Moran on Agency and Self-knowledge1

Self-knowledge is not just another epistemic acquisition, like knowledge of trains or stamps. It is knowledge that lies at the core of our understanding of what it is to be, and what is important in being, a person. Just as fascinating as the centrality of self-knowledge is its fragility. Perhaps the central most notable achievement of Moran's book is the substance it gives to these truths. It provides a rich, illuminating and nuanced discussion of the character and role of self-knowledge. Moran's central conviction is that the special nature of self-knowledge depends upon it being a product of rational agency. He juxtaposes this view to that of self-knowledge as a 'purely epistemic ' gain attained via reasons or evidence. Persons, on the view that emerges, are beings capable of taking both theoretical and deliberative attitudes toward themselves. In general, we will expect the explanation of how we know something to draw on our capacities for theoretical enquiry, for gathering evidence or reasons in favour of that thing. It is therefore natural to try to explain self-knowledge as a product of a particular kind of theoretical enquiry. However, such attempts have proved highly unsuccessful. Moran follows others in finding an