British Muslims between October and December 2002 that focused on diﬀerences before and after 9/11, Sheridan (2006) ﬁnds that 82.6% of the respondents reported an increase in implicit racism and religious discrimination, while 76.3% reported an increase in “general discriminatory experiences”. The 20th of March 2003 marked the beginning of the (highly disputed) war on Iraq, led by American and British Forces, that was oﬃcially aimed at ﬁnding and destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, as well as severing suspected links between the Iraqi government and islamistic terrorists. In May 2003 US President George Bush announced the oﬃcial end of the war, however, up to today a large number of American and British soldiers remain in Iraq securing a more or less fragile peace. On March 11th, 2004 the ﬁrst mayor terrorist attack by islamistic terrorists after 9/11 occurred when several bombs exploded in commuter trains in Madrid 2An in-depth description of the events on September 11th, 2001 can be found in the oﬃcial report by the “National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” (2004). 4during the morning rush hour. The attack that was initially blamed on the Basque separatist group ETA by the then ruling government under Prime Minister Aznar caused the deaths of 191 people and the injuries of over 2,000. The events on this day and their handling by the conservative government is believed to have had a mayor impact on the outcome of the Spanish election on March 14th, 2004 that brought the Socialist Workers Party under José Zapatero to power (for a recent analysis of the attack’s impact on the electoral outcomes see Montalvo 2006). On July 7th, 2005 England was hit directly by a terrorist attack, when a group of four young British-born Muslims set oﬀ four bombs in the London underground and one double-decker bus resulting in the deaths of 56 people (including the four attackers) and several hundred injuries. A similar attack on July 21st, 2005 resulted in no casualties as only the detonators of the bombs exploded. Shortly after the attacks government oﬃcials and the police issued warnings that violent reactions against the Muslim community would not be tolerated and tried to ensure that a distinction was made between the terrorists and Muslims as a whole. Nevertheless, several organizations reported a rise in incidents against Muslims and Muslim organizations issued warnings of possible negative reactions and threats, while at the same time condemning the attacks. Media responses were generally balanced with a shift towards integration issues and a possible radicalization in the Muslim communities after it became known that the attacks were conducted by British-born Muslims (for a detailed account of the events, including a full time- line and a more detailed description of the reactions in the United Kingdom, see European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2005). 3 Data The data used in this study comes from the British (Quarterly) Labour Force Survey (LFS), a survey conducted among households living at private addresses or National Health Service accommodations in the UK by the Oﬃce of National Statistics since 1973.3 The survey is collected quarterly since Spring 1992. From 1992 to May 2006 data collection took place in a seasonal pattern with surveys being conducted in winter (December to February), spring (March to May), summer (June to August) and autumn (September to November). Due to EU regulations the LFS moved to calendar quarters in May 2006 with surveys now covering the periods January to March, April to June, July to September and October to December. The current sample size is approximately 50,000 responding households in Great Britain with an additional 2,000 being added from Northern Ireland resulting in a coverage of 0.1% of the target population. Each household is surveyed in ﬁve consec- 3The data can be accessed free of charge at the “Economic and Social Data Service” after registration. See http://www.esds.ac.uk/ for further information. To facilitate replication all Stata do-ﬁles used in the analysis can be obtained from the author. 5utive quarters in a rotating panel design. Since roughly one ﬁfth of the respondents enter and leave each quarter there is an 80% overlap between two adjacent quarters. The survey is designed to provide information on the labor market status and personal situation of individuals living in the UK during a reference period, usually a speciﬁc week. The questionnaire therefore encompasses information on employment, including information on the current employer, socio-demographic characteristics, education, and wages as well as information on the respective household. Most importantly for the scope of this paper, the data contains information on a respon- dent’s ethnicity, country of birth, current nationality and religion which can be used to construct treatment and control groups. Additionally, the data provides informa- tion on a number of relevant labor market outcomes and control variables. As the data contains information on the timing of the interview and the reference week the information relates to it is also possible to assess whether a speciﬁc individual was observed before or after any of the events of interest. In this paper four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of “Arabs” or “Muslims” are considered. The ﬁrst deﬁnition is based on self-assessed ethnicity, where those individuals re- porting a “Pakistani” or “Bangladeshi” ethnicity form the treatment group. This deﬁnition is in line with ﬁndings on Islamophobia by the European Monitoring Cen- tre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006, p.17) stating that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have the highest risk of being victim of a racially motivated crime. Additionally, the majority of (migrant) Muslims in the UK originates from those two countries (Eu- ropean Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 2006, p. 22). As comparison groups we will look at individuals with a British ethnicity and those reporting any other non-white ethnicity. The second deﬁnition is based on an individual’s country of birth. The treatment group is formed by those individuals born in Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan, and all Middle East countries with the exception of Israel. As controls we use individuals born in Britain and those born in southern Africa, Asia, South America, and the Caribbean. The third deﬁnition uses the same countries, but is based on current nationality rather than country of birth. Note that we follow Kaushal, Kaestner, and Reimers (2007) in excluding Indians from the comparison groups formed by these deﬁnitions. First, Indians might be expected to look somewhat similar to Pakistani and Bangladeshi as these stem from almost the same region. Secondly, while the Indian population is predominantly Hindu, there is a strong Muslim minority which might be expected to underlie the same discriminational mechanism as the treatment group. Finally, for the fourth deﬁnition we rely on religion. The treatment group is formed by Muslims who are being compared with Christians and other religions respectively. Note that Muslims can only be identiﬁed in the data from Spring 2002 onward which means that we can only measure the impact of the beginning of the war on Iraq and the Madrid and London bombings relative to the time after 9/11. Note further that Sikhs are excluded from the control group “other religions” as 6several reports (e.g. Allen and Nielsen 2002) suggest that these were often confused with Muslims. The data used in this paper covers the time from Spring 2001, when a major revision of the ethnicity question was introduced, to Winter 2006. To minimize the impact of regional diﬀerences we focus on persons living in England and consequently exclude households with residence in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We further exclude individuals who are under 16 or over 65 years of age to restrict the sample to the working population. Finally, the estimation sample is restricted to males since case numbers for women from the treatment groups are too low to provide reliable estimates of the parameters of interest. Tables 2 and 3 display information on some key variables of the respective sam- ples. Note that there are both diﬀerences between the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the treatment group and between the respective treatment and control groups. A com- mon ﬁnding over all group deﬁnitions is that the members of the respective treat- ment groups have somewhat less favorable labor market relevant characteristics than members of the control groups. (Tables 2 and 3 about here.) 4 Econometric Model Before we outline the estimation strategy, several basic facts about the problem at hand should be noted. Interest in this paper lies in the estimation of the causal (treatment) eﬀect of recent terrorist attacks and the related war on Iraq on several labor market outcomes caused by a possible shift in attitudes towards Arabs or Muslims. Note that there is a clear theoretical one-way causality between these interventions and the outcomes of interest. Furthermore all three terrorist attacks are unexpected events that can be consid- ered natural experiments leading to an exogenous shift in attitudes towards Arabs or Muslims. The case of the Iraq war is somewhat diﬀerent: As the begin of a war is usually not completely unanticipated it might be the case that a possible change in attitudes took place at some diﬀerent point in time, e.g. after going to war was ﬁrst discussed in the public or after the ﬁrst British casualties were reported. For the scope of this paper this fact implies that care should be taken when attaching a causal interpretation to the eﬀect associated with the war. Finally, selection out of or into the treatment group can be ruled out for both ethnicity and country of birth as both are strictly exogenous variables. Religion and current nationality however can be inﬂuenced by personal decisions: Persons may decide to become naturalized or convert to some other religion to avoid discrimi- nation. However, since this paper uses all four variables to deﬁne treatment and control groups, it is possible to make a statement whether the choice of this variable inﬂuences the results. 7To model the eﬀects of the diﬀerent terrorist attacks and the beginning of the war on Iraq consider a regression-adjusted diﬀerences-in-diﬀerence estimator of the form yi = α + β 0Xi + χ ∗ di + 4 X j=1 δj ∗ tji + 4 X j=1 τj ∗ (tji ∗ di) + i (1) where yi is the respective outcome of interest, i is an error term, Xi is a matrix of control variables, di is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual belongs to the respective treatment group and tji indicates the period in which an individual was observed. More speciﬁcally, tji takes the values displayed in ﬁgure 1 that also gives an overview of the complete setup of the estimation. (Figure 1 about here.) The parameters of interest measuring the change in labor market outcomes for the treatment group after the respective event are given by τ1 to τ4 for the events from 9/11 to the London bombings respectively. Note that the setup of the period dummies implies that each τ measures the impact of the associated event relative to the preceding period – that is e.g. τ3, the parameter associated with the Madrid bombings, measures the impact of that event relative to the situation after the begin of the war on Iraq.4 For (log) hourly wages, (log) weekly wages and weekly hours worked as dependent variables equation (1) is estimated by OLS while the probability of being employed is estimated by standard Probit regression. Note that two further sample restrictions are imposed for the OLS estimations. First, the estimations are only conducted for those in employment as wages and to some extent hours worked are ill-deﬁned for the unemployed or those out of the labor force. Secondly, due to low case numbers in the treatment groups individuals working in agriculture, ﬁshing, mining, private households and extraterritorial organizations are excluded from these estimations. Xi contains information on education measured by 6 dummies, age in years and a dummy variable indicating whether the individual has health problems hindering at work, as well as occupation ﬁxed eﬀects based on sub mayor groups, regional ﬁxed eﬀects based on government regions and monthly and yearly ﬁxed eﬀects. In the wage and hours regressions we furthermore include tenure (measured by several dummies), ﬁrmsize (2 dummy variables) and industry group dummies. A central assumption of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is that both treat- ment and control groups would have experienced the same trend in the absence of the treatment. To assess the validity of this assumption, pseudo-interventions that is artiﬁcial events deﬁned to have taken place one month before the actual event of interest, e.g. August 11th, 2001 for the September 11th attacks, are used. The 4All calculations were also performed using a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimator without adjusting for possible diﬀerences in control variables. The results were not substantially diﬀerent. Detailed results can be found in the appendix. 8diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimator is then calculated using these artiﬁcial events as the actual intervention. As the interaction terms in equation (1) measure the diver- gence of trends in the treatment and control groups after the respective interventions, we would expect the coeﬃcients of the pseudo-interventions to be insigniﬁcant if the common trend assumption is valid. Note that a violation of this assumption does not necessarily invalidate the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-analysis: While diverging trends prior to the event of interest introduce bias in the coeﬃcients of interest, the direction of this bias can be seen from the estimated coeﬃcients of the pseudo-interventions. Depending on the results of the actual diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis and the di- rection of the bias it might be possible to interpret the coeﬃcients of the actual interventions as lower or upper bounds for the eﬀect of interest. (Table 4 about here.) Table 4 gives an overview of the relevant parameters for the pseudo-interventions. Note that the common trend assumption cannot be rejected for most of the treat- ment/control group pairs. The exceptions will be discussed below jointly with the main results for diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-analysis. 5 Results Consider ﬁrst the information on weekly wages shown in table 5. Note that the time dummies do not seem to indicate a large impact of any of the events of interests on the population as a whole. The associated coeﬃcients are generally either insigniﬁ- cant or (small) positive, the only exception being the time after 9/11 in one of the ethnicity speciﬁcations. Next, note that the dummies for the treatment group are always associated with a negative point estimate that is also signiﬁcant when using country of birth (regardless of the comparison group) or comparing Muslims with Christians. (Table 5 about here.) Now, turn to the parameters of interest associated with the period-group-interaction terms. Remember that Kaushal, Kraemer and Reimers (2007) found – depending on the speciﬁcation used – a 10 to 14 percent decline in weekly wages for Arab men after 9/11. A similar result, however, cannot be found for England: All coeﬃcients for the interaction term associated with 9/11 are insigniﬁcant. Additionally, all coeﬃcients have positive signs which is rather unexpected. Basically the same results can be seen for the impact of the Iraq war on the treatment group. Here again, insigniﬁcant results are obtained for all deﬁnitions of the treatment group. The associated point estimates are always positive with the 9exception of the groups deﬁned by religion where a negative, but still insigniﬁcant, impact is found. For the Madrid train bombings we ﬁnd mostly negative point estimates that are always insigniﬁcant. Note however, that the insigniﬁcance is to some extent driven by large standard errors that may disguise an otherwise large eﬀect. Finally, consider the results for the London bombings. Here, all point estimates are positive and rather large in magnitude. However, all but one are also insigniﬁcant on all conventional levels. The only signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates that the wages of Muslims have risen by approximately 12 % relative to those of Christians after the London bombings. One should keep in mind though that this counterintuitive result may be a purely statistical eﬀect related to the rather large number of signiﬁcance tests. Consider next the estimations for hourly wages shown in table 6. For this out- come Kaushal, Kraemer and Reimers (2007) found a 9 to 11 percent decline for Arab men in the US. Again, these results are not conﬁrmed for the British labor market. In fact, the pattern of results is practically identical to those obtained for weekly wages thus resulting in the same conclusions as outlined above. The only substantial diﬀerence is a now signiﬁcant and rather large wage penalty for those with Pakistani / Bangladeshi ethnicity relative to those with British ethnicity that could not be found for weekly wages. (Table 6 about here.) Now turn to the results for hours worked displayed in table 7. Consider ﬁrst the coeﬃcients for the time dummies. The point estimates show a general negative trend after 9/11 and no clear results for the remaining events. Additionally, the estimates are generally rather small for most of the treatment/control group combinations and insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. There is also no clear result for the coeﬃcient associated with the treatment group dummy: Strictly negative point estimates for all comparison groups are ob- tained for the speciﬁcation using country of birth, while the opposite result can be found when using religion. For the remaining two speciﬁcations, the results gener- ally vary with the control groups used. However, none of these results seem to hold outside the sample with all results being insigniﬁcant on conventional levels. (Table 7 about here.) The same results hold for the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms measuring the impact of the respective events of interest: While mostly positive point estimates are obtained for 9/11 and the London bombings, the signs of the remaining coeﬃ- cients tend to vary unsystematically with the treatment/control group combination. However, none of them is signiﬁcant on any conventional level. One should note 10at this point that this result is similar to those obtained by Kaushal, Kraemer and Reimers (2007) who also did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the 9/11 attacks on workings hours. Finally, consider the results from the Probit estimation of the employment prob- ability shown in table 8. Here, we ﬁnd negative point estimates associated with the 9/11 attacks in all speciﬁcations. This eﬀect is also signiﬁcant on conventional levels when using the respective native groups as controls. The results for the next two period dummies are less clear cut: The point esti- mates have varying signs for the periods after the beginning of the Iraq war and the Madrid train attacks. For the period following the London bombings we obtain neg- ative point estimates over all speciﬁcations. However, none of the above mentioned eﬀects is signiﬁcant on any conventional level. The treatment group dummy in this set of estimations is always associated with a negative impact, thus indicating a lower employment probability of Arabs or Muslims compared with any other group. (Table 8 about here.) The results for the interaction terms are again mixed: For the 9/11-attacks and the begin of the Iraq war we usually obtain positive point estimates that are insigniﬁcant on all conventional levels. The only exception is found for those born in an Arab country compared with natives where the point estimate is negative though still insigniﬁcant. For the Madrid train bombings we ﬁnd positive point estimates in the speciﬁcations using ethnicity and country of birth and negative point estimates when using current nationality and religion. Again non of these eﬀects is signiﬁcant on any conventional levels. Furthermore, for two of the negative point estimates, Arabs contrasted with those with a British/UK nationality in the case of current nationality and Muslims vs. other religions in the case of religion, the pseudo-interventions indicated pre-existing negative trends that may have inﬂuenced the negative point estimates. Finally, for the London bombings we obtain almost exclusively positive, though insigniﬁcant point estimates. The only exception, a highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect found in the speciﬁcation using those with an Arab nationality compared with those with a British/UK nationality, is most likely caused by a pre-existing positive trend that was found using the pseudo-interventions. Taken together, our results imply that the job prospects of Arab men in Eng- land have not been signiﬁcantly harmed by either the three mayor terrorist attacks conducted by islamistic terrorists after 2000 or by the beginning of the Iraq war. Furthermore, the results indicate that a country’s direct involvement in acts of ter- rorism, in our case the London bombings of 2005, does not seem to cause a rise in discrimination. The latter ﬁnding is in line with a report by the European Monitor- ing Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2005) that also did not ﬁnd a lasting eﬀect of the attacks. 116 Conclusion This paper uses data from the British Labour Force Survey for the years 2001 to 2006 and regression-adjusted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences-estimators to gain further in- sight into the question whether islamistic terrorism is harmful for the job prospects of Arabs or Muslims living in Western countries. More speciﬁcally, this paper uses the fact that England was hit “indirectly” by the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in 2001 and the Madrid trains bombings in 2004 and “di- rectly” by the bomb attacks in London in 2005 to provide an answer to the question whether a country’s direct involvement in acts of terrorism inﬂuences the labor market prospects of those possibly associated with the terrorists. Furthermore, this paper uses for the ﬁrst time the same outcome variables as previous US studies thus allowing to decide whether diﬀerences between the US and Europe found in these studies can be explained by diﬀerent choices of the dependent variables. Finally, this paper is the ﬁrst to use treatment group deﬁnitions based on more than one variable, in this case ethnicity, country of birth, current nationality and religion, to gain further insight into the question against which group a possible discrimination is directed. Our results indicate that neither of the attacks inﬂuenced the wages, the working hours or the employment probability of Arab or Muslim men in England. In par- ticular, the fact that the labor market prospects of Arabs remain unchanged after the London bomb attacks indicate that a country’s direct involvement in acts of terrorism does – at least in this particular case – not seem to have a large impact on the discrimination of Arabs. This result is stable over all deﬁnitions of the treatment and control groups used. It also conﬁrms the evidence from prior studies for Sweden (Åslund and Rooth 2005) and Germany (Braakmann 2007) that found no evidence for an increase in discrimination after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. Furthermore, it is in line with the reports from the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (2005, 2006) that pointed towards no (lasting) impacts of the terrorist attacks. Regarding the diﬀerences between the US and Europe found in previous studies, the results indicate that these diﬀerences were not merely a result of the choice of diﬀerent outcomes. Furthermore, the diﬀerences cannot solely be explained by the fact that the US were the (only) direct target of the attacks. However, a possible explanation for the apparently much stronger reaction in the US might be the dif- ferent scale of the attacks. While the attacks in London (and Madrid) were some of the largest terrorist attacks in Europe, both were smaller than 9/11 in terms of casualties and none of them had the massive impact on the public opinion that 9/11 had. 127 Bibliography 1. Abadie, Alberto, 2006: “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terror- ism”, American Economic Review 96(2): 50-56. 2. Abadie, Alberto and Soﬁa Dermisi, 2006: “Is terrorism eroding agglomera- tion economies in central business districts? Lessons from the oﬃce real es- tate market in downtown Chicago”. 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StataCorp, 2005: “Stata Statistical Software: Release 9.2”, StataCorp LP: College Station. 148 Appendix 8.1 Results and Tables Table 1: Impact of 9/11 on labor market prospects of Arabs: previ- ous evidence Study Country Treatment / Control groups Outcome Results Dávila, Mora (2005) US based on country of birth: hourly wages large wage penalty for Middle US-born white non-Hispanics Eastern Arabs (more than 20%), vs. Middle-East Arab men, less for Afghan, Pakistani, vs. African Arab men Iranian men, no eﬀect for African vs. Iranian, Pakistani, Afghan men Arabs Kaushal, Kaestner, US US-born (excluding Asians), weekly wages weekly and hourly wages reduced by Reimers (2007) other immigrants (1st and 2nd hourly wages approx. 9-11% by 9/11, evidence for generation) vs. 1st and 2nd hours worked temporary decline, no eﬀect generation immigrants from variety employment on hours worked and employment, of “Arab” countries intrastate mobility intrastate mobility was reduced Åslund, Rooth Sweden based on country of birth: exits from no eﬀect for any group relative to (2005) Middle East, Sweden, other Nordic unemployment any other countries, Western, Eastern Europe Former Yugoslavia, Latin America, Asia, Africa Braakmann (2007) Germany based on current and past nationality: exits from no eﬀect for any treatment group Arab countries, Arab countries + Turkey unemployment compared to any control group vs. Germans, vs. Central Europeans, vs. South Europeans, vs. East Europeans vs. South-East Europeans, vs. South Americans Americans, vs. Southern Africans 15Figure 1: Overview of observation period and period dummies The lowest black bar marks the observation period ranging from January 2001 to December 2006. The top four bars show the periods where the respective period dummy takes the value “1”. The dates of the events of interest are marked by the dashed lines. 16T a b l e 2 : D e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s b y g r o u p ( e t h n i c i t y a n d c o u n t r y o f b i r t h ) V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h A r a b B r i t i s h O t h e r n o n - w h i t e A r a b c o u n t r y B r i t a i n / U K O t h e r n o n - E u r o p e a n E m p l o y e d ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 7 2 8 0 . 4 6 7 3 0 . 2 8 8 1 0 . 1 5 8 5 0 . 4 6 3 5 0 . 3 8 4 3 0 . 3 7 8 1 0 . 4 9 8 9 0 . 4 5 2 9 0 . 3 6 5 3 0 . 4 9 8 7 0 . 4 8 6 5 H o u r l y r e a l w a g e 9 . 8 7 7 3 1 1 . 6 3 2 5 1 0 . 5 8 8 6 1 0 . 6 3 8 8 1 1 . 5 8 6 9 1 3 . 0 1 0 7 7 . 0 1 9 3 7 . 5 4 4 5 6 . 6 9 0 6 7 . 4 9 8 0 7 . 4 8 8 5 9 . 4 2 3 2 A c t u a l h o u r s w o r k e d ( w e e k ) 4 0 . 6 5 1 9 4 2 . 8 6 6 3 4 1 . 9 6 5 0 4 2 . 0 4 6 7 4 2 . 8 2 9 3 4 2 . 9 2 5 6 1 3 . 7 2 1 3 1 3 . 2 0 4 5 1 4 . 0 9 3 9 1 3 . 5 7 1 5 1 3 . 2 2 5 5 1 4 . 0 0 4 1 R e a l w e e k l y w a g e 4 0 2 . 0 5 2 8 4 7 6 . 0 0 8 9 4 3 8 . 7 4 4 4 4 3 2 . 4 8 9 1 4 7 4 . 1 8 8 8 5 3 2 . 1 7 5 5 2 8 1 . 3 3 9 9 2 8 6 . 7 9 0 3 2 6 6 . 9 3 8 3 2 9 6 . 0 8 4 7 2 8 4 . 9 5 0 9 3 6 7 . 8 8 7 0 A g e i n y e a r s 3 6 . 3 2 9 7 4 3 . 0 2 6 2 3 7 . 5 0 2 5 3 9 . 5 2 4 0 4 2 . 6 7 7 6 3 9 . 4 6 5 2 1 2 . 3 0 5 4 1 4 . 0 1 5 3 1 2 . 0 3 4 9 1 1 . 7 6 8 7 1 4 . 0 8 2 7 1 1 . 9 7 9 4 M a r r i e d / c o h a b i t i n g ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 7 1 9 7 0 . 6 5 5 4 0 . 4 7 8 5 0 . 7 3 7 4 0 . 6 4 6 8 0 . 6 2 6 1 0 . 4 4 9 2 0 . 4 7 5 2 0 . 4 9 9 6 0 . 4 4 0 1 0 . 4 7 8 0 0 . 4 8 3 9 N o . o f c h i l d r e n u n d e r 1 6 1 . 4 9 0 0 0 . 5 0 7 5 0 . 6 2 2 2 1 . 3 4 7 1 0 . 5 1 0 5 0 . 6 5 1 6 1 . 5 4 1 8 0 . 9 1 7 9 1 . 0 0 4 9 1 . 5 2 6 8 0 . 9 2 0 6 1 . 0 1 3 1 D e g r e e o r e q u i v a l e n t ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 0 9 6 0 . 1 7 7 8 0 . 1 8 3 5 0 . 1 2 6 2 0 . 1 7 6 1 0 . 2 6 0 1 0 . 3 1 2 5 0 . 3 8 2 4 0 . 3 8 7 1 0 . 3 3 2 2 0 . 3 8 0 9 0 . 4 3 8 8 H i g h e r e d u c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 3 8 6 0 . 0 8 1 1 0 . 0 6 4 2 0 . 0 4 4 7 0 . 0 8 0 6 0 . 0 7 3 2 0 . 1 9 2 7 0 . 2 7 3 0 0 . 2 4 5 2 0 . 2 0 6 7 0 . 2 7 2 2 0 . 2 6 0 5 G C S E g r a d e s A * - C o r e q u i v a l e n t ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 1 5 9 0 . 1 8 2 3 0 . 1 5 5 7 0 . 0 6 3 1 0 . 1 8 5 3 0 . 0 8 3 6 0 . 3 2 0 1 0 . 3 8 6 1 0 . 3 6 2 6 0 . 2 4 3 2 0 . 3 8 8 5 0 . 2 7 6 8 O t h e r q u a l i ﬁ c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 4 5 4 0 . 1 2 3 5 0 . 2 5 3 7 0 . 3 2 5 7 0 . 1 2 2 4 0 . 3 0 6 8 0 . 4 3 0 4 0 . 3 2 9 0 0 . 4 3 5 2 0 . 4 6 8 7 0 . 3 2 7 7 0 . 4 6 1 2 N o q u a l i ﬁ c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 3 6 8 4 0 . 1 3 5 3 0 . 1 3 6 1 0 . 3 5 2 0 0 . 1 3 5 1 0 . 1 1 1 1 0 . 4 8 2 5 0 . 3 4 2 0 0 . 3 4 2 9 0 . 4 7 7 7 0 . 3 4 1 9 0 . 3 1 4 3 H e a l t h p r o b l e m h i n d e r i n g a t w o r k ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 3 1 8 5 0 . 2 5 4 6 0 . 1 8 6 5 0 . 3 4 5 2 0 . 2 5 3 0 0 . 1 8 8 6 0 . 4 6 6 0 0 . 4 3 5 6 0 . 3 8 9 5 0 . 4 7 5 5 0 . 4 3 4 7 0 . 3 9 1 2 T e n u r e 3 t o 6 m o n t h s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 5 0 5 0 . 0 3 7 6 0 . 0 5 2 1 0 . 0 4 5 0 0 . 0 3 7 6 0 . 0 4 7 2 0 . 2 1 9 2 0 . 1 9 0 3 0 . 2 2 2 4 0 . 2 0 7 6 0 . 1 9 0 2 0 . 2 1 2 2 T e n u r e 6 t o 1 2 m o n t h s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 8 6 5 0 . 0 6 8 6 0 . 0 7 9 4 0 . 0 9 4 8 0 . 0 6 8 7 0 . 0 9 3 4 0 . 2 8 1 5 0 . 2 5 2 8 0 . 2 7 0 5 0 . 2 9 3 3 0 . 2 5 3 0 0 . 2 9 1 0 T e n u r e 1 t o 2 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 . 1 0 4 9 0 . 1 4 3 5 0 . 1 4 6 9 0 . 1 0 5 1 0 . 1 4 0 1 0 . 3 7 0 2 0 . 3 0 6 5 0 . 3 5 0 8 0 . 3 5 4 4 0 . 3 0 6 7 0 . 3 4 7 1 T e n u r e 2 t o 5 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 3 1 9 7 0 . 2 1 6 8 0 . 2 6 6 2 0 . 2 8 9 1 0 . 2 1 7 6 0 . 2 6 4 7 0 . 4 6 6 9 0 . 4 1 2 1 0 . 4 4 2 2 0 . 4 5 3 9 0 . 4 1 2 6 0 . 4 4 1 3 T e n u r e 5 t o 1 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 3 9 4 0 . 1 7 9 9 0 . 1 8 4 4 0 . 1 6 3 5 0 . 1 8 0 2 0 . 1 6 6 6 0 . 3 4 6 8 0 . 3 8 4 1 0 . 3 8 8 0 0 . 3 7 0 3 0 . 3 8 4 4 0 . 3 7 2 7 T e n u r e 1 0 t o 2 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 4 6 6 0 . 2 1 2 4 0 . 1 7 4 8 0 . 1 4 2 2 0 . 2 1 2 6 0 . 1 5 9 7 0 . 3 5 4 2 0 . 4 0 9 0 0 . 3 8 0 0 0 . 3 4 9 6 0 . 4 0 9 1 0 . 3 6 6 4 T e n u r e m o r e t h e n 2 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 4 5 7 0 . 1 4 8 1 0 . 0 6 1 7 0 . 0 7 5 8 0 . 1 4 6 6 0 . 0 8 3 3 0 . 2 0 9 0 0 . 3 5 5 2 0 . 2 4 0 8 0 . 2 6 5 0 0 . 3 5 3 7 0 . 2 7 6 4 F i r m s i z e < 2 5 e m p l o y e e s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 2 1 2 0 . 2 4 6 8 0 . 2 1 4 9 0 . 2 2 9 9 0 . 2 4 6 8 0 . 2 1 5 4 0 . 4 1 5 5 0 . 4 3 1 1 0 . 4 1 0 9 0 . 4 2 1 2 0 . 4 3 1 1 0 . 4 1 1 2 F i r m s i z e > 5 0 0 e m p l o y e e s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 8 2 7 0 . 1 5 7 2 0 . 2 2 4 5 0 . 1 8 2 5 0 . 1 5 7 1 0 . 2 3 4 5 0 . 3 8 6 9 0 . 3 6 4 0 0 . 4 1 7 4 0 . 3 8 6 7 0 . 3 6 3 9 0 . 4 2 3 8 N o . o f c a s e s 2 , 4 0 8 1 3 0 , 0 7 3 4 , 3 2 8 2 , 6 6 2 1 3 2 , 5 2 3 4 , 9 0 5 - E m p l o y e d 4 1 6 6 0 , 7 7 8 1 , 2 4 7 4 2 2 6 1 , 4 2 4 1 , 8 8 5 - w i t h w a g e i n f o r m a t i o n 4 0 1 5 8 , 6 3 7 1 , 2 0 4 4 0 1 5 9 , 2 3 3 1 , 8 0 0 M e a n s , s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n b e l o w . W a g e s h a v e b e e n d e ﬂ a t e d t o 2 0 0 0 p r i c e s u s i n g t h e B r i t i s h R e t a i l P r i c e I n d e x . 17T a b l e 3 : D e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s b y g r o u p ( C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y a n d r e l i g i o n ) V a r i a b l e C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n A r a b B r i t i s h O t h e r n o n - E u r o p e a n M u s l i m C h r i s t i a n O t h e r ( n o n S i k h ) E m p l o y e d ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 2 2 9 0 . 4 5 9 5 0 . 3 1 7 4 0 . 1 7 9 6 0 . 4 5 7 3 0 . 3 7 1 7 0 . 3 2 8 5 0 . 4 9 8 4 0 . 4 6 5 6 0 . 3 8 3 9 0 . 4 9 8 2 0 . 4 8 3 4 H o u r l y r e a l w a g e 9 . 0 8 8 0 1 1 . 6 4 6 7 1 1 . 7 0 8 6 1 0 . 3 4 2 9 1 1 . 8 2 7 5 1 3 . 1 3 3 8 6 . 6 1 0 4 7 . 5 5 4 3 9 . 1 6 5 3 6 . 8 8 6 7 7 . 6 1 5 1 8 . 6 6 0 5 A c t u a l h o u r s w o r k e d ( w e e k ) 4 2 . 3 1 8 6 4 2 . 8 3 3 0 4 3 . 5 3 3 0 4 2 . 0 9 5 3 4 2 . 8 3 4 5 4 2 . 2 1 5 3 1 3 . 8 0 5 1 1 3 . 2 4 6 5 1 3 . 9 6 3 2 1 4 . 1 6 8 2 1 3 . 1 3 6 7 1 3 . 5 9 3 4 R e a l w e e k l y w a g e 3 7 6 . 4 8 7 8 4 7 6 . 4 7 5 3 4 8 8 . 6 4 8 1 4 2 4 . 2 3 5 1 4 8 3 . 8 2 0 1 5 2 0 . 3 6 7 8 2 6 3 . 5 8 8 3 2 8 7 . 7 8 4 5 3 5 7 . 6 6 5 9 2 7 7 . 1 4 9 1 2 8 9 . 2 7 8 1 3 4 6 . 2 6 1 6 A g e i n y e a r s 3 4 . 1 6 7 5 4 2 . 7 6 4 8 3 5 . 2 7 5 7 3 7 . 1 2 1 8 4 4 . 6 0 6 3 4 1 . 0 6 0 3 9 . 6 4 0 1 1 4 . 0 1 1 6 1 0 . 5 3 1 8 1 1 . 9 5 9 3 1 3 . 7 5 4 1 1 3 . 6 8 2 6 M a r r i e d / c o h a b i t i n g ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 6 0 3 6 0 . 6 5 0 8 0 . 5 5 0 9 0 . 6 5 3 0 0 . 6 6 5 4 0 . 5 5 6 4 0 . 4 8 9 4 0 . 4 7 6 7 0 . 4 9 7 5 0 . 4 7 6 1 0 . 4 7 1 8 0 . 4 9 7 0 N o . o f c h i l d r e n u n d e r 1 6 1 . 0 2 6 8 0 . 5 2 6 3 0 . 6 4 5 9 1 . 2 2 6 4 0 . 4 7 4 5 0 . 4 8 3 5 1 . 2 8 8 0 0 . 9 4 0 8 1 . 0 1 2 9 1 . 4 5 7 5 0 . 8 8 8 1 1 . 0 0 3 8 D e g r e e o r e q u i v a l e n t ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 0 3 1 0 . 1 7 8 7 0 . 1 9 3 4 0 . 1 2 4 5 0 . 1 7 0 8 0 . 2 6 6 5 0 . 3 0 4 2 0 . 3 8 3 1 0 . 3 9 5 1 0 . 3 3 0 1 0 . 3 7 6 3 0 . 4 4 2 3 H i g h e r e d u c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 3 6 7 0 . 0 8 0 2 0 . 0 6 3 5 0 . 0 3 9 5 0 . 0 8 4 2 0 . 0 9 8 7 0 . 1 8 8 0 0 . 2 7 1 7 0 . 2 4 3 9 0 . 1 9 4 9 0 . 2 7 7 6 0 . 2 9 8 4 G C S E g r a d e s A * - C o r e q u i v a l e n t ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 3 1 7 0 . 1 8 1 6 0 . 0 5 7 5 0 . 0 9 9 9 0 . 1 7 5 9 0 . 1 5 9 9 0 . 1 7 5 3 0 . 3 8 5 5 0 . 2 3 2 9 0 . 2 9 9 8 0 . 3 8 0 8 0 . 3 6 6 6 O t h e r q u a l i ﬁ c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 4 6 6 8 0 . 1 2 6 6 0 . 4 3 8 4 0 . 2 9 9 3 0 . 1 3 2 3 0 . 1 3 0 9 0 . 4 9 9 1 0 . 3 3 2 5 0 . 4 9 6 3 0 . 4 5 8 0 0 . 3 3 8 9 0 . 3 3 7 4 N o q u a l i ﬁ c a t i o n ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 9 4 4 0 . 1 3 8 3 0 . 1 1 8 0 0 . 3 1 4 5 0 . 1 3 5 4 0 . 1 0 8 9 0 . 4 5 6 0 0 . 3 4 5 2 0 . 3 2 2 7 0 . 4 6 4 4 0 . 3 4 2 2 0 . 3 1 1 7 H e a l t h p r o b l e m h i n d e r i n g a t w o r k ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 6 0 7 0 . 2 5 5 6 0 . 1 2 4 8 0 . 3 0 8 9 0 . 2 6 9 5 0 . 2 6 1 0 0 . 4 3 9 2 0 . 4 3 6 2 0 . 3 3 0 6 0 . 4 6 2 1 0 . 4 4 3 7 0 . 4 3 9 3 T e n u r e 3 t o 6 m o n t h s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 0 4 8 0 . 0 3 7 8 0 . 0 5 6 4 0 . 0 4 9 2 0 . 0 3 5 0 0 . 0 4 0 2 0 . 3 0 7 6 0 . 1 9 0 6 0 . 2 3 0 8 0 . 2 1 6 4 0 . 1 8 3 9 0 . 1 9 6 6 T e n u r e 6 t o 1 2 m o n t h s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 2 1 0 0 . 0 6 8 4 0 . 1 4 3 6 0 . 0 8 0 3 0 . 0 6 5 7 0 . 0 6 7 7 0 . 3 2 7 4 0 . 2 5 2 5 0 . 3 5 0 9 0 . 2 7 2 0 0 . 2 4 7 8 0 . 2 5 1 4 T e n u r e 1 t o 2 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 5 8 1 0 . 1 0 4 9 0 . 1 9 4 6 0 . 1 2 4 6 0 . 0 9 9 9 0 . 1 2 0 5 0 . 4 3 9 3 0 . 3 0 6 4 0 . 3 9 6 2 0 . 3 3 0 5 0 . 2 9 9 9 0 . 3 2 5 9 T e n u r e 2 t o 5 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 3 1 4 5 0 . 2 1 8 4 0 . 3 1 4 1 0 . 3 4 5 9 0 . 2 1 4 0 0 . 2 3 2 6 0 . 4 6 6 2 0 . 4 1 3 2 0 . 4 6 4 5 0 . 4 7 6 1 0 . 4 1 0 1 0 . 4 2 2 9 T e n u r e 5 t o 1 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 6 4 5 0 . 1 8 0 4 0 . 1 2 6 2 0 . 1 7 3 8 0 . 1 8 1 5 0 . 2 0 9 3 0 . 2 4 6 7 0 . 3 8 4 6 0 . 3 3 2 3 0 . 3 7 9 2 0 . 3 8 5 5 0 . 4 0 7 2 T e n u r e 1 0 t o 2 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 7 2 6 0 . 2 1 2 5 0 . 0 7 7 9 0 . 1 3 9 3 0 . 2 1 4 7 0 . 1 7 1 2 0 . 2 6 0 5 0 . 4 0 9 1 0 . 2 6 8 1 0 . 3 4 6 6 0 . 4 1 0 6 0 . 3 7 7 1 T e n u r e m o r e t h e n 2 0 y e a r s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 0 1 6 1 0 . 1 4 5 8 0 . 0 3 0 9 0 . 0 4 4 3 0 . 1 5 9 9 0 . 1 1 4 2 0 . 1 2 6 5 0 . 3 5 2 9 0 . 1 7 3 1 0 . 2 0 5 8 0 . 3 6 6 6 0 . 3 1 8 3 F i r m s i z e < 2 5 e m p l o y e e s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 5 8 1 0 . 2 4 5 1 0 . 2 1 6 1 0 . 1 9 5 1 0 . 2 4 3 5 0 . 2 6 6 4 0 . 4 3 9 3 0 . 4 3 0 1 0 . 4 1 1 9 0 . 3 9 6 6 0 . 4 2 9 2 0 . 4 4 2 5 F i r m s i z e > 5 0 0 e m p l o y e e s ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 1 2 9 0 0 . 1 6 0 0 0 . 2 2 6 8 0 . 2 8 5 2 0 . 2 0 1 9 0 . 2 4 3 1 0 . 3 3 6 6 0 . 3 6 6 6 0 . 4 1 9 1 0 . 4 5 1 9 0 . 4 0 1 4 0 . 4 2 9 4 N o . o f c a s e s 1 , 0 0 9 1 3 9 , 7 1 6 2 , 3 4 7 3 , 4 1 5 8 1 , 0 6 7 1 , 2 7 6 - E m p l o y e d 1 2 4 6 4 , 0 1 9 7 4 5 6 1 0 3 6 , 9 8 3 4 7 3 - w i t h w a g e i n f o r m a t i o n 1 1 6 6 1 , 7 1 6 7 1 5 5 7 4 3 5 , 1 6 7 4 4 9 M e a n s , s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n b e l o w . W a g e s h a v e b e e n d e ﬂ a t e d t o 2 0 0 0 p r i c e s u s i n g t h e B r i t i s h R e t a i l P r i c e I n d e x . 18T a b l e 4 : I m p a c t o f p s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n s G r o u p s d e ﬁ n e d b y : V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n v s . B r i t i s h v s . n o n - w h i t e v s . B r i t i s h - b o r n v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . B r i t a i n / U K v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . C h r i s t i a n s v s . o t h e r r e l i g i o n W e e k l y w a g e s : P e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h 0 . 0 8 7 0 0 . 2 7 5 3 * 0 . 0 4 2 1 0 . 1 7 2 1 0 . 4 0 7 6 0 . 4 7 4 8 ( 0 . 1 2 8 9 ) ( 0 . 1 3 6 6 ) ( 0 . 1 0 6 7 ) ( 0 . 1 1 6 2 ) ( 0 . 3 8 0 1 ) ( 0 . 4 0 0 0 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n w a r o n I r a q 0 . 0 2 6 0 - 0 . 0 1 6 9 0 . 0 3 2 8 0 . 0 3 2 5 0 . 1 3 5 0 0 . 1 1 0 2 - 0 . 0 4 6 6 - 0 . 1 6 3 3 ( 0 . 0 6 9 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 5 9 ) ( 0 . 0 7 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 9 7 ) ( 0 . 1 1 6 3 ) ( 0 . 1 4 4 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 5 2 ) ( 0 . 0 9 3 7 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n M a d r i d B o m b i n g s - 0 . 0 5 3 7 - 0 . 0 5 1 2 - 0 . 0 5 1 5 - 0 . 0 1 4 2 - 0 . 1 0 7 0 0 . 0 6 5 5 - 0 . 0 2 7 0 0 . 0 6 8 6 ( 0 . 0 7 2 5 ) ( 0 . 0 8 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 7 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 9 7 ) ( 0 . 1 3 7 6 ) ( 0 . 1 4 4 8 ) ( 0 . 0 5 2 1 ) ( 0 . 0 8 1 1 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n L o n d o n B o m b i n g s 0 . 0 8 1 0 0 . 0 7 4 0 0 . 0 7 9 3 0 . 0 3 3 3 0 . 1 7 6 4 0 . 0 6 4 0 0 . 0 9 1 9 - 0 . 0 0 9 3 ( 0 . 0 7 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 7 7 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 5 2 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 2 ) ( 0 . 1 3 8 1 ) ( 0 . 1 3 5 4 ) ( 0 . 0 5 1 4 ) ( 0 . 0 8 0 2 ) H o u r l y w a g e s : P e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h 0 . 1 5 2 8 0 . 2 5 6 5 0 . 1 1 3 9 0 . 2 3 3 9 * 0 . 4 6 1 6 0 . 4 6 6 4 ( 0 . 1 3 0 5 ) ( 0 . 1 3 6 0 ) ( 0 . 1 0 9 3 ) ( 0 . 1 1 6 9 ) ( 0 . 3 8 2 6 ) ( 0 . 3 9 3 6 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n w a r o n I r a q 0 . 0 2 4 5 - 0 . 0 1 6 0 0 . 0 4 0 7 0 . 0 3 0 0 0 . 0 8 5 9 0 . 0 8 4 4 - 0 . 0 6 8 4 - 0 . 1 8 8 4 * ( 0 . 0 6 3 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 0 ) ( 0 . 0 6 1 2 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 0 ) ( 0 . 1 0 4 4 ) ( 0 . 1 3 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 5 9 4 ) ( 0 . 0 8 6 5 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n M a d r i d B o m b i n g s - 0 . 0 4 3 1 - 0 . 0 3 8 3 - 0 . 0 6 9 5 - 0 . 0 4 0 6 - 0 . 0 7 2 1 - 0 . 0 1 5 4 - 0 . 0 1 1 3 0 . 0 6 1 8 ( 0 . 0 6 6 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 4 6 ) ( 0 . 0 6 2 3 ) ( 0 . 0 7 3 0 ) ( 0 . 1 3 4 6 ) ( 0 . 1 4 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 1 ) ( 0 . 0 7 7 1 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n L o n d o n B o m b i n g s 0 . 0 9 4 6 0 . 1 1 0 2 0 . 0 9 1 4 0 . 0 6 5 9 0 . 1 4 2 1 0 . 0 9 4 7 0 . 1 3 0 9 * * 0 . 0 6 5 1 ( 0 . 0 6 6 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 4 5 ) ( 0 . 0 6 3 7 ) ( 0 . 0 7 0 0 ) ( 0 . 1 4 8 6 ) ( 0 . 1 4 4 9 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 9 ) ( 0 . 0 7 3 3 ) A c t u a l h o u r s w o r k e d : P e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h - 2 . 4 4 1 3 1 . 5 0 8 6 - 1 . 9 2 6 3 - 0 . 1 6 3 1 0 . 3 6 8 5 0 . 7 9 8 6 ( 1 . 8 9 1 4 ) ( 2 . 4 6 6 1 ) ( 1 . 6 6 1 6 ) ( 2 . 3 0 9 5 ) ( 2 . 9 3 5 6 ) ( 3 . 6 4 5 3 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n w a r o n I r a q 0 . 4 0 6 6 1 . 7 6 0 3 - 0 . 4 8 6 3 0 . 9 4 7 4 3 . 2 5 1 6 4 . 6 4 7 2 - 0 . 7 0 5 2 - 2 . 4 0 5 9 ( 1 . 9 5 3 7 ) ( 2 . 3 4 3 3 ) ( 1 . 9 4 9 9 ) ( 2 . 2 0 4 1 ) ( 3 . 6 5 8 6 ) ( 4 . 0 8 9 0 ) ( 1 . 6 7 2 3 ) ( 2 . 7 1 3 6 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n M a d r i d B o m b i n g s - 2 . 1 5 5 7 - 3 . 6 0 1 3 - 0 . 5 4 7 5 - 1 . 1 8 7 3 - 0 . 5 3 0 9 2 . 5 7 6 5 - 0 . 3 6 7 2 2 . 3 3 2 4 ( 1 . 9 3 7 5 ) ( 2 . 4 1 5 9 ) ( 2 . 0 6 7 3 ) ( 2 . 3 5 7 1 ) ( 4 . 4 0 0 1 ) ( 4 . 6 0 4 0 ) ( 1 . 4 6 1 2 ) ( 2 . 6 3 9 9 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n L o n d o n B o m b i n g s 0 . 8 1 3 5 0 . 2 0 6 1 0 . 7 3 2 9 - 0 . 1 7 7 0 - 1 . 6 2 0 8 - 4 . 1 4 8 6 0 . 7 2 9 5 - 0 . 6 8 5 9 ( 1 . 8 2 6 8 ) ( 2 . 2 4 1 4 ) ( 1 . 9 1 7 2 ) ( 2 . 1 6 1 2 ) ( 3 . 7 7 6 9 ) ( 3 . 8 9 9 7 ) ( 1 . 4 6 2 2 ) ( 2 . 3 8 2 1 ) P r o b a b i l i t y o f e m p l o y m e n t : P e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n S e p t e m b e r 1 1 t h 0 . 0 6 2 8 0 . 1 2 7 6 - 0 . 0 0 1 6 0 . 0 8 4 4 0 . 3 6 7 9 0 . 3 8 3 1 ( 0 . 1 5 4 8 ) ( 0 . 1 7 3 2 ) ( 0 . 1 4 2 2 ) ( 0 . 1 6 1 4 ) ( 0 . 2 4 8 1 ) ( 0 . 2 7 9 7 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n w a r o n I r a q 0 . 1 3 1 6 0 . 2 0 4 0 0 . 0 1 1 5 0 . 1 1 8 1 0 . 1 8 8 3 0 . 2 3 1 5 0 . 0 7 5 3 0 . 2 7 2 3 ( 0 . 1 1 2 3 ) ( 0 . 1 3 2 9 ) ( 0 . 1 0 9 2 ) ( 0 . 1 2 8 4 ) ( 0 . 1 8 1 0 ) ( 0 . 2 0 2 9 ) ( 0 . 0 9 9 3 ) ( 0 . 1 6 4 0 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n M a d r i d B o m b i n g s 0 . 0 1 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 5 0 . 0 2 4 3 - 0 . 0 3 3 2 - 0 . 4 6 0 9 * - 0 . 4 3 6 8 - 0 . 1 0 9 1 - 0 . 3 6 1 4 * ( 0 . 1 2 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 4 2 8 ) ( 0 . 1 1 5 1 ) ( 0 . 1 3 5 8 ) ( 0 . 2 0 1 3 ) ( 0 . 2 3 1 9 ) ( 0 . 0 8 8 4 ) ( 0 . 1 5 4 6 ) P s e u d o - i n t e r v e n t i o n L o n d o n B o m b i n g s 0 . 0 3 2 2 0 . 0 0 3 2 0 . 1 4 8 5 0 . 0 0 7 7 0 . 5 0 8 2 * * 0 . 2 4 7 5 0 . 0 9 2 1 0 . 1 4 2 1 ( 0 . 1 0 9 7 ) ( 0 . 1 3 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 0 5 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 1 9 ) ( 0 . 1 9 6 2 ) ( 0 . 2 2 2 3 ) ( 0 . 0 8 1 2 ) ( 0 . 1 4 1 8 ) C o e ﬃ c i e n t s , r o b u s t s t a n d a r d - e r r o r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s . * * * / * * / * d e n o t e s i g n i ﬁ c a n c e o n t h e 0 . 1 % , 1 % , a n d 5 % l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . 19T a b l e 5 : P a r a m e t e r s o f i n t e r e s t : I m p a c t o n r e a l w e e k l y w a g e s , O L S e s t i m a t e s G r o u p s d e ﬁ n e d b y : V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n v s . B r i t i s h v s . n o n - w h i t e v s . B r i t i s h - b o r n v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . B r i t a i n / U K v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . C h r i s t i a n s v s . o t h e r r e l i g i o n O b s e r v e d a f t e r 9 / 1 1 0 . 0 3 4 6 * * * - 0 . 1 8 9 4 * 0 . 0 3 1 3 * * * - 0 . 1 1 7 0 0 . 0 2 8 8 * * - 0 . 1 7 4 7 ( 0 . 0 0 9 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 5 3 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 5 ) ( 0 . 0 6 4 8 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 4 ) ( 0 . 1 2 7 4 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 1 7 - 0 . 0 7 1 8 0 . 0 0 2 3 0 . 0 4 2 5 0 . 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 4 0 0 0 . 0 1 3 3 0 . 1 4 0 7 ( 0 . 0 1 1 0 ) ( 0 . 0 7 1 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 1 0 ) ( 0 . 0 6 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 1 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 9 4 8 ) ( 0 . 0 1 4 1 ) ( 0 . 0 9 9 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 4 0 . 0 2 4 9 * - 0 . 0 3 4 9 0 . 0 2 4 5 * 0 . 0 0 5 6 0 . 0 2 6 4 * - 0 . 0 2 9 6 0 . 0 2 5 8 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 ( 0 . 0 1 2 4 ) ( 0 . 0 7 8 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 2 ) ( 0 . 0 7 5 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 0 ) ( 0 . 1 1 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 4 4 ) ( 0 . 1 2 8 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 7 / 7 / 2 0 0 5 0 . 0 1 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 6 9 0 . 0 0 9 5 0 . 0 3 7 0 0 . 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 4 6 7 0 . 0 0 5 5 0 . 0 8 4 9 ( 0 . 0 0 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 6 4 3 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 5 2 9 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 6 ) ( 0 . 0 8 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 1 1 2 ) ( 0 . 0 8 9 9 ) T r e a t m e n t g r o u p ( 1 = y e s ) - 0 . 1 9 3 8 - 0 . 1 4 0 6 - 0 . 1 8 3 1 * - 0 . 2 4 8 1 * - 0 . 5 8 6 6 - 0 . 6 4 9 7 - 0 . 1 2 0 9 * - 0 . 0 0 6 1 ( 0 . 1 0 8 2 ) ( 0 . 1 1 6 2 ) ( 0 . 0 9 0 3 ) ( 0 . 0 9 8 6 ) ( 0 . 3 2 7 2 ) ( 0 . 3 4 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 4 9 3 ) ( 0 . 0 6 9 8 ) P o s t - 9 / 1 1 * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 5 1 5 0 . 1 9 9 7 0 . 0 0 1 6 0 . 1 2 0 1 0 . 3 8 1 1 0 . 4 3 8 5 ( 0 . 1 1 7 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 5 9 ) ( 0 . 1 0 0 3 ) ( 0 . 1 0 9 1 ) ( 0 . 3 3 7 0 ) ( 0 . 3 5 8 9 ) P o s t - I r a q - W a r * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 1 9 7 - 0 . 0 1 3 7 0 . 0 5 1 5 0 . 0 4 4 1 0 . 1 0 8 0 0 . 0 7 5 6 - 0 . 0 4 2 1 - 0 . 1 5 9 6 ( 0 . 0 7 0 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 6 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 4 ) ( 0 . 0 8 0 8 ) ( 0 . 1 1 9 4 ) ( 0 . 1 4 8 2 ) ( 0 . 0 6 3 3 ) ( 0 . 0 9 2 0 ) P o s t - M a d r i d - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p - 0 . 0 4 6 7 - 0 . 0 3 8 6 - 0 . 0 8 2 3 - 0 . 0 5 3 1 - 0 . 1 0 1 1 0 . 0 5 9 4 - 0 . 0 3 8 1 0 . 0 4 3 2 ( 0 . 0 7 3 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 1 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 3 ) ( 0 . 0 8 0 4 ) ( 0 . 1 4 2 6 ) ( 0 . 1 5 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 5 3 1 ) ( 0 . 0 8 4 7 ) P o s t - L o n d o n - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 8 6 8 0 . 0 6 3 1 0 . 1 1 8 7 0 . 0 8 8 3 0 . 1 7 7 1 0 . 0 8 3 8 0 . 1 2 8 8 * 0 . 0 2 8 5 ( 0 . 0 7 0 2 ) ( 0 . 0 7 7 7 ) ( 0 . 0 6 5 0 ) ( 0 . 0 7 1 8 ) ( 0 . 1 3 8 1 ) ( 0 . 1 3 6 1 ) ( 0 . 0 5 1 3 ) ( 0 . 0 8 0 5 ) N 5 4 , 5 6 6 1 , 3 8 7 5 5 , 1 2 1 1 , 9 1 3 5 7 , 0 7 5 7 1 0 3 2 , 9 0 7 9 0 9 C o e ﬃ c i e n t s , r o b u s t s t a n d a r d - e r r o r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s . * * * / * * / * d e n o t e s i g n i ﬁ c a n c e o n t h e 0 . 1 % , 1 % , a n d 5 % l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . S e e a p p e n d i x f o r d e t a i l e d e s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s a n d t e x t f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d v a r i a b l e d e ﬁ n i t i o n s . 20T a b l e 6 : P a r a m e t e r s o f i n t e r e s t : I m p a c t o n r e a l h o u r l y w a g e s , O L S e s t i m a t e s G r o u p s d e ﬁ n e d b y : V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n v s . B r i t i s h v s . n o n - w h i t e v s . B r i t i s h - b o r n v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . B r i t a i n / U K v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . C h r i s t i a n s v s . o t h e r r e l i g i o n O b s e r v e d a f t e r 9 / 1 1 0 . 0 3 7 6 * * * - 0 . 1 9 4 2 * * 0 . 0 3 4 7 * * * - 0 . 1 1 5 5 0 . 0 3 2 1 * * * - 0 . 1 7 2 8 ( 0 . 0 0 8 9 ) ( 0 . 0 7 4 6 ) ( 0 . 0 0 8 9 ) ( 0 . 0 6 4 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 8 8 ) ( 0 . 1 2 4 7 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 7 5 - 0 . 0 3 6 3 0 . 0 0 7 6 0 . 0 4 9 4 0 . 0 0 8 6 0 . 0 6 0 7 0 . 0 0 7 5 0 . 1 1 9 8 ( 0 . 0 1 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 7 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 1 0 0 ) ( 0 . 0 6 0 9 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 8 7 0 ) ( 0 . 0 1 3 0 ) ( 0 . 0 9 5 6 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 4 0 . 0 2 0 3 - 0 . 0 1 8 6 0 . 0 2 0 0 - 0 . 0 2 6 7 0 . 0 2 0 7 0 . 0 1 6 8 0 . 0 1 8 6 - 0 . 0 3 8 8 ( 0 . 0 1 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 7 8 3 ) ( 0 . 0 1 1 4 ) ( 0 . 0 7 6 5 ) ( 0 . 0 1 1 2 ) ( 0 . 1 1 9 4 ) ( 0 . 0 1 3 6 ) ( 0 . 1 2 1 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 7 / 7 / 2 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 7 3 - 0 . 0 2 3 0 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 0 2 0 1 0 . 0 0 9 7 0 . 0 1 9 4 0 . 0 0 1 8 - 0 . 0 1 5 5 ( 0 . 0 0 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 6 4 7 ) ( 0 . 0 0 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 5 1 1 ) ( 0 . 0 0 8 9 ) ( 0 . 0 8 4 3 ) ( 0 . 0 1 0 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 8 0 ) T r e a t m e n t g r o u p ( 1 = y e s ) - 0 . 2 2 5 1 * - 0 . 1 5 7 9 - 0 . 1 9 7 6 * - 0 . 2 5 9 0 * - 0 . 6 0 5 4 - 0 . 5 8 4 8 - 0 . 1 2 0 9 * * - 0 . 0 1 3 1 ( 0 . 1 1 4 5 ) ( 0 . 1 2 0 6 ) ( 0 . 0 9 5 9 ) ( 0 . 1 0 2 5 ) ( 0 . 3 2 7 8 ) ( 0 . 3 3 2 5 ) ( 0 . 0 4 6 9 ) ( 0 . 0 6 5 9 ) P o s t - 9 / 1 1 * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 7 9 4 0 . 1 6 8 7 0 . 0 3 5 3 0 . 1 6 7 5 0 . 4 3 7 0 0 . 4 5 6 2 ( 0 . 1 2 3 3 ) ( 0 . 1 3 0 1 ) ( 0 . 1 0 5 2 ) ( 0 . 1 1 2 6 ) ( 0 . 3 3 7 4 ) ( 0 . 3 5 1 4 ) P o s t - I r a q - W a r * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 5 0 4 0 . 0 1 5 4 0 . 0 8 1 2 0 . 0 5 5 3 0 . 0 9 7 9 0 . 0 7 4 5 - 0 . 0 4 4 2 - 0 . 1 6 6 4 ( 0 . 0 6 3 5 ) ( 0 . 0 7 1 9 ) ( 0 . 0 6 1 3 ) ( 0 . 0 7 1 9 ) ( 0 . 1 0 3 9 ) ( 0 . 1 4 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 5 7 7 ) ( 0 . 0 8 5 6 ) P o s t - M a d r i d - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p - 0 . 0 4 6 0 - 0 . 0 3 1 0 - 0 . 1 0 8 3 - 0 . 0 8 1 6 - 0 . 0 8 7 7 - 0 . 0 2 9 2 - 0 . 0 1 5 7 0 . 0 3 6 8 ( 0 . 0 6 6 4 ) ( 0 . 0 7 4 8 ) ( 0 . 0 6 2 9 ) ( 0 . 0 7 3 2 ) ( 0 . 1 3 6 6 ) ( 0 . 1 5 2 6 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 0 ) ( 0 . 0 7 8 4 ) P o s t - L o n d o n - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 8 6 3 0 . 0 8 4 5 0 . 1 2 9 8 * 0 . 1 1 4 2 0 . 1 4 2 6 0 . 1 0 3 7 0 . 1 4 0 4 * * 0 . 0 9 6 8 ( 0 . 0 6 6 6 ) ( 0 . 0 7 3 9 ) ( 0 . 0 6 3 1 ) ( 0 . 0 6 9 4 ) ( 0 . 1 4 8 6 ) ( 0 . 1 4 5 0 ) ( 0 . 0 4 8 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 3 1 ) N 5 4 , 5 6 6 1 , 3 8 7 5 5 , 1 2 1 1 , 9 1 3 5 7 , 0 7 5 7 1 0 3 2 , 9 0 7 9 0 9 C o e ﬃ c i e n t s , r o b u s t s t a n d a r d - e r r o r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s . * * * / * * / * d e n o t e s i g n i ﬁ c a n c e o n t h e 0 . 1 % , 1 % , a n d 5 % l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . S e e a p p e n d i x f o r d e t a i l e d e s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s a n d t e x t f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d v a r i a b l e d e ﬁ n i t i o n s . 21T a b l e 7 : P a r a m e t e r s o f i n t e r e s t : I m p a c t o n a c t u a l w e e k l y w o r k i n g h o u r s , O L S e s t i m a t e s G r o u p s d e ﬁ n e d b y : V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n v s . B r i t i s h v s . n o n - w h i t e v s . B r i t i s h - b o r n v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . B r i t a i n / U K v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . C h r i s t i a n s v s . o t h e r r e l i g i o n O b s e r v e d a f t e r 9 / 1 1 - 0 . 2 2 0 2 - 1 . 4 5 2 6 - 0 . 2 3 2 0 - 2 . 2 8 8 0 - 0 . 2 2 4 3 - 1 . 1 9 0 2 ( 0 . 2 9 4 4 ) ( 2 . 2 1 3 5 ) ( 0 . 2 9 3 6 ) ( 1 . 8 4 6 0 ) ( 0 . 2 9 0 5 ) ( 2 . 4 2 3 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 3 - 0 . 3 9 5 8 0 . 5 1 0 5 - 0 . 3 3 7 4 - 1 . 1 2 7 6 - 0 . 3 2 3 7 3 . 1 5 5 0 0 . 4 3 3 8 3 . 4 5 0 5 ( 0 . 3 4 8 4 ) ( 2 . 6 6 1 3 ) ( 0 . 3 4 6 8 ) ( 1 . 9 7 1 3 ) ( 0 . 3 4 0 5 ) ( 3 . 7 4 4 7 ) ( 0 . 4 3 2 8 ) ( 3 . 6 8 2 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 4 0 . 1 4 1 2 - 0 . 2 7 6 2 0 . 0 5 3 8 - 2 . 3 6 4 3 0 . 0 7 7 9 - 3 . 9 6 9 2 0 . 2 3 6 4 0 . 9 0 7 1 ( 0 . 3 6 3 3 ) ( 2 . 1 1 4 4 ) ( 0 . 3 5 9 8 ) ( 2 . 1 7 8 7 ) ( 0 . 3 5 2 8 ) ( 5 . 0 5 2 1 ) ( 0 . 4 2 3 1 ) ( 2 . 9 0 6 3 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 7 / 7 / 2 0 0 5 0 . 1 6 8 4 1 . 4 2 2 8 0 . 1 2 8 7 0 . 9 7 0 0 0 . 1 3 2 6 - 1 . 6 1 4 8 0 . 0 5 9 4 3 . 8 5 6 8 ( 0 . 2 9 9 5 ) ( 1 . 9 7 2 2 ) ( 0 . 2 9 8 3 ) ( 1 . 4 9 4 1 ) ( 0 . 2 9 1 5 ) ( 2 . 6 3 3 8 ) ( 0 . 3 3 7 6 ) ( 2 . 7 8 6 1 ) T r e a t m e n t g r o u p ( 1 = y e s ) 0 . 2 5 6 0 - 1 . 0 6 1 8 0 . 1 8 8 5 - 1 . 7 1 3 5 - 2 . 1 8 3 5 - 4 . 1 7 6 0 0 . 7 8 8 4 0 . 9 0 9 5 ( 1 . 6 2 5 4 ) ( 1 . 9 9 3 0 ) ( 1 . 3 5 3 7 ) ( 1 . 8 1 8 8 ) ( 1 . 5 5 1 5 ) ( 2 . 4 0 1 4 ) ( 1 . 2 1 9 5 ) ( 1 . 8 3 1 3 ) P o s t - 9 / 1 1 * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p - 0 . 5 2 5 0 3 . 0 0 1 2 0 . 0 3 3 5 2 . 1 0 6 7 1 . 5 1 2 5 2 . 5 4 6 0 ( 2 . 0 5 3 4 ) ( 2 . 5 0 0 6 ) ( 1 . 7 9 0 4 ) ( 2 . 2 7 4 7 ) ( 2 . 8 4 4 8 ) ( 3 . 4 7 5 4 ) P o s t - I r a q - W a r * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p - 0 . 7 4 1 0 - 0 . 6 6 5 9 - 1 . 5 8 5 1 - 0 . 5 7 7 7 0 . 5 2 5 7 0 . 9 3 0 0 - 1 . 5 4 0 9 - 3 . 4 8 0 3 ( 1 . 9 4 7 2 ) ( 2 . 3 1 8 9 ) ( 1 . 9 5 6 8 ) ( 2 . 2 1 2 4 ) ( 3 . 8 0 4 8 ) ( 4 . 3 1 4 6 ) ( 1 . 6 4 5 6 ) ( 2 . 6 6 4 2 ) P o s t - M a d r i d - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p - 1 . 6 6 6 2 - 2 . 3 5 4 8 - 0 . 1 7 0 4 - 0 . 5 2 8 4 0 . 7 1 9 5 4 . 1 7 3 2 - 0 . 1 6 4 9 2 . 3 8 1 7 ( 1 . 9 2 8 5 ) ( 2 . 3 6 1 6 ) ( 2 . 0 4 3 7 ) ( 2 . 3 4 4 1 ) ( 4 . 4 9 8 0 ) ( 4 . 6 5 4 2 ) ( 1 . 4 5 5 3 ) ( 2 . 6 0 7 6 ) P o s t - L o n d o n - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 9 2 8 6 0 . 4 7 2 3 0 . 8 1 7 1 - 0 . 2 1 7 3 - 1 . 5 0 9 6 - 3 . 7 1 7 6 1 . 1 4 1 5 - 0 . 2 6 0 3 ( 1 . 8 5 3 7 ) ( 2 . 2 6 7 9 ) ( 1 . 9 2 7 7 ) ( 2 . 1 7 7 9 ) ( 3 . 7 7 6 4 ) ( 3 . 8 7 8 8 ) ( 1 . 4 8 9 2 ) ( 2 . 3 8 5 7 ) N 5 6 , 5 3 2 1 , 4 3 4 5 7 , 1 3 4 2 , 0 0 0 5 9 , 1 7 3 7 3 5 3 4 , 5 7 8 9 5 7 C o e ﬃ c i e n t s , r o b u s t s t a n d a r d - e r r o r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s . * * * / * * / * d e n o t e s i g n i ﬁ c a n c e o n t h e 0 . 1 % , 1 % , a n d 5 % l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . S e e a p p e n d i x f o r d e t a i l e d e s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s a n d t e x t f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d v a r i a b l e d e ﬁ n i t i o n s . 22T a b l e 8 : P a r a m e t e r s o f i n t e r e s t : I m p a c t o n p r o b a b i l i t y o f e m p l o y m e n t , P r o b i t e s t i m a t e s G r o u p s d e ﬁ n e d b y : V a r i a b l e E t h n i c i t y C o u n t r y o f b i r t h C u r r e n t n a t i o n a l i t y R e l i g i o n v s . B r i t i s h v s . n o n - w h i t e v s . B r i t i s h - b o r n v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . B r i t a i n / U K v s . n o n - E u r o p e a n v s . C h r i s t i a n s v s . o t h e r r e l i g i o n O b s e r v e d a f t e r 9 / 1 1 - 0 . 0 5 0 5 * - 0 . 0 7 2 7 - 0 . 0 5 1 9 * - 0 . 0 1 9 7 - 0 . 0 4 9 4 * - 0 . 1 4 5 5 ( 0 . 0 2 3 0 ) ( 0 . 1 2 4 9 ) ( 0 . 0 2 2 8 ) ( 0 . 1 1 8 0 ) ( 0 . 0 2 2 3 ) ( 0 . 1 7 9 9 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 3 0 . 0 3 4 9 0 . 0 5 0 2 0 . 0 4 1 5 - 0 . 0 1 1 1 0 . 0 4 1 7 - 0 . 1 8 8 6 0 . 0 4 8 6 0 . 3 8 2 1 * ( 0 . 0 2 6 8 ) ( 0 . 1 4 0 7 ) ( 0 . 0 2 6 5 ) ( 0 . 1 2 9 0 ) ( 0 . 0 2 5 9 ) ( 0 . 2 0 2 8 ) ( 0 . 0 3 3 7 ) ( 0 . 1 9 3 3 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 3 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 4 0 . 0 1 3 4 - 0 . 0 0 5 5 0 . 0 1 4 2 - 0 . 0 5 2 3 0 . 0 1 6 1 - 0 . 0 2 1 2 0 . 0 0 2 6 0 . 2 8 3 1 ( 0 . 0 3 0 3 ) ( 0 . 1 5 8 5 ) ( 0 . 0 2 9 9 ) ( 0 . 1 4 1 4 ) ( 0 . 0 2 9 3 ) ( 0 . 2 1 8 8 ) ( 0 . 0 3 4 4 ) ( 0 . 2 0 6 2 ) O b s e r v e d a f t e r 7 / 7 / 2 0 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 7 7 - 0 . 0 1 5 4 - 0 . 0 0 8 2 - 0 . 1 1 2 7 - 0 . 0 0 7 6 - 0 . 1 2 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 7 5 - 0 . 2 0 0 0 ( 0 . 0 2 3 4 ) ( 0 . 1 1 9 7 ) ( 0 . 0 2 3 1 ) ( 0 . 1 0 7 0 ) ( 0 . 0 2 2 5 ) ( 0 . 1 6 4 2 ) ( 0 . 0 2 6 2 ) ( 0 . 1 5 7 2 ) T r e a t m e n t g r o u p ( 1 = y e s ) - 1 . 0 8 3 0 * * * - 0 . 4 1 5 7 * * - 1 . 0 3 8 1 * * * - 0 . 5 8 9 7 * * * - 1 . 5 7 1 0 * * * - 0 . 8 9 2 4 * * * - 0 . 9 4 1 2 * * * - 0 . 3 9 3 7 * * ( 0 . 1 2 3 2 ) ( 0 . 1 4 1 5 ) ( 0 . 1 1 4 3 ) ( 0 . 1 2 9 3 ) ( 0 . 2 0 2 3 ) ( 0 . 2 2 9 8 ) ( 0 . 0 7 2 5 ) ( 0 . 1 2 0 4 ) P o s t - 9 / 1 1 * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 9 7 6 0 . 1 8 0 2 - 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 9 2 6 0 . 3 9 0 3 0 . 4 5 3 6 ( 0 . 1 4 1 3 ) ( 0 . 1 6 1 2 ) ( 0 . 1 3 3 4 ) ( 0 . 1 5 1 2 ) ( 0 . 2 3 4 6 ) ( 0 . 2 6 2 9 ) P o s t - I r a q - W a r * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 7 9 2 0 . 1 2 7 4 - 0 . 0 1 6 1 0 . 0 5 9 9 0 . 0 6 4 4 0 . 1 0 8 7 0 . 0 5 6 3 0 . 1 6 2 4 ( 0 . 1 1 4 3 ) ( 0 . 1 3 4 6 ) ( 0 . 1 1 0 6 ) ( 0 . 1 2 9 5 ) ( 0 . 1 8 2 6 ) ( 0 . 2 0 2 3 ) ( 0 . 0 9 7 5 ) ( 0 . 1 6 1 0 ) P o s t - M a d r i d - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 7 8 1 0 . 0 8 6 1 0 . 0 8 6 2 0 . 0 0 4 0 - 0 . 3 6 2 3 - 0 . 3 8 9 9 - 0 . 0 5 3 9 - 0 . 2 4 7 9 ( 0 . 1 2 1 0 ) ( 0 . 1 4 3 6 ) ( 0 . 1 1 5 6 ) ( 0 . 1 3 5 6 ) ( 0 . 2 0 5 8 ) ( 0 . 2 3 2 3 ) ( 0 . 0 8 8 3 ) ( 0 . 1 5 3 1 ) P o s t - L o n d o n - B o m b i n g s * T r e a t m e n t g r o u p 0 . 0 1 2 7 - 0 . 0 2 9 7 0 . 1 3 7 4 0 . 0 5 5 5 0 . 5 2 8 5 * * 0 . 3 1 8 4 0 . 0 6 2 3 0 . 0 8 2 9 ( 0 . 1 1 0 2 ) ( 0 . 1 3 1 1 ) ( 0 . 1 0 6 4 ) ( 0 . 1 2 2 6 ) ( 0 . 1 9 8 4 ) ( 0 . 2 2 3 5 ) ( 0 . 0 8 1 7 ) ( 0 . 1 4 2 1 ) N 1 1 9 , 1 0 8 5 , 6 0 4 1 2 1 , 4 3 5 6 , 3 3 8 1 2 6 , 2 7 8 2 , 7 0 2 7 5 , 6 8 6 3 , 9 7 2 C o e ﬃ c i e n t s , r o b u s t s t a n d a r d - e r r o r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s . * * * / * * / * d e n o t e s i g n i ﬁ c a n c e o n t h e 0 . 1 % , 1 % , a n d 5 % l e v e l r e s p e c t i v e l y . S e e a p p e n d i x f o r d e t a i l e d e s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s a n d t e x t f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d v a r i a b l e d e ﬁ n i t i o n s . 238.2 Detailed estimation results Not necessarily for inclusion in final paper, internet appendix or referee information only 24Table 9: Weekly real wages, groups defined by ethnicity, OLS- regression Treatment group: Ethnicity Pakistan or Bangladesh Comparison: British Comparison: Non-White Ethnicity Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0347*** 0.0346*** -0.0448 -0.1894* (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0560) (0.0753) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0052 0.0017 -0.0071 -0.0718 (0.0073) (0.0110) (0.0505) (0.0710) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0211** 0.0249* -0.0109 -0.0349 (0.0078) (0.0124) (0.0567) (0.0780) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0191* 0.0102 0.0344 -0.0069 (0.0079) (0.0098) (0.0533) (0.0643) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.1626 -0.1938 -0.1627 -0.1406 (0.1170) (0.1082) (0.1262) (0.1162) Post-9/11*Treatment group -0.0958 0.0515 -0.0162 0.1997 (0.1332) (0.1178) (0.1446) (0.1259) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0397 0.0197 0.0520 -0.0137 (0.0922) (0.0708) (0.1051) (0.0768) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0601 -0.0467 -0.0281 -0.0386 (0.1008) (0.0738) (0.1157) (0.0815) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0760 0.0868 0.0607 0.0631 (0.1044) (0.0702) (0.1172) (0.0777) Age in years 0.0809*** 0.0610*** (0.0014) (0.0088) Age (squared) -0.0009*** -0.0007*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0871*** 0.0412 (0.0045) (0.0272) No. of children under 16 0.0099*** -0.0240* (0.0021) (0.0121) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2189*** 0.1640*** (0.0059) (0.0389) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0688*** 0.0112 (0.0065) (0.0471) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0459*** -0.0482 (0.0053) (0.0389) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.0731*** -0.0507 (0.0064) (0.0359) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1490*** -0.1372** (0.0078) (0.0457) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0265 0.0541 (0.0159) (0.0940) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0249 0.0264 (0.0141) (0.0838) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0101 0.1069 (0.0134) (0.0814) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0553*** 0.1562* (0.0125) (0.0779) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0810*** 0.1495 (0.0126) (0.0840) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1144*** 0.2631** (0.0126) (0.0847) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1484*** 0.2747** (0.0130) (0.0903) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0685*** -0.1159* (0.0067) (0.0549) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0976*** -0.0957** (0.0045) (0.0344) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0752*** 0.1008*** (0.0050) (0.0291) Constant 5.9607*** 4.1352*** 5.9608*** 4.4830*** (0.0071) (0.0578) (0.0469) (0.2697) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 59,512 54,566 1,619 1,387 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 25Table 10: Hourly real wages, groups defined by ethnicity, OLS- regression Treatment group: Ethnicity Pakistan or Bangladesh Comparison: British Comparison: Non-White Ethnicity Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0410*** 0.0376*** -0.0225 -0.1942** (0.0080) (0.0089) (0.0536) (0.0746) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0094 0.0075 -0.0172 -0.0363 (0.0070) (0.0100) (0.0487) (0.0707) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0245** 0.0203 0.0367 -0.0186 (0.0075) (0.0116) (0.0516) (0.0783) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0232** 0.0073 -0.0081 -0.0230 (0.0075) (0.0091) (0.0488) (0.0647) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.2145 -0.2251* -0.1964 -0.1579 (0.1098) (0.1145) (0.1187) (0.1206) Post-9/11*Treatment group -0.0139 0.0794 0.0497 0.1687 (0.1249) (0.1233) (0.1361) (0.1301) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0367 0.0504 0.0633 0.0154 (0.0834) (0.0635) (0.0965) (0.0719) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0245 -0.0460 -0.0367 -0.0310 (0.0886) (0.0664) (0.1025) (0.0748) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0449 0.0863 0.0762 0.0845 (0.0923) (0.0666) (0.1044) (0.0739) Age in years 0.0586*** 0.0346*** (0.0011) (0.0081) Age (squared) -0.0006*** -0.0004*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0618*** -0.0234 (0.0042) (0.0257) No. of children under 16 0.0182*** 0.0015 (0.0019) (0.0112) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2645*** 0.1576*** (0.0057) (0.0367) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0902*** -0.0285 (0.0063) (0.0486) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0441*** -0.0538 (0.0048) (0.0364) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1114*** -0.0974** (0.0059) (0.0335) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1767*** -0.1767*** (0.0070) (0.0443) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0105 0.0912 (0.0133) (0.0847) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0107 0.0313 (0.0117) (0.0796) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0171 0.0939 (0.0113) (0.0754) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0462*** 0.1221 (0.0106) (0.0735) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0689*** 0.1205 (0.0108) (0.0784) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1133*** 0.2409** (0.0107) (0.0804) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1503*** 0.2834** (0.0112) (0.0871) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0562*** -0.0488 (0.0061) (0.0533) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0999*** -0.0689* (0.0041) (0.0328) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0855*** 0.1150*** (0.0048) (0.0291) Constant 2.2348*** 0.8874*** 2.2166*** 1.4594*** (0.0068) (0.0491) (0.0449) (0.2436) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 59,512 54,566 1,619 1,387 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 26Table 11: Weekly hours worked, groups defined by ethnicity, OLS- regression Treatment group: Ethnicity Pakistan or Bangladesh Comparison: British Comparison: Non-White Ethnicity Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.2618 -0.2202 -1.8609 -1.4526 (0.1849) (0.2944) (1.2718) (2.2135) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.1731 -0.3958 -0.3733 0.5105 (0.1626) (0.3484) (1.1981) (2.6613) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.2122 0.1412 -0.5229 -0.2762 (0.1717) (0.3633) (1.3214) (2.1144) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0772 0.1684 1.6443 1.4228 (0.1652) (0.2995) (1.2764) (1.9722) Treatment group (1 = yes) 0.2692 0.2560 -0.4184 -1.0618 (1.8905) (1.6254) (2.1563) (1.9930) Post-9/11*Treatment group -1.9809 -0.5250 -0.3819 3.0012 (2.3058) (2.0534) (2.6327) (2.5006) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.5998 -0.7410 0.7999 -0.6659 (2.0006) (1.9472) (2.3312) (2.3189) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -2.7064 -1.6662 -1.9713 -2.3548 (2.0173) (1.9285) (2.4104) (2.3616) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 1.0729 0.9286 -0.4942 0.4723 (2.0154) (1.8537) (2.3848) (2.2679) Age in years 0.7373*** 0.7659** (0.0375) (0.2489) Age (squared) -0.0090*** -0.0086** (0.0005) (0.0031) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.9464*** 1.7168 (0.1423) (0.8760) No. of children under 16 -0.0357 -0.9763** (0.0646) (0.3327) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.6388*** -0.2919 (0.1701) (1.1683) Higher education ( 1 = yes) -0.3993* 0.2420 (0.2017) (1.4548) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0000 0.4571 (0.1568) (1.1846) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) 1.3199*** 1.2059 (0.1983) (1.1053) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.3761 0.1970 (0.2481) (1.6177) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.2568 -1.7219 (0.4030) (2.1414) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.5876 -1.5263 (0.3637) (2.1950) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) -0.5075 -0.0044 (0.3379) (1.8629) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) -0.1657 0.4174 (0.3154) (1.8468) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) -0.2630 -0.1842 (0.3219) (2.0083) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) -0.6982* -1.1452 (0.3210) (2.0581) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) -0.9174** -0.2744 (0.3355) (2.2351) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.7331*** 0.1725 (0.1960) (1.5411) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) 0.5108*** -0.7623 (0.1306) (0.9163) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) -0.6819*** 1.0460 (0.1551) (0.9625) Constant 43.0880*** 23.2850*** 43.7756*** 20.5268*** (0.1564) (1.0974) (1.0390) (5.9339) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 61,668 56,532 1,677 1,434 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 27Table 12: Probability of employment, groups defined by ethnicity, Probit-regression Treatment group: Ethnicity Pakistan or Bangladesh Comparison: British Comparison: Non-White Ethnicity Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.0393** -0.0505* -0.0917 -0.0727 (0.0124) (0.0230) (0.0744) (0.1249) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.0254* 0.0349 -0.0143 0.0502 (0.0106) (0.0268) (0.0617) (0.1407) Observed after 3/11/2004 -0.0109 0.0134 -0.0032 -0.0055 (0.0113) (0.0303) (0.0659) (0.1585) Observed after 7/7/2005 -0.0610*** -0.0077 -0.0265 -0.0154 (0.0106) (0.0234) (0.0611) (0.1197) Treatment group (1 = yes) -1.0204*** -1.0830*** -0.5741*** -0.4157** (0.1011) (0.1232) (0.1196) (0.1415) Post-9/11*Treatment group 0.0916 0.0976 0.1440 0.1802 (0.1156) (0.1413) (0.1369) (0.1612) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0853 0.0792 0.0742 0.1274 (0.0922) (0.1143) (0.1104) (0.1346) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0348 0.0781 0.0271 0.0861 (0.0974) (0.1210) (0.1171) (0.1436) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0535 0.0127 0.0189 -0.0297 (0.0902) (0.1102) (0.1084) (0.1311) Age in years 0.1862*** 0.1081*** (0.0024) (0.0128) Age (squared) -0.0026*** -0.0014*** (0.0000) (0.0002) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.5755*** 0.4236*** (0.0111) (0.0542) No. of children under 16 -0.0783*** -0.0617** (0.0051) (0.0203) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0009 0.1660* (0.0140) (0.0716) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0135 0.1200 (0.0162) (0.0876) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0746*** -0.0491 (0.0124) (0.0696) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1311*** -0.2867*** (0.0148) (0.0641) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.4706*** -0.6502*** (0.0160) (0.0802) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.9988*** -0.9138*** (0.0112) (0.0668) Constant -0.0096 -2.8425*** -0.4558*** -2.8042*** (0.0106) (0.0995) (0.0648) (0.4154) Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 132,955 119,108 6,750 5,604 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 28Table 13: Weekly real wages, groups defined by country of birth, OLS-regression Treatment group: Born in Arabian / Muslim country Comparison: British-born Comparison: Non-European-born Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0312*** 0.0313*** 0.0026 -0.1170 (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0577) (0.0648) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0066 0.0023 -0.0472 0.0425 (0.0073) (0.0110) (0.0447) (0.0602) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0194* 0.0245* 0.0300 0.0056 (0.0078) (0.0122) (0.0488) (0.0750) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0215** 0.0095 -0.0647 0.0370 (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0451) (0.0529) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.0705 -0.1831* -0.2228 -0.2481* (0.1022) (0.0903) (0.1145) (0.0986) Post-9/11*Treatment group -0.0832 0.0016 -0.0545 0.1201 (0.1206) (0.1003) (0.1337) (0.1091) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.0183 0.0515 0.0355 0.0441 (0.0924) (0.0724) (0.1026) (0.0808) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0066 -0.0823 -0.0040 -0.0531 (0.0986) (0.0723) (0.1099) (0.0804) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0555 0.1187 0.1417 0.0883 (0.0998) (0.0650) (0.1094) (0.0718) Age in years 0.0816*** 0.0603*** (0.0014) (0.0076) Age (squared) -0.0009*** -0.0007*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0892*** 0.0556* (0.0045) (0.0243) No. of children under 16 0.0080*** 0.0012 (0.0021) (0.0112) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2222*** 0.1806*** (0.0059) (0.0337) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0680*** 0.0677 (0.0065) (0.0406) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0435*** -0.0040 (0.0053) (0.0380) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.0756*** 0.0342 (0.0064) (0.0317) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1482*** -0.0733 (0.0078) (0.0459) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0199 0.0334 (0.0159) (0.0732) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0210 0.0095 (0.0141) (0.0618) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0098 0.0695 (0.0134) (0.0594) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0578*** 0.1189* (0.0125) (0.0560) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0856*** 0.0738 (0.0126) (0.0595) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1181*** 0.2042*** (0.0126) (0.0605) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1532*** 0.2687*** (0.0131) (0.0652) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0679*** -0.0935* (0.0067) (0.0418) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0967*** -0.1690*** (0.0045) (0.0290) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0733*** 0.1009*** (0.0050) (0.0258) Constant 5.9590*** 4.1247*** 6.1113*** 4.4670*** (0.0071) (0.0573) (0.0515) (0.1841) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 60,116 55,121 2,211 1,913 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 29Table 14: Hourly real wages, groups defined by country of birth, OLS-regression Treatment group: Born in Arabian / Muslim country Comparison: British-born Comparison: Non-European-born Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0390*** 0.0347*** -0.0199 -0.1155 (0.0079) (0.0089) (0.0538) (0.0640) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0104 0.0076 -0.0407 0.0494 (0.0069) (0.0100) (0.0454) (0.0609) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0231** 0.0200 0.0522 -0.0267 (0.0074) (0.0114) (0.0482) (0.0765) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0250*** 0.0065 -0.0766 0.0201 (0.0074) (0.0091) (0.0438) (0.0511) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.0908 -0.1976* -0.2615* -0.2590* (0.1020) (0.0959) (0.1122) (0.1025) Post-9/11*Treatment group -0.0246 0.0353 0.0343 0.1675 (0.1184) (0.1052) (0.1300) (0.1126) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.0432 0.0812 0.0079 0.0553 (0.0861) (0.0613) (0.0973) (0.0719) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0038 -0.1083 -0.0329 -0.0816 (0.0912) (0.0629) (0.1031) (0.0732) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0728 0.1298* 0.1744 0.1142 (0.0941) (0.0631) (0.1037) (0.0694) Age in years 0.0588*** 0.0431*** (0.0011) (0.0075) Age (squared) -0.0006*** -0.0005*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0631*** 0.0160 (0.0042) (0.0239) No. of children under 16 0.0166*** 0.0163 (0.0019) (0.0109) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2669*** 0.1817*** (0.0057) (0.0312) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0885*** 0.0374 (0.0063) (0.0406) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0430*** 0.0124 (0.0047) (0.0364) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1143*** 0.0095 (0.0058) (0.0300) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1759*** -0.1047* (0.0069) (0.0434) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0043 0.0323 (0.0133) (0.0642) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0052 -0.0003 (0.0117) (0.0557) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0214 0.0624 (0.0113) (0.0538) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0516*** 0.0838 (0.0106) (0.0495) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0764*** 0.0477 (0.0108) (0.0535) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1205*** 0.1882*** (0.0108) (0.0550) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1587*** 0.2457*** (0.0113) (0.0609) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0552*** -0.0529 (0.0061) (0.0390) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0995*** -0.1402*** (0.0041) (0.0273) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0833*** 0.1045*** (0.0047) (0.0260) Constant 2.2328*** 0.8828*** 2.4035*** 1.1150*** (0.0068) (0.0487) (0.0467) (0.2302) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 60,116 55,121 2,211 1,913 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 30Table 15: Weekly hours worked, groups defined by country of birth, OLS-regression Treatment group: Born in Arabian / Muslim country Comparison: British-born Comparison: Non-European-born Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.2841 -0.2320 -1.0539 -2.2880 (0.1845) (0.2936) (1.2387) (1.8460) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.1168 -0.3374 -0.5968 -1.1276 (0.1624) (0.3468) (0.9983) (1.9713) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.1047 0.0538 -0.0405 -2.3643 (0.1712) (0.3598) (1.0574) (2.1787) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.1346 0.1287 0.7077 0.9700 (0.1642) (0.2983) (0.9520) (1.4941) Treatment group (1 = yes) 0.5879 0.1885 -0.4380 -1.7135 (1.5237) (1.3537) (1.8682) (1.8188) Post-9/11*Treatment group -1.0723 0.0335 -0.3025 2.1067 (1.9572) (1.7904) (2.3123) (2.2747) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0482 -1.5851 0.5282 -0.5777 (1.9827) (1.9568) (2.2176) (2.2124) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.6167 -0.1704 -0.4714 -0.5284 (2.1122) (2.0437) (2.3599) (2.3441) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group -0.2967 0.8171 -0.8697 -0.2173 (2.0770) (1.9277) (2.2827) (2.1779) Age in years 0.7353*** 0.4550* (0.0374) (0.2267) Age (squared) -0.0089*** -0.0055* (0.0005) (0.0028) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 1.0219*** 1.4501 (0.1413) (0.8123) No. of children under 16 -0.0649 -0.6924* (0.0642) (0.3149) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.6380*** 1.2408 (0.1689) (1.0440) Higher education ( 1 = yes) -0.4528* 0.9901 (0.2006) (1.2264) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0605 -0.4519 (0.1558) (1.2333) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) 1.2170*** 1.4563 (0.1975) (0.9881) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.3000 2.8559* (0.2467) (1.4198) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.2551 2.2229 (0.4031) (1.5574) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.6447 1.9343 (0.3624) (1.6949) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) -0.6492 1.4813 (0.3360) (1.4111) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) -0.3094 2.1350 (0.3140) (1.3250) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) -0.3258 1.7476 (0.3203) (1.4239) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) -0.7602* 0.3993 (0.3193) (1.5057) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) -1.0540** 3.0405 (0.3342) (1.6281) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.7262*** -1.6208 (0.1959) (1.0492) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) 0.5077*** -0.5130 (0.1298) (0.7909) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) -0.6128*** 0.5789 (0.1548) (0.7923) Constant 43.0706*** 23.4777*** 44.0965*** 32.1829*** (0.1561) (1.0963) (1.0878) (5.2850) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 62,328 57,134 2,317 2,000 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 31Table 16: Probability of employment, groups defined by country of birth, Probit-regression Treatment group: Born in Arabian / Muslim country Comparison: British-born Comparison: Non-European-born Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.0436*** -0.0519* -0.1344 -0.0197 (0.0123) (0.0228) (0.0695) (0.1180) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.0215* 0.0415 -0.0184 -0.0111 (0.0105) (0.0265) (0.0568) (0.1290) Observed after 3/11/2004 -0.0164 0.0142 0.0249 -0.0523 (0.0111) (0.0299) (0.0595) (0.1414) Observed after 7/7/2005 -0.0578*** -0.0082 0.0047 -0.1127 (0.0105) (0.0231) (0.0531) (0.1070) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.9326*** -1.0381*** -0.7772*** -0.5897*** (0.0964) (0.1143) (0.1133) (0.1293) Post-9/11*Treatment group -0.0525 -0.0131 0.0383 0.0926 (0.1112) (0.1334) (0.1306) (0.1512) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0483 -0.0161 0.0451 0.0599 (0.0886) (0.1106) (0.1047) (0.1295) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0161 0.0862 -0.0252 0.0040 (0.0942) (0.1156) (0.1109) (0.1356) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.1548 0.1374 0.0923 0.0555 (0.0885) (0.1064) (0.1027) (0.1226) Age in years 0.1875*** 0.1132*** (0.0023) (0.0124) Age (squared) -0.0026*** -0.0015*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.5828*** 0.4627*** (0.0110) (0.0506) No. of children under 16 -0.0818*** -0.0481** (0.0051) (0.0184) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0078 0.1031 (0.0139) (0.0625) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0093 0.0589 (0.0161) (0.0836) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0706*** -0.0207 (0.0122) (0.0805) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1403*** -0.3210*** (0.0147) (0.0590) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.4714*** -0.6872*** (0.0159) (0.0779) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.9936*** -0.8303*** (0.0111) (0.0554) Constant -0.0155 -2.3424*** -0.1708** -2.9253*** (0.0106) (0.0770) (0.0604) (0.4807) Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 135,667 121,435 7,577 6,338 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 32Table 17: Weekly real wages, groups defined by current nationality, OLS-regression Treatment group: Current nationality from Arab / Muslim country Comparison: British Comparison: Non-European Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0309*** 0.0288** -0.1234 -0.1747 (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0910) (0.1274) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0050 0.0029 -0.0336 0.0400 (0.0071) (0.0108) (0.0724) (0.0948) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0201** 0.0264* -0.0229 -0.0296 (0.0077) (0.0120) (0.0780) (0.1105) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0208** 0.0115 -0.0550 0.0467 (0.0077) (0.0096) (0.0728) (0.0898) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.4733 -0.5866 -0.6464* -0.6497 (0.3052) (0.3272) (0.3166) (0.3405) Post-9/11*Treatment group 0.1799 0.3811 0.3342 0.4385 (0.3310) (0.3370) (0.3451) (0.3589) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.0481 0.1080 -0.0095 0.0756 (0.1640) (0.1194) (0.1801) (0.1482) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0767 -0.1011 -0.0337 0.0594 (0.1536) (0.1426) (0.1729) (0.1507) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.2573 0.1771 0.3331 0.0838 (0.1584) (0.1381) (0.1750) (0.1361) Age in years 0.0812*** 0.0412** (0.0013) (0.0128) Age (squared) -0.0009*** -0.0005** (0.0000) (0.0002) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0877*** 0.0221 (0.0044) (0.0406) No. of children under 16 0.0073*** -0.0168 (0.0021) (0.0213) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2191*** 0.1186 (0.0058) (0.0658) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0647*** 0.0548 (0.0064) (0.0923) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0427*** -0.0816 (0.0052) (0.0867) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.0725*** 0.0304 (0.0063) (0.0566) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1483*** 0.0005 (0.0076) (0.0877) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0161 0.0073 (0.0156) (0.1046) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0192 0.0518 (0.0139) (0.0864) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0124 0.1342 (0.0132) (0.0804) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0596*** 0.1738* (0.0123) (0.0804) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0839*** 0.1248 (0.0124) (0.0959) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1185*** 0.4314*** (0.0124) (0.1059) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1534*** 0.4116** (0.0129) (0.1460) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0688*** -0.0547 (0.0066) (0.1113) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0986*** -0.1193* (0.0044) (0.0501) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0751*** 0.1165* (0.0049) (0.0488) Constant 5.9639*** 3.8519*** 6.1370*** 5.1782*** (0.0069) (0.0379) (0.0777) (0.2779) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 62,326 57,075 835 710 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 33Table 18: Hourly real wages, groups defined by current nationality, OLS-regression Treatment group: Current nationality from Arab / Muslim country Comparison: British Comparison: Non-European Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 0.0384*** 0.0321*** -0.1294 -0.1728 (0.0078) (0.0088) (0.0866) (0.1247) Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0091 0.0086 -0.0442 0.0607 (0.0068) (0.0098) (0.0760) (0.0870) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0232** 0.0207 0.0659 0.0168 (0.0073) (0.0112) (0.0775) (0.1194) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0250*** 0.0097 -0.0902 0.0194 (0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0671) (0.0843) Treatment group (1 = yes) -0.4574 -0.6054 -0.6019 -0.5848 (0.2977) (0.3278) (0.3080) (0.3325) Post-9/11*Treatment group 0.1919 0.4370 0.3597 0.4562 (0.3211) (0.3374) (0.3343) (0.3514) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.1038 0.0979 -0.0505 0.0745 (0.1490) (0.1039) (0.1679) (0.1401) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0697 -0.0877 -0.1124 -0.0292 (0.1615) (0.1366) (0.1799) (0.1526) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.2275 0.1426 0.3427 0.1037 (0.1815) (0.1486) (0.1943) (0.1450) Age in years 0.0587*** 0.0299* (0.0011) (0.0121) Age (squared) -0.0006*** -0.0003* (0.0000) (0.0002) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0614*** 0.0068 (0.0041) (0.0395) No. of children under 16 0.0161*** -0.0164 (0.0019) (0.0211) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2627*** 0.1148 (0.0056) (0.0620) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0849*** 0.0007 (0.0062) (0.0925) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0419*** -0.0689 (0.0047) (0.0816) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1108*** 0.0042 (0.0057) (0.0527) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1756*** -0.0413 (0.0068) (0.0863) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0012 0.0241 (0.0131) (0.0964) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0043 0.0530 (0.0116) (0.0798) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0227* 0.1306 (0.0111) (0.0785) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0526*** 0.1264 (0.0105) (0.0761) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0738*** 0.0812 (0.0107) (0.0909) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1190*** 0.4108*** (0.0106) (0.1017) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1574*** 0.3686* (0.0111) (0.1440) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0551*** -0.0260 (0.0059) (0.1014) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.1015*** -0.0552 (0.0040) (0.0508) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0847*** 0.1403** (0.0047) (0.0474) Constant 2.2380*** 0.5774*** 2.3824*** 1.8376*** (0.0067) (0.0306) (0.0719) (0.2651) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 62,326 57,075 835 710 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 34Table 19: Weekly hours worked, groups defined by current nation- ality, OLS-regression Treatment group: Current nationality from Arab / Muslim country Comparison: British Comparison: Non-European Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.2883 -0.2243 -1.2268 -1.1902 (0.1813) (0.2905) (1.7221) (2.4232) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.1208 -0.3237 -0.3034 3.1550 (0.1592) (0.3405) (1.6485) (3.7447) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.1315 0.0779 -1.8890 -3.9692 (0.1677) (0.3528) (1.8439) (5.0521) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.1248 0.1326 0.8310 -1.6148 (0.1609) (0.2915) (1.5510) (2.6338) Treatment group (1 = yes) -1.4051 -2.1835 -3.8596 -4.1760 (2.8284) (1.5515) (3.2121) (2.4014) Post-9/11*Treatment group 1.6502 1.5125 2.5887 2.5460 (3.6481) (2.8448) (4.0488) (3.4754) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.1100 0.5257 0.2926 0.9300 (3.8514) (3.8048) (4.2066) (4.3146) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group 0.5451 0.7195 2.5655 4.1732 (4.4748) (4.4980) (4.8605) (4.6542) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group -2.4442 -1.5096 -3.1504 -3.7176 (3.8860) (3.7764) (4.2015) (3.8788) Age in years 0.7244*** 0.3376 (0.0368) (0.4634) Age (squared) -0.0088*** -0.0044 (0.0004) (0.0061) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 1.0451*** -0.6323 (0.1396) (1.1962) No. of children under 16 -0.0867 -0.4795 (0.0630) (0.5696) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.6059*** 1.8745 (0.1664) (2.1407) Higher education ( 1 = yes) -0.4344* 2.6676 (0.1972) (2.5306) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0299 2.3335 (0.1539) (3.4399) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) 1.2549*** 2.4253 (0.1937) (1.8334) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.3473 3.6782 (0.2428) (2.6051) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.1352 0.5567 (0.3973) (2.5175) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.5943 -0.1974 (0.3595) (2.3214) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) -0.5517 0.9215 (0.3333) (2.1426) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) -0.2457 0.6465 (0.3116) (2.1818) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) -0.3003 3.4287 (0.3178) (2.4899) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) -0.7382* 3.3875 (0.3169) (2.9076) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) -0.9601** 0.0344 (0.3316) (3.5676) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.7757*** -1.9734 (0.1919) (2.2088) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) 0.4975*** 0.7477 (0.1281) (1.3867) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) -0.5547*** 0.1561 (0.1519) (1.3619) Constant 43.0718*** 24.7248*** 45.5263*** 46.8674*** (0.1535) (1.2406) (1.4999) (10.8510) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 64,637 59,173 873 735 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 35Table 20: Probability of employment, groups defined by current na- tionality, Probit-regression Treatment group: Current nationality from Arab / Muslim country Comparison: British Comparison: Non-European Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 9/11 -0.0443*** -0.0494* -0.3159** -0.1455 (0.0120) (0.0223) (0.1033) (0.1799) Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.0239* 0.0417 0.1426 -0.1886 (0.0102) (0.0259) (0.0833) (0.2028) Observed after 3/11/2004 -0.0135 0.0161 -0.0138 -0.0212 (0.0109) (0.0293) (0.0872) (0.2188) Observed after 7/7/2005 -0.0558*** -0.0076 0.1008 -0.1296 (0.0102) (0.0225) (0.0793) (0.1642) Treatment group (1 = yes) -1.3067*** -1.5710*** -1.0408*** -0.8924*** (0.1769) (0.2023) (0.1980) (0.2298) Post-9/11*Treatment group 0.2142 0.3903 0.4858* 0.4536 (0.2011) (0.2346) (0.2258) (0.2629) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.1184 0.0644 -0.0481 0.1087 (0.1465) (0.1826) (0.1682) (0.2023) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.2781 -0.3623 -0.2778 -0.3899 (0.1662) (0.2058) (0.1874) (0.2323) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.4386** 0.5285** 0.2820 0.3184 (0.1600) (0.1984) (0.1783) (0.2235) Age in years 0.1860*** 0.0328 (0.0023) (0.0191) Age (squared) -0.0026*** -0.0005 (0.0000) (0.0002) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.5758*** 0.4697*** (0.0108) (0.0731) No. of children under 16 -0.0900*** -0.0888** (0.0049) (0.0315) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0042 -0.0050 (0.0135) (0.1111) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0043 0.0200 (0.0158) (0.1466) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0704*** 0.0706 (0.0120) (0.1633) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1549*** -0.1283 (0.0143) (0.0968) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.4935*** -0.4495*** (0.0156) (0.1248) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.9904*** -0.8073*** (0.0109) (0.1067) Constant -0.0284** -2.8861*** -0.2944*** -1.7580** (0.0103) (0.0971) (0.0894) (0.6736) Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 141,219 126,278 3,360 2,702 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 36Table 21: Weekly real wages, groups defined by religion, OLS- regression Treatment group: Muslims Comparison: Christians Comparison: other Religion (not Sikh) Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.0205* 0.0133 0.1573 0.1407 (0.0090) (0.0141) (0.0823) (0.0992) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0150 0.0258 -0.0808 -0.0004 (0.0085) (0.0144) (0.0900) (0.1282) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0106 0.0055 0.0367 0.0849 (0.0086) (0.0112) (0.0805) (0.0899) muslim -0.1575* -0.1209* -0.1099 -0.0061 (0.0639) (0.0493) (0.0815) (0.0698) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.0223 -0.0421 -0.2000 -0.1596 (0.0815) (0.0633) (0.1157) (0.0920) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0401 -0.0381 0.0557 0.0432 (0.0715) (0.0531) (0.1148) (0.0847) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0808 0.1288* 0.0546 0.0285 (0.0741) (0.0513) (0.1093) (0.0805) Age in years 0.0789*** 0.0660*** (0.0017) (0.0116) Age (squared) -0.0009*** -0.0007*** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0782*** 0.0792 (0.0058) (0.0404) No. of children under 16 0.0109*** -0.0271 (0.0028) (0.0160) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2220*** 0.1626** (0.0076) (0.0567) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0705*** 0.0586 (0.0083) (0.0617) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0430*** -0.0772 (0.0068) (0.0616) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.0590*** -0.0453 (0.0082) (0.0594) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1411*** -0.1490* (0.0103) (0.0626) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) -0.0032 -0.0989 (0.0215) (0.1256) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0060 -0.0033 (0.0189) (0.0944) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0251 -0.0101 (0.0182) (0.0921) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0728*** 0.0744 (0.0170) (0.0845) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0932*** 0.0443 (0.0172) (0.0866) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1377*** 0.1672 (0.0171) (0.0890) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1687*** 0.1674 (0.0176) (0.0973) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0676*** -0.0868 (0.0084) (0.0603) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0952*** -0.1667*** (0.0059) (0.0446) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0824*** 0.0937** (0.0057) (0.0363) Constant 6.0308*** 3.9254*** 5.9832*** 4.4482*** (0.0063) (0.0489) (0.0506) (0.2963) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 35,992 32,907 1,032 909 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 37Table 22: Hourly real wages, groups defined by religion, OLS- regression Treatment group: Muslims Comparison: Christians Comparison: other Religion (not Sikh) Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 3/20/2003 -0.0216* 0.0075 0.1540 0.1198 (0.0088) (0.0130) (0.0823) (0.0956) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.0209* 0.0186 -0.0380 -0.0388 (0.0082) (0.0136) (0.0850) (0.1212) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0155 0.0018 -0.0075 -0.0155 (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0752) (0.0780) muslim -0.1564* -0.1209** -0.1455 -0.0131 (0.0621) (0.0469) (0.0810) (0.0659) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.0272 -0.0442 -0.2028 -0.1664 (0.0773) (0.0577) (0.1127) (0.0856) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.0006 -0.0157 0.0582 0.0368 (0.0633) (0.0480) (0.1058) (0.0784) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0879 0.1404** 0.1109 0.0968 (0.0650) (0.0488) (0.0992) (0.0731) Age in years 0.0565*** 0.0387*** (0.0014) (0.0102) Age (squared) -0.0006*** -0.0004** (0.0000) (0.0001) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.0550*** 0.0732* (0.0054) (0.0362) No. of children under 16 0.0209*** -0.0143 (0.0026) (0.0140) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.2590*** 0.1510** (0.0074) (0.0509) Higher education ( 1 = yes) 0.0815*** 0.0271 (0.0081) (0.0600) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.0476*** -0.0655 (0.0062) (0.0554) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.0983*** -0.1030 (0.0075) (0.0526) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.1721*** -0.2254*** (0.0093) (0.0561) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) 0.0015 -0.0401 (0.0182) (0.1185) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) -0.0005 0.0193 (0.0160) (0.0948) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0282 0.0750 (0.0155) (0.0880) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0622*** 0.0869 (0.0146) (0.0843) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0764*** 0.0802 (0.0149) (0.0857) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1288*** 0.2017* (0.0148) (0.0882) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) 0.1649*** 0.1989* (0.0153) (0.0955) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.0562*** -0.0356 (0.0077) (0.0551) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) -0.0931*** -0.1197** (0.0053) (0.0395) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) 0.0949*** 0.1282*** (0.0055) (0.0343) Constant 2.3110*** 0.6567*** 2.3001*** 1.2248*** (0.0063) (0.0399) (0.0522) (0.2934) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 35,992 32,907 1,032 909 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 38Table 23: Weekly hours worked, groups defined by religion, OLS- regression Treatment group: Muslims Comparison: Christians Comparison: other Religion (not Sikh) Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 3/20/2003 0.4124* 0.4338 2.7409 3.4505 (0.2096) (0.4328) (1.7329) (3.6822) Observed after 3/11/2004 0.1716 0.2364 -3.1550 0.9071 (0.1884) (0.4231) (1.9564) (2.9063) Observed after 7/7/2005 0.0649 0.0594 0.8361 3.8568 (0.1800) (0.3376) (1.7862) (2.7861) muslim 0.2077 0.7884 1.0096 0.9095 (1.2363) (1.2195) (1.6208) (1.8313) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group -0.9413 -1.5409 -3.2698 -3.4803 (1.6740) (1.6456) (2.4044) (2.6642) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group -0.7742 -0.1649 2.5524 2.3817 (1.5094) (1.4553) (2.4671) (2.6076) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.8953 1.1415 0.1241 -0.2603 (1.5552) (1.4892) (2.3651) (2.3857) Age in years 0.7524*** 0.8690** (0.0479) (0.3088) Age (squared) -0.0091*** -0.0111** (0.0006) (0.0038) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.8780*** 0.7371 (0.1781) (1.2245) No. of children under 16 -0.1118 -0.6964 (0.0828) (0.4103) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.3710 -0.5999 (0.2158) (1.6624) Higher education ( 1 = yes) -0.1988 -0.1183 (0.2561) (1.8302) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.1461 -0.7906 (0.1985) (1.6990) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) 1.1022*** 1.5632 (0.2453) (1.7083) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) 0.2211 1.7928 (0.3149) (1.9109) Tenure 3 to 6 months (1 = yes) 0.2341 -5.8944* (0.5385) (2.4922) Tenure 6 to 12 months (1 = yes) 0.2348 0.4122 (0.4827) (2.1681) Tenure 1 to 2 years (1 = yes) 0.0031 -3.8849 (0.4475) (2.1850) Tenure 2 to 5 years (1 = yes) 0.0132 -1.3720 (0.4180) (1.9335) Tenure 5 to 10 years (1 = yes) 0.0829 -1.4108 (0.4260) (2.0330) Tenure 10 to 20 years (1 = yes) -0.3159 -3.6985 (0.4246) (2.2117) Tenure more then 20 years (1 = yes) -0.5273 0.5535 (0.4385) (2.4413) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.7399** -0.8862 (0.2406) (1.4463) Firmsize < 25 employees (1 = yes) 0.2620 -0.1645 (0.1672) (1.2420) Firmsize > 500 employees (1 = yes) -0.7335*** 0.8592 (0.1764) (1.0910) Constant 42.3764*** 20.8364*** 41.5745*** 32.6880** (0.1530) (1.4519) (1.0541) (12.6063) Industry ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 37,844 34,578 1,092 957 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 39Table 24: Probability of employment, groups defined by religion, Probit-regression Treatment group: Muslims Comparison: Christians Comparison: other Religion (not Sikh) Variable naive adjusted naive adjusted Observed after 3/20/2003 0.0202 0.0486 0.0587 0.3821* (0.0137) (0.0337) (0.1071) (0.1933) Observed after 3/11/2004 -0.0196 0.0026 -0.0183 0.2831 (0.0123) (0.0344) (0.1042) (0.2062) Observed after 7/7/2005 -0.0625*** -0.0075 -0.0020 -0.2000 (0.0115) (0.0262) (0.0965) (0.1572) muslim -0.8410*** -0.9412*** -0.5717*** -0.3937** (0.0589) (0.0725) (0.0951) (0.1204) Post-Iraq-War*Treatment group 0.0116 0.0563 -0.0269 0.1624 (0.0801) (0.0975) (0.1330) (0.1610) Post-Madrid-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0114 -0.0539 0.0101 -0.2479 (0.0720) (0.0883) (0.1261) (0.1531) Post-London-Bombings*Treatment group 0.0580 0.0623 -0.0025 0.0829 (0.0659) (0.0817) (0.1163) (0.1421) Age in years 0.1894*** 0.1095*** (0.0030) (0.0164) Age (squared) -0.0026*** -0.0015*** (0.0000) (0.0002) Married/cohabiting (1 = yes) 0.5313*** 0.4160*** (0.0140) (0.0664) No. of children under 16 -0.0702*** -0.0780** (0.0066) (0.0238) Degree or equivalent ( 1 = yes) 0.0275 0.2392** (0.0177) (0.0843) Higher education ( 1 = yes) -0.0245 0.0282 (0.0201) (0.1086) GCSE grades A*-C or equivalent ( 1 = yes) -0.1012*** -0.0865 (0.0158) (0.0920) Other qualiﬁcation ( 1 = yes) -0.1844*** -0.3702*** (0.0182) (0.0839) No qualiﬁcation (1 = yes) -0.5057*** -0.7108*** (0.0205) (0.0975) Health problem hindering at work (1 = yes) -0.9588*** -0.9317*** (0.0139) (0.0713) Constant -0.0928*** -2.4620*** -0.3621*** -1.7931*** (0.0100) (0.0973) (0.0754) (0.4465) Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Region ﬁxed eﬀects no yes no yes Time ﬁxed eﬀects (months, years) no yes no yes N 84,733 75,686 4,700 3,972 Coeﬃcients, robust standard-errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level respectively. See text for explanations and variable deﬁnitions. 40Working Paper Series in Economics (see www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers for a complete list) No.69: Maik Heinemann: E-stability and stability learning in models with asymmetric information, December 2007 No.68: Joachim Wagner: Exporte und Produktivität in Industriebetrieben – Niedersachsen im interregionalen und internationalen Vergleich, Dezember 2007 No.67: Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin F. Quaas: Ecological-economic viability as a criterion of strong sustainability under uncertainty, November 2007 No.66: Kathrin Michael: Überbrückungsgeld und Existenzgründungszuschuss – Ergebnisse einer schriftlichen Befragung drei Jahre nach Gründungsbeginn, November 2007 No.65: The International Study Group on Export and Productivity: Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence for 14 Countries, November 2007 No.64: Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Freistellung von Betriebsräten – Eine Beschäftigungsbremse?, November 2007 No.63: Anne-Kathrin Last: The Monetary Value of Cultural Goods: A Contingent Valuation Study of the Municipal Supply of Cultural Goods in Lueneburg, Germany, October 2007 No.62: Thomas Wein und Heike Wetzel: The Difficulty to Behave as a (regulated) Natural Monopolist – The Dynamics of Electricity Network Access Charges in Germany 2002 to 2005, September 2007 No.61: Stefan Baumgärtner und Martin F. Quaas: Agro-biodiversity as natural insurance and the development of financial insurance markets, September 2007 No.60: Stefan Bender, Joachim Wagner, Markus Zwick: KombiFiD - Kombinierte Firmendaten für Deutschland, September 2007 No.59: Jan Kranich: Too much R&D? - Vertical differentiation in a model of monopolistic competition, August 2007 No.58: Christian Papilloud und Ingrid Ott: Convergence or mediation? Experts of vulnerability and the vulnerability of experts’ discourses on nanotechnologies – a case study, July 2007 No.57: Ingrid Ott und Susanne Soretz: Governmental activity, integration and agglomeration, July 2007 No.56: Nils Braakmann: Struktur und Erfolg von Ich-AG-Gründungen: Ergebnisse einer Umfrage im Arbeitsagenturbezirk Lüneburg, Juli 2007 No.55: Nils Braakmann: Differences in the earnings distribution of self- and dependent employed German men – evidence from a quantile regression decomposition analysis, July 2007 No.54: Joachim Waagner: Export entry, export exit, and productivity in German Manufacturing Industries, June 2007 [forthcoming in: International Journal of the Economics of Business] No.53: Nils Braakmann: Wirkungen der Beschäftigungspflicht schwerbehinderter Arbeitnehmer – Erkenntnisse aus der Einführung des „Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit Schwerbehinderter“, Juni 2007 No.52: Jan Kranich und Ingrid Ott: Regionale Spitzentechnologie auf internationalen Märkten, Juni 2007 No.51: Joachim Wagner: Die Forschungspotenziale der Betriebspaneldaten des Monatsberichts im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe, Mai 2007 No.50: Stefan Baumgärtner, Frank Jöst und Ralph Winkler: Optimal dynamic scale and structure of a multi-pollution economy, May 2007 No.49: Helmut Fryges und Joachim Wagner: Exports and productivity growth – First evidence from a continuous treatment approach, May 2007 No.48: Ulrich Kaiser und Joachim Wagner: Neue Möglichkeiten zur Nutzung vertraulicher amtlicher Personen- und Firmendaten, April 2007 [erscheint in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik] No.47: Joachim Wagner: Jobmotor Mittelstand? Arbeitsplatzdynamik und Betriebsgröße in der westdeutschen Industrie, April 2007 [publiziert in: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 76 (2007), 3, 76-87] No.46: Christiane Clemens und Maik Heinemann: Credit Constraints, Idiosyncratic Risks, and the Wealth Distribution in a Heterogenous Agent Model, March 2007 No.45: Jan Kranich: Biotechnologie und Internationalisierung. Ergebnisse der Online-Befragung, März 2007 No.44: Joachim Wagner: Entry, exit and productivity. Empirical results for German manufacturing industries, March 2007 No.43: Joachim Wagner: Productivity and Size of the Export Market Evidence for West and East German Plants, 2004, March 2007 [erscheint in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik] No.42: Joachim Wagner: Why more West than East German firms export, March 2007 No.41: Joachim Wagner: Exports and Productivity in Germany, March 2007 [forthcoming in: Applied Economics Quarterly] No.40: Lena Koller, Klaus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Schwellenwerte im Arbeitsrecht. Höhere Transparenz und Effizienz durch Vereinheitlichung, Februar 2007 [publiziert in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 8 (2007), 3, 242-255] No.39: Thomas Wein und Wiebke B. Röber: Sind ausbildende Handwerksbetriebe erfolgreicher?, Januar 2007 No.38: Joachim Wagner: Institut für Volkswirtschaft: Forschungsbericht 2006, Januar 2007 No.37: Nils Braakmann: The impact of September 11 th, 2001 on the job prospects of foreigners with Arab background – Evidence from German labor market data, January 2007 No.36: Jens Korunig: Regulierung des Netzmonopolisten durch Peak-load Pricing?, Dezember 2006 No.35: Nils Braakmann: Die Einführung der fachkundigen Stellungnahme bei der Ich-AG, November 2006 No.34: Martin F. Quaas and Stefan Baumgärtner: Natural vs. financial insurance in the management of public-good ecosystems, October 2006 [forthcoming in: Ecological Economics] No.33: Stefan Baumgärtner and Martin F. Quaas: The Private and Public Insurance Value of Conservative Biodiversity Management, October 2006 No.32: Ingrid Ott and Christian Papilloud: Converging institutions. Shaping the relationships between nanotechnologies, economy and society, October 2006 [published in: Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 2007 (27), 4, 455-466] No.31: Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner: The persistent decline in unionization in western and eastern Germany, 1980-2004: What can we learn from a decomposition analysis?, October 2006 [published in: Industrielle Beziehungen/The German Journal of Industrial Relations 14 (2007), 118-132] No.30: Ingrid Ott and Susanne Soretz: Regional growth strategies: fiscal versus institutional governmental policies, September 2006 [forthcoming in: Economic Modelling] No.29: Christian Growitsch and Heike Wetzel: Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis, July 2006 No.28: Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner: Do exporters really pay higher wages? First evidence from German linked employer-employee data, June 2006 [published in in: Journal of International Economics 72 (2007), 1, 52-74] No.27: Joachim Wagner: Markteintritte, Marktaustritte und Produktivität Empirische Befunde zur Dynamik in der Industrie, März 2006 [erscheint in: Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv, Heft 3/2007] No.26: Ingrid Ott and Susanne Soretz: Governmental activity and private capital adjustment, March 2006 [forthcoming in: Icfai Journal of Managerial Economics] No.25: Joachim Wagner: International Firm Activities and Innovation: Evidence from Knowledge Production Functions for German Firms, March 2006 No.24: Ingrid Ott und Susanne Soretz: Nachhaltige Entwicklung durch endogene Umweltwahrnehmung, März 2006 publiziert in: Clemens, C., Heinemann, M. & Soretz, S., Auf allen Märkten zu Hause (Gedenkschrift für Franz Haslinger), Marburg: Metropolis, 2006, 233-256 No.23: John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel, and Joachim Wagner: The (Parlous) State of German Unions, February 2006 [forthcoming in: Journal of Labor Research 28 (2007), 3-18] No.22: Joachim Wagner, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabel, and John T. Addison: Works Councils, Labor Productivity and Plant Heterogeneity: First Evidence from Quantile Regressions, February 2006 [published in: Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 226 (2006), 505 - 518] No.21: Corinna Bunk: Betriebliche Mitbestimmung vier Jahre nach der Reform des BetrVG: Ergebnisse der 2. Befragung der Mitglieder des Arbeitgeberverbandes Lüneburg Nordostniedersachsen, Februar 2006 No.20: Jan Kranich: The Strength of Vertical Linkages, July 2006 No.19: Jan Kranich und Ingrid Ott: Geographische Restrukturierung internationaler Wertschöpfungsketten – Standortentscheidungen von KMU aus regionalökonomischer Perspektive, Februar 2006 No.18: Thomas Wein und Wiebke B. Röber: Handwerksreform 2004 – Rückwirkungen auf das Ausbildungsverhalten Lüneburger Handwerksbetriebe?, Februar 2006 No.17: Wiebke B. Röber und Thomas Wein: Mehr Wettbewerb im Handwerk durch die Handwerksreform?, Februar 2006 No.16: Joachim Wagner: Politikrelevante Folgerungen aus Analysen mit wirtschaftsstatistischen Einzeldaten der Amtlichen Statistik, Februar 2006 [publiziert in: Schmollers Jahrbuch 126 (2006) 359-374] No.15: Joachim Wagner: Firmenalter und Firmenperformance Empirische Befunde zu Unterschieden zwischen jungen und alten Firmen in Deutschland, September 2005 [publiziert in: Lutz Bellmann und Joachim Wagner (Hrsg.), Betriebsdemographie (Beiträge zur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Band 305), Nürnberg: IAB der BA, 83-111] No.14: Joachim Wagner: German Works Councils and Productivity: First Evidence from a Nonparametric Test, September 2005 [forthcoming in: Applied Economics Letters] No.13: Lena Koller, Claus Schnabel und Joachim Wagner: Arbeitsrechtliche Schwellenwerte und betriebliche Arbeitsplatzdynamik: Eine empirische Untersuchung am Beispiel des Schwerbehindertengesetzes, August 2005 [publiziert in: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung/ Journal for Labour Market Research 39 (2006), 181-199] No.12: Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner: Who are the workers who never joined a union? Empirical evidence from Germany, July 2005 [published in: Industrielle Beziehungen/ The German Journal of Industrial Relations 13 (2006), 118-131] No.11: Joachim Wagner: Exporte und Produktivität in mittelständischen Betrieben Befunde aus der niedersächsischen Industrie (1995 – 2004), June 2005 [publiziert in: Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Statistik, Statistische Berichte Niedersachsen, Sonderausgabe: Tagung der NLS am 9. März 2006, Globalisierung und regionale Wirtschaftsentwicklung - Datenlage und Datenbedarf in Niedersachsen. Hannover, Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Statistik, Juli 2006, 18 – 29] No.10: Joachim Wagner: Der Noth gehorchend, nicht dem eignen Trieb. Nascent Necessity and Opportunity Entrepreneurs in Germany. Evidence from the Regional Entrepreneurship Monitor (REM), May 2005 [published in: RWI: Mitteilungen. Quarterly 54/ 55 (2003/04), 287-303 {published June 2006}] No. 9: Gabriel Desgranges and Maik Heinemann: Strongly Rational Expectations Equilibria with Endogenous Acquisition of Information, March 2005 No. 8: Joachim Wagner: Exports, Foreign Direct Investment, and Productivity: Evidence from German Firm Level Data, March 2005 [published in: Applied Economics Letters 13 (2006), 347-349] No. 7: Thomas Wein: Associations’ Agreement and the Interest of the Network Suppliers – The Strategic Use of Structural Features, March 2005 No. 6: Christiane Clemens and Maik Heinemann: On the Effects of Redistribution on Growth and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking, March 2005 No. 5: Christiane Clemens and Maik Heinemann: Endogenous Redistributive Cycles – An overlapping Generations Approach to Social Conflict and Cyclical Growth, March 2005 No. 4: Joachim Wagner: Exports and Productivity: A Survey of the Evidence from Firm Level Data, March 2005 [published in: The World Economy 30 (2007), 1, 60-82] No. 3: Thomas Wein and Reimund Schwarze: Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance, March 2005 No. 2: Ingrid Ott and Stephen J. Turnovsky: Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs: Consequences for Economic Growth, June 2005 (Revised version) [published in: Economica 73 (2006), 292, 725-742 also published as CESifo Working Paper 1423] No. 1: Joachim Wagner: Nascent and Infant Entrepreneurs in Germany. Evidence from the Regional Entrepreneurship Monitor (REM), March 2005 [published in: Simon C. Parker (Ed.), The Life Cycle of Entrepreneurial Ventures (International Handbook Series on Entrepreneurship, Volume 3), New York etc.: Springer, 2006, 15-37] Leuphana Universität Lüneburg Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre Postfach 2440 D-21314 Lüneburg Tel.: ++49 4131 677 2321 email: brodt@leuphana.de www.leuphana.de/vwl/papers

Post 9-11 U.S. Muslim Labor Market Outcomes

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