The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Typically the largest shareholder in any large listed company is likely to own a voting minority of the shares. Majority ownership by a single shareholder is unusual. It is not uncommon for the largest shareholding to be under 20 percent and in many cases it is much less than that. A broadly similar pattern is observed in the USA. Two inferences about corporate governance are conventionally drawn from this, following the early work of Berle and Means: (1) All but the very largest shareholders are typically too small to have any real incentive to participate in decision making; (2) All but the ver...
This paper investigates whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to discipline ...
Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not...
We investigate the empirical relationship between managerial ownership of shares and corporate perfo...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory to applied own...
The first striking feature is that ownership of the average UK company is diffuse: a coalition of at...
Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth r...
Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth re...
The fundamental problem of corporate governance in the United States isto alleviate the conflict of ...
This paper investigates the characteristics of 73 UK companies in which managers have an ownership s...
An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory applied to own...
Most U.S. public companies have a one-share, one-vote capital structure, in which voting power is pr...
The focus of comparative corporate governance scholarship is shifting from takeovers to controlling ...
This paper investigates whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to discipline ...
Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not...
We investigate the empirical relationship between managerial ownership of shares and corporate perfo...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countri...
An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory to applied own...
The first striking feature is that ownership of the average UK company is diffuse: a coalition of at...
Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth r...
Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s wealth re...
The fundamental problem of corporate governance in the United States isto alleviate the conflict of ...
This paper investigates the characteristics of 73 UK companies in which managers have an ownership s...
An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory applied to own...
Most U.S. public companies have a one-share, one-vote capital structure, in which voting power is pr...
The focus of comparative corporate governance scholarship is shifting from takeovers to controlling ...
This paper investigates whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to discipline ...
Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not...
We investigate the empirical relationship between managerial ownership of shares and corporate perfo...