[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per Shimomura (1997) i el nucli d'un joc cooperatiu amb utilitat transferible coincideixin. A tal efecte, s'introdueix el concepte de vectors de màxim pagament. La condició necessària consiteix a verificar que aquests vectors pertanyen al nucli del joc.[eng] A necessary condition for the coincidence of the bargaining sets defined by Shimomura (1997) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility is provided. To this aim, a set of payoff vectors, called max-payoff vectors, are introduced. This necessary condition simply checks whether these vectors are core elements of the game
This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solutio...
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduct...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per...
Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a ga...
AbstractFirst, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as refere...
We introduce a new notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show a convergence result
A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely games with regu...
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's...
Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs...
[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden e...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis fo...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solutio...
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduct...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
[cat] En l'article es dona una condició necessària per a que els conjunts de negociació definits per...
Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a ga...
AbstractFirst, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as refere...
We introduce a new notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show a convergence result
A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namely games with regu...
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's...
Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs...
[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden e...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...
A static comparative study on set-solutions for cooperative TU games is carried out. The analysis fo...
First, we introduce pairwise-bargained consistency with a reference point, and use as reference poin...
This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solutio...
One of David Schmeidler’s many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduct...
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assig...