OWNERSHIP, COMPETITION, AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

Empirical research on firms ’ (dis)incentives to disclose investigates the effects of a range of variables including information asymmetry, agency costs, political costs, and proprietary costs. Verrecchia (2001) argues that economic-based models of disclosure must establish a link between financial reporting and its economic consequences. In response to Verrecchia (2001) and drawing on the industrial organization and strategic management disciplines we introduce a new variable (measuring insider ownership and industry competition) which links both the internal and external environments of the firm and demonstrate that it adds to our understanding of discretionary financial disclosure decisions. We test the model by examining voluntary segment disclosures in Australian firms. We find that our new variable linking the internal and external environment of the firm, alongside previously tested variables including ownership diffusion, return and size is significant. We conduct a series of robustness tests on our model and find that the significance of the model is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring the change in standard, acquisitions and disposals and cross listing on the US stock exchange