Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make “smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, i...
It is well known that laypersons and practitioners often resist using complex mathematical models su...
When ranking two alternatives by some criteria and only one of the alternatives is recognized, parti...
The recognition heuristic (RH) is one of the most prominent models of inferential decision making, b...
Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons othe...
The ‘fast and frugal ’ approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heur...
In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers ...
In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two obje...
Choices in value-based decision making are affected by the magnitude of the alternatives (i.e. the s...
It has long been supposed that preference judgments between sets of to-be-considered possibilities a...
We conducted 2 experiments on the framing effect; recording reaction times in the first using a ques...
Overwhelming evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that, in simple discrimination tasks (determ...
One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1...
Decision makers are often called on to make snap judgments using fast-and- frugal decisionrules call...
The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in order to make...
Delayed comparison tasks are widely used in the study of working memory and perception in psychology...
It is well known that laypersons and practitioners often resist using complex mathematical models su...
When ranking two alternatives by some criteria and only one of the alternatives is recognized, parti...
The recognition heuristic (RH) is one of the most prominent models of inferential decision making, b...
Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons othe...
The ‘fast and frugal ’ approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heur...
In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers ...
In a series of three experiments, participants made inferences about which one of a pair of two obje...
Choices in value-based decision making are affected by the magnitude of the alternatives (i.e. the s...
It has long been supposed that preference judgments between sets of to-be-considered possibilities a...
We conducted 2 experiments on the framing effect; recording reaction times in the first using a ques...
Overwhelming evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that, in simple discrimination tasks (determ...
One-reason decision-making heuristics as proposed by Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1...
Decision makers are often called on to make snap judgments using fast-and- frugal decisionrules call...
The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in order to make...
Delayed comparison tasks are widely used in the study of working memory and perception in psychology...
It is well known that laypersons and practitioners often resist using complex mathematical models su...
When ranking two alternatives by some criteria and only one of the alternatives is recognized, parti...
The recognition heuristic (RH) is one of the most prominent models of inferential decision making, b...