This paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic development by studying the effects of years in office on economic development. The hypothesis is that dictators who stay in office for a long time period will find it increasingly difficult to carry out sound economic policies. We argue that such economic policies are the result of information asymmetries inherent to dictatorships (known as the ‘dictator dilemma’) and of changes in the personality of dictators (known as the ‘winner effect’). We call the combination of these two terms the ‘dictator effect’. We present evidence to suggest that long years in office impacts on economic growth (which is reduced), inflation (which increases) and ...
Since the recent emphasis on institutions for overall economic development of the countries, t...
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives ove...
Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provid...
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic...
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. I...
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. I...
Non-democratic regimes vary in the degree to which domestic groups threaten their rule and the exten...
Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? An emerging literature is hig...
While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both resul...
While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both resul...
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives ove...
This paper studies empirically the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic...
This paper explores whether the probability of being punished after losing power leads dictators to ...
While there has been extensive evidence provided on the varying effects of leaders’ extended tenures...
We examine the impact of leadership change after a coup d’etat on economic growth. We consider succe...
Since the recent emphasis on institutions for overall economic development of the countries, t...
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives ove...
Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provid...
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the links between political regimes and economic...
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. I...
This paper develops a model of the relationship between the age of a dictator and economic growth. I...
Non-democratic regimes vary in the degree to which domestic groups threaten their rule and the exten...
Why do some autocracies have higher economic growth rates than others? An emerging literature is hig...
While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both resul...
While some believe that economic development prompts democratization, others contend that both resul...
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives ove...
This paper studies empirically the relationship between oil endowment and the duration of autocratic...
This paper explores whether the probability of being punished after losing power leads dictators to ...
While there has been extensive evidence provided on the varying effects of leaders’ extended tenures...
We examine the impact of leadership change after a coup d’etat on economic growth. We consider succe...
Since the recent emphasis on institutions for overall economic development of the countries, t...
In this article, the author argues that the time horizon a dictator faces affects his incentives ove...
Using data for a panel of 62 partly to fully democratic countries in the period 1984–2008, we provid...