On the Relation between Mind and Body in Human Being

The relation between mind and body in human being has hitherto been studied chiefly from the dualistic standpoint. In Descartes' philosophy, which has greatly contributed to the philosophical foundation of the psycho-physical dualism, cogitatio was regarded as an act of pure spirit, while human being was thought to be a complex of mind and body, though these, each in itself, were treated as separate substances. This mode of thinking seems to find acceptance even with some modern philosophers. In Husserl's phenomenology pure consciousness with its intentional structure is distinguished from the human being qua psycho-physical (natural being). Heidegger determines existence as a total being abstracted from the relation between mind and body. Sartre gives an interesting interpretation of human body, leaving however some points questionable. Mind and body in their close relation compose the totality of human being, so that the totality, apart from this relation, would be nothing but a mere abstraction. It is true that mind and body are different in their mode of being, but this modal difference should not be interpreted as substantial. They, although quite different in so far as the former is incorporeal and temporal, while the latter corporeal and spacial, have nevertheless no separate existence, but are different aspects of the same self. As my consciousness constitutes my own being, so my body in its absolute individuality also represents my whole self. Human being as the being in the world stands in communication with each other. The communication is the personal relation by means of expression and understanding. Expression, however, is a bodily manifestation of one's own mental experience : therefore, it is only possible on the ground of the unity of mind and body, whence it follows that the explanation of the possibility of understanding others with the theory of Einfühlung is wrong. But on the other hand, mind transcends body, as well as body may be called automaton as by Descartes, and this is the reason why the understanding of others is not so easy as Scheler's hypothesis of Du-Evidenz assumes. Not only my expression but also my whole body is closely related to my soul; my mental act, however, though dependent upon my body, has freedom to transcend it, and thus it is creative. Bergson says that the relation of soul to body, when expressed in terms of space, is like that of two railway lines which cut each other at a right angle, while from the standpoint of time the rails come together in a curve so that we may sensibly pass from the one to the other; I should rather like to compare soul and body to two circles which cover each other in part indeterminable in extent. The transcendence of mind and body by each other is correlative, and is conditioned by their correlativity