We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good contributors. In steady state, larger economies have more contributors. If thepublic good is normal, then its quantity increases in population size in the open-loopequilibrium, but not necessarily in the feedback equilibrium. If both private and public goodsare normal, then the open-loop equilibrium exhibits greater steady-state public provision thanthe feedback equilibrium. If private consumption is inferior the opposite is true. Interpretingindividuals as countries, our findings suggest that all countries over time will becomecontributors toward a global public good
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public ...
In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each...
This paper examines whether two regions should remain together within a fiscal federation, or separa...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free riding in the accumulation of durable ...
ArticleIn this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. ...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
The public good game is a popular model of cooperation problems. Rational egoism predicts that in fi...
The traditional Solow-Swan growth framework has only one kind privately owned capital. Output saved ...
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually...
The traditional Solow-Swan growth framework has only one kind privately owned capital. Output saved ...
I present a dynamic public good experiment where subjects endogenously determine contribution produc...
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public ...
In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each...
This paper examines whether two regions should remain together within a fiscal federation, or separa...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free riding in the accumulation of durable ...
ArticleIn this paper, we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. ...
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free-riding in the accumulation of durable ...
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
The public good game is a popular model of cooperation problems. Rational egoism predicts that in fi...
The traditional Solow-Swan growth framework has only one kind privately owned capital. Output saved ...
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually...
The traditional Solow-Swan growth framework has only one kind privately owned capital. Output saved ...
I present a dynamic public good experiment where subjects endogenously determine contribution produc...
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public ...
In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each...
This paper examines whether two regions should remain together within a fiscal federation, or separa...