This technical paper contains the proofs of all lemmata, propo- sitions and other statements made in the paper Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market
In this paper, I consider a problem of multi-dimensional screening in the case when the number of co...
We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-bu...
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells ra...
This technical paper contains the proofs of all lemmata, propo- sitions and other statements made i...
Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and po...
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type...
We extend Armstrong’s [2] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening mod-els in two key ways...
Informed insurance monopoly and risk discrimination We model a situation where a monopolistic insur...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple mult...
This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensio...
This paper studies a standard screening problem where the principal’s allocation rule is multi-dimen...
Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques Nous modélisons une situation où le monop...
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empir...
This paper studies a class of multidimensional screening models where dif-ferent type dimensions lie...
We study the identification of an insurance model with multidimensional screen-ing, where insurees a...
In this paper, I consider a problem of multi-dimensional screening in the case when the number of co...
We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-bu...
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells ra...
This technical paper contains the proofs of all lemmata, propo- sitions and other statements made i...
Bundled coverage of different losses and distinct perils, along with differential deductibles and po...
In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type...
We extend Armstrong’s [2] result on exclusion in multi-dimensional screening mod-els in two key ways...
Informed insurance monopoly and risk discrimination We model a situation where a monopolistic insur...
Abstract: This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple mult...
This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensio...
This paper studies a standard screening problem where the principal’s allocation rule is multi-dimen...
Monopole d'assurance informé et discrimination des risques Nous modélisons une situation où le monop...
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empir...
This paper studies a class of multidimensional screening models where dif-ferent type dimensions lie...
We study the identification of an insurance model with multidimensional screen-ing, where insurees a...
In this paper, I consider a problem of multi-dimensional screening in the case when the number of co...
We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-bu...
A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells ra...
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