The present work describes the model of heuristic judgment of Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and two experiments based upon it. According to the model people answer a question with an answer to an easier question when making a heuristic judgment. This process is called the attribute substitution because a target attribute of a question is substituted by an associated and easier accessible heuristic attribute. The first experiment investigated whether two heuristic attributes can be used simultaneously during making of a judgment. A part of participants gave 1 or 4 reasons for one of the statements in Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Numbers of reasons were selected so as to produce a feeling of fluency of disfluency. Although the conj...
The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and...
Six experiments were carried out to examine possible heuristics and biases in the evaluation of yes-...
Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristi...
How and when are individuals more or less influenced by heuristics when making judgments? The first...
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) offered an explanation that in intuitive probability judgment people use j...
New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of “dual pr...
AbstractPsychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of in...
The Heuristics and Biases approach to judgment under uncertainty began 40 years ago with the publica...
This discussion paper will look at heuristics (rule of thumb techniques for decision making), (Tvers...
The Heuristics and Biases approach to judgment under uncertainty began 40 years ago with the publica...
Understanding the underlying psychological process that leads to a bias is crucial for developing re...
Research on judgment and decision making presents a confusing picture of human abilities. For exampl...
In the intuitive probability judgment, two approaches to explain “conjunction fallacy" and “base rat...
Traditionally, studies examining decision-making heuristics and biases (H&B) have focused on aggrega...
This chapter is concerned with two related processes – judgement and decision making. We start off b...
The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and...
Six experiments were carried out to examine possible heuristics and biases in the evaluation of yes-...
Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristi...
How and when are individuals more or less influenced by heuristics when making judgments? The first...
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) offered an explanation that in intuitive probability judgment people use j...
New work on heuristics and biases has explored the role of emotions and affect; the idea of “dual pr...
AbstractPsychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of in...
The Heuristics and Biases approach to judgment under uncertainty began 40 years ago with the publica...
This discussion paper will look at heuristics (rule of thumb techniques for decision making), (Tvers...
The Heuristics and Biases approach to judgment under uncertainty began 40 years ago with the publica...
Understanding the underlying psychological process that leads to a bias is crucial for developing re...
Research on judgment and decision making presents a confusing picture of human abilities. For exampl...
In the intuitive probability judgment, two approaches to explain “conjunction fallacy" and “base rat...
Traditionally, studies examining decision-making heuristics and biases (H&B) have focused on aggrega...
This chapter is concerned with two related processes – judgement and decision making. We start off b...
The categorization of inductive reasoning into largely automatic processes (heuristic reasoning) and...
Six experiments were carried out to examine possible heuristics and biases in the evaluation of yes-...
Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristi...