The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in 30 Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either 'closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendees can see the contribution made by their direct neighbors as well as the total amount already gathered. Contributions to offerings with an external cause initially increase by 10% when baskets are used, but this effect peters out over time. No effect is found for offerings with an internal cause. This result can be explained by the presence of social incentives, but is also in line with recent studies showing that asymmetric i...
This paper deals with the differences of altruism in the frameworks of different anonymity of decisi...
Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a ...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based...
We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based...
Charities frequently spend significant expenses on solicitation. A common findingis potential donors...
Some social institutions reveal participants’ behavior in the aggregate, while concealing the identi...
Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in r...
Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in r...
Using a natural field experiment in a recreational site, a public good almost fully dependent on vol...
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of g...
In this paper we study the effect of social influence in the voluntary provision of public goods in ...
This paper deals with the differences of altruism in the frameworks of different anonymity of decisi...
Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a ...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches...
We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based...
We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary contributions, based...
Charities frequently spend significant expenses on solicitation. A common findingis potential donors...
Some social institutions reveal participants’ behavior in the aggregate, while concealing the identi...
Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in r...
Costly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in r...
Using a natural field experiment in a recreational site, a public good almost fully dependent on vol...
This study reports data from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of g...
In this paper we study the effect of social influence in the voluntary provision of public goods in ...
This paper deals with the differences of altruism in the frameworks of different anonymity of decisi...
Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a ...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...