From pragmatism to idealism to failure: Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974

Both before and after 1974, the question of territory controlled by the Greek or the Turkish side in Cyprus has been one of the most important and enduring aspects of the Cyprus problem. With its starting point at an unpublished telegram (from the National Archives of Australia) detailing secret UK views, this paper examines British -and to a slightly lesser extent, US- policy towards Cyprus in July and August 1974. In particular it focuses on policy towards the amount of territory that could, would or should be controlled by Turkey in Cyprus; on the factors that led to this policy and its eventual implementation by Turkey; on the changes of stance and the interaction between British and US policy (and James Callaghan and Henry Kissinger respectively); on military assessments and options in Cyprus; and on the reasons why ultimately the British policy in Cyprus failed in August 1974