Traffic Networks provide a model for studying selfish routing: non-cooperative agents travel from sources to destinations experiencing a latency that depends on the network congestion and, hence, on routes chosen by other agents. Traffic stabilizes to a game-theoretic equilibrium in which all agents experience the same latency. A multi-commodity (that is, a graph with many source-target pairs) is vulnerable if there exists an assignment of latency functions to edges such that the resulting traffic network suffers from the counterintuitive phenomenon, called Braess paradox, for which a network increases its efficiency by removing edges. Building on an existing characterization of vulnerable multi-commodities and a polynomial algorithm to che...
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic sel...
We first consider the K-user(player) resource allocation problem when the resources or strategies ar...
Abstract. In this work we study weighted network congestion games with player-specific latency funct...
AbstractWe consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function that specifi...
A directed multigraph is said vulnerable if it can generate Braess paradox in traffic networks. In t...
AbstractIntuitively, Braess’s paradox states that destroying a part of a network may improve the com...
The vulnerability of a transportation network is strongly correlated with the ability of the network...
We consider a directed network in which every edge pos-sesses a latency function specifying the time...
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed in...
abstract: This paper uses network theory to simulate Nash equilibria for selfish travel within a tra...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
Global communication networks like the Internet often lack a central authority that monitors and reg...
We consider a priority-based selfish routing model, where agents may have different priorities on a ...
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic sel...
Traditionally, game theoretic approaches to measuring transport network reliability have relied on t...
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic sel...
We first consider the K-user(player) resource allocation problem when the resources or strategies ar...
Abstract. In this work we study weighted network congestion games with player-specific latency funct...
AbstractWe consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function that specifi...
A directed multigraph is said vulnerable if it can generate Braess paradox in traffic networks. In t...
AbstractIntuitively, Braess’s paradox states that destroying a part of a network may improve the com...
The vulnerability of a transportation network is strongly correlated with the ability of the network...
We consider a directed network in which every edge pos-sesses a latency function specifying the time...
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed in...
abstract: This paper uses network theory to simulate Nash equilibria for selfish travel within a tra...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
Global communication networks like the Internet often lack a central authority that monitors and reg...
We consider a priority-based selfish routing model, where agents may have different priorities on a ...
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic sel...
Traditionally, game theoretic approaches to measuring transport network reliability have relied on t...
We introduce a unifying model to study the impact of worst-case latency deviations in non-atomic sel...
We first consider the K-user(player) resource allocation problem when the resources or strategies ar...
Abstract. In this work we study weighted network congestion games with player-specific latency funct...