On the basis of a case study of two sequential alliances between the same firms, we develop a more integrative perspective on alliance governance, providing insights into the interactions between structural and relational aspects, both within and between transactions. In particular, we disentangle (1) how contracts with a similar degree but different nature of formalization (narrow versus broad) trigger different kinds of trust dynamics (negative versus positive) at both operational and managerial levels, (2) how trust dynamics and contract application (rigid versus flexible) coevolve over time, and (3) how relational dynamics in previous transactions influence the design of contracts in subsequent transactions
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a control and coo...
On the basis of a case study of two sequential alliances between the same firms, we develop a more i...
On the basis of a case study of two sequential alliances between the same firms, we develop a more i...
Existing academic literature has discussed contracts and relational governance as the key mechanisms...
Despite the large literature on alliance contract design, we know little about how transacting parti...
Research on managing interpartner risk underscores the roles of informal and formal safeguards, such...
In this paper we will identify the contract dimensions of alliance contracts directed at joint devel...
Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, ...
Strategy research underscores the role of alliances and networks in driving cooperation and value cr...
Contains fulltext : 167413.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)This paper ma...
This paper makes sense of the contract-control-trust nexus in interfirm relationships by exposing th...
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theorists traditionally have classified transactions between firms ...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a control and coo...
On the basis of a case study of two sequential alliances between the same firms, we develop a more i...
On the basis of a case study of two sequential alliances between the same firms, we develop a more i...
Existing academic literature has discussed contracts and relational governance as the key mechanisms...
Despite the large literature on alliance contract design, we know little about how transacting parti...
Research on managing interpartner risk underscores the roles of informal and formal safeguards, such...
In this paper we will identify the contract dimensions of alliance contracts directed at joint devel...
Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, ...
Strategy research underscores the role of alliances and networks in driving cooperation and value cr...
Contains fulltext : 167413.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)This paper ma...
This paper makes sense of the contract-control-trust nexus in interfirm relationships by exposing th...
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theorists traditionally have classified transactions between firms ...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Extant empirical work frequently fails to capture the underlying causes derived from differing gove...
Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a control and coo...