The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depends, among other things, on prior ideological beliefs about parties and/or candidates. Voters that are ex ante indifferent about the candidates attach little value to information because they perceive that voting itself will have little value. Voters that are ex ante very ideological also attach little value to information because they think that the news will hardly change their opinion. Thus, high incentives to be informed can be found at intermediate levels of ideological strength. Moreover, the impact of increased political knowledge on turnout is asymmetric: New information increase the probability of voting of indifferent voters but decr...
This paper uses longitudinal data from the National Cohort Development Study (NCDS) to investigate t...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters h...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during anelectoral campaign depend...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both i...
This thesis contributes to the study of the role of information in elections and public policy forma...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both i...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of politicalknowledge on turnout. Both in...
This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour ...
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences ha...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
This paper uses longitudinal data from the National Cohort Development Study (NCDS) to investigate t...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters h...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during anelectoral campaign depend...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
The amount of political information that voters decide to acquire during an electoral campaign depen...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both i...
This thesis contributes to the study of the role of information in elections and public policy forma...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both i...
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of politicalknowledge on turnout. Both in...
This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour ...
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences ha...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
This paper uses longitudinal data from the National Cohort Development Study (NCDS) to investigate t...
Defence date: 4 November 2016Examining Board: Professor Diego Gambetta, European University Institu...
We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of different precision. Voters h...