The Ground of the World: A Marginal Problem in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

Is there a world in G. W. F. Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit? This is the central question my doctoral thesis aims to address. Both scholars and philosophers alike tend to consider Hegel a thinker who, having formulated the philosophy of absolute spirit, has surrendered the world. Despite this suspicion, the consciousness finds itself at nearly every level of Hegel's oeuvre in a place called "the world". At every stage, the world changes its shape - along with the consciousness - but its function seems to remain the same. The world is a conception of totality; thus, the world is an object of the consciousness that, by definition, surpasses the consciousness and thus reveals its limits. This moment of a "worldly" estrangement is especially pronounced as the consciousness sets itself into action. One of the most recurring motives in Hegel's The Phenomenology of Spirit is the inability of the consciousness to realize its intentions as planned. The consciousness fails to recognize itself in the deed, and thus devises strategies to distance itself from the deed. In my interpretation, this testifies that the deed is the door to the world, and obviously this world is not one that would be in the power of the consciousness. Instead, it is the consciousness that needs to subordinate itself to the deed..