In the paper we discuss three general properties of values of TU-games: λ-standardness, general probabilistic consistency and some modifications of the null player property. Necessary and sufficient conditions for different families of efficient, linear and symmetric values are given in terms of these properties. It is shown that the results obtained can be used to get new axiomatizations of several classical values of TU-games
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
CNRS : 2 ; AERES : AInternational audienceWe introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with...
In the paper we discuss three general properties of values of TU-games: λ-standardness, general prob...
By Hart and Mas-Colell’s axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called l...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
Hamiache assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value ...
A value on the set {\bf G} of all transferable utility games is said to have a weighted potential re...
One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notio...
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vi...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
Abstract We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which posse...
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise called consistency...
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
CNRS : 2 ; AERES : AInternational audienceWe introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with...
In the paper we discuss three general properties of values of TU-games: λ-standardness, general prob...
By Hart and Mas-Colell’s axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called l...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
Hamiache assigns to every TU game a so-called associated game and then shows that the Shapley value ...
A value on the set {\bf G} of all transferable utility games is said to have a weighted potential re...
One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notio...
In the framework of cooperative game theory, Sobolev (Advances in game theory, Izdat., “Minitis”, Vi...
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomat...
Abstract We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which posse...
It was a quarter of a century ago that Sobolev proved the reduced game (otherwise called consistency...
This thesis focuses on the area of solutions for TU-games, which contains new axiomatic characteriza...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
CNRS : 2 ; AERES : AInternational audienceWe introduce new axioms for the class of all TU-games with...