EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust : Antitrust in Payoff Matrix

EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust Antitrust in Payoff Matrix Abstract The thesis consists of two parts - comparative study and antitrust model. First part is dedicated to the comparison of European competition policy and American antitrust. It introduces both policies and focuses mostly on key differences between them, especially on the non-price vertical restraints and monopoly pricing. The economic theory is indecisive about the effects of vertical agreements on competition. The EU finds them often anticompetitive compared to the U.S. that believes in their procompetitive or neutral impact. Second part presents an antitrust model which describes the process of protecting competition and suggests optimal behavior for both enforcement officials and firms. In the game theory framework the payoff matrixes show the difference discussed in the first part and offer theoretical solution. Optimal strategies are derived for American, European and neutral policies and compared afterwards. The case study concludes the thesis and gives a real example of the difference between antitrust and competition policy. Key words: antitrust, competition policy, vertical mergers, game theory, payoff matrix, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, Sherman Ac