The Material Apriori and the Material Ethics of Values in Max Scheler

Prolegomena zur phänomenologischen materialen Wertethik bei Max Scheler: Vom Materialen Apriori bis zum emotionalen Apriori in Bezug auf I. Kant und E. Husserl ZHANG Wei Abstract This essay is an investigation on Scheler's phenomenological material ethics of value against the background of his thoughts of ethics. It discusses the static founding-relation of Scheler's material apriorism and his phenomenological meta-ethics in the context of Kant and Husserl. The introduction includes three basic questions of ethics. The first one is the fundamental question of ethics, that is, "how should men live?" The second one is the leading question of ethics, that is, "what is good?" The third one is the grounding question of ethics, that is, "whether is the ethics founded on reason or feeling/emotions at all?" These three questions form a wide background of ideas for the investigation of Scheler's phenomenological material ethics of value. The primary problem of Scheler's ethics is how an absolute or a priori, emotional ethics is possible. Therefore, the entry point of this essay is to phenomenologically re-examine the "a priori." Chapter 1 begins with the analysis of Kant's and Husserl's understandings of the "a priori." And the next step is to discuss Scheler's critique of Kant's understanding of the formal a..