Proof. Let 2 be an information structure that is consistent with PA 2 P. First, we list in order all distinct posteriors i 2 () for 1 i I = j()j. Given that is consistent with PA, there exists a corresponding optimal choice strategy CA: () ! (A) such that the information structure and choice functions match the data, PA(aj!) = IX i=1 (ij!)CA(aji): We also list in order all possible posteriors associated with the corresponding revealed in-formation structure, j 2 (A), 1 j jj, and identify all chosen actions that are associated with posterior j as F j, Fj fa 2 Aj aA = jg: The garbling matrix bij sets the probability of j 2 given i 2 () as the probability of all choices associated with actions a 2 Fj bij = X a2 Fj CA(aji)...
Models for optional stopping in statistics are also normative models for tasks in which subjects may...
In this paper, we study a general model of information acquisition: costly Bayesian learning. Using ...
Economic analysis containing agents with incomplete information is common in many fields of economic...
Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reect irrationality, as oppos...
This dissertation contains three essays on information economics that aim to understand the value an...
In many environments it is costly for decision makers to determine which option is best for them bec...
We consider a rational utility maximizer decision maker (DM) who must gather two pieces of informati...
This dissertation contains three essays in Economic Theory. The first chapter relates to information...
This dissertation consists of three chapters with the common ground of economic decision making, a s...
Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opp...
We explore two highly interrelated models of "hard information." In the evidence-acquisition model, ...
We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifyin...
We consider an agent who chooses from a set of options after receiving some private information. Thi...
This paper establishes the equivalence between Bayesian revealed preference (Caplin and Dean, 2015) ...
This thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is a self-contained analysis of a distinct th...
Models for optional stopping in statistics are also normative models for tasks in which subjects may...
In this paper, we study a general model of information acquisition: costly Bayesian learning. Using ...
Economic analysis containing agents with incomplete information is common in many fields of economic...
Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reect irrationality, as oppos...
This dissertation contains three essays on information economics that aim to understand the value an...
In many environments it is costly for decision makers to determine which option is best for them bec...
We consider a rational utility maximizer decision maker (DM) who must gather two pieces of informati...
This dissertation contains three essays in Economic Theory. The first chapter relates to information...
This dissertation consists of three chapters with the common ground of economic decision making, a s...
Apparently mistaken decisions are ubiquitous. To what extent does this reflect irrationality, as opp...
We explore two highly interrelated models of "hard information." In the evidence-acquisition model, ...
We show how information acquisition costs can be identified using observable choice data. Identifyin...
We consider an agent who chooses from a set of options after receiving some private information. Thi...
This paper establishes the equivalence between Bayesian revealed preference (Caplin and Dean, 2015) ...
This thesis consists of three chapters, each of which is a self-contained analysis of a distinct th...
Models for optional stopping in statistics are also normative models for tasks in which subjects may...
In this paper, we study a general model of information acquisition: costly Bayesian learning. Using ...
Economic analysis containing agents with incomplete information is common in many fields of economic...