Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face identical difficulties in creation and dissemination. One traditional view says market failure is endemic: societies tolerate monopolistic inefficiency in intellectual property (IP) protection to incentivize the creation and distribution of intellectual assets. This paper examines that tradeoff in dynamic, representative agent general equilibrium, and characterizes socially efficient creativity. Markets for intellectual assets protected by IP rights can produce too much or too little innovation
Abstract: The main rationale for intellectual property relies on the thesis of the incentive to crea...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
International audienceWe study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Abstract. In the modern theory of innovation, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an e...
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have...
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
Innovation and the adoption of new ideas are fundamental to economic progress. Here we examine the u...
The work presented here is part of a wider research programme oriented around three specific questio...
Our objective in this paper is to review what economists have said about incentive schemes to promot...
The work presented here is part of a wider research programme oriented around three specific questio...
Abstract: The main rationale for intellectual property relies on the thesis of the incentive to crea...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
International audienceWe study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Many cultural products have the same nonrival nature as scientific knowledge. They therefore face id...
Abstract. In the modern theory of innovation, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and an e...
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have...
Intellectual property (IP) rights differ from ordinary property rights. Historically, societies have...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
Innovation and the adoption of new ideas are fundamental to economic progress. Here we examine the u...
The work presented here is part of a wider research programme oriented around three specific questio...
Our objective in this paper is to review what economists have said about incentive schemes to promot...
The work presented here is part of a wider research programme oriented around three specific questio...
Abstract: The main rationale for intellectual property relies on the thesis of the incentive to crea...
We study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) when firms facin...
International audienceWe study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights (...