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In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within group lending programs on moral hazard behavior of its participants, based on data from an extensive questionnaire held in Eritrea among participants of 102 groups. We find support for the fact that peer monitoring by and social ties of group leaders do help to reduce moral hazard behavior of group members. In contrast, peer monitoring by and social ties of other group members are not related to reducing the occurrence of moral hazard within groups
This paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the pre...
Main objective of the study is to understand how self-help groups can give loans and finance to the ...
We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from t...
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within g...
In this paper, we investigate the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral hazard behavior with...
In this paper, we investigate the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral hazard behavior with...
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within g...
Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be attribute...
This paper analyses whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other ...
This paper analyzes whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other ...
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Abstract: This paper investigates the strategic monitoring behaviour within a group lending setting....
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group len...
This paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the pre...
Main objective of the study is to understand how self-help groups can give loans and finance to the ...
We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from t...
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within g...
In this paper, we investigate the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral hazard behavior with...
In this paper, we investigate the impact of monitoring and social ties on moral hazard behavior with...
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the impact of monitoring and social ties within g...
Most problems with formal sector credit lending to the poor in developing countries can be attribute...
This paper analyses whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other ...
This paper analyzes whether the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other ...
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Abstract: This paper investigates the strategic monitoring behaviour within a group lending setting....
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from in...
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs. Group len...
This paper reports the results from a laboratory microfinance experiment of group lending in the pre...
Main objective of the study is to understand how self-help groups can give loans and finance to the ...
We conducted a survey in 2001 among members and group leaders of borrowers who accessed loans from t...
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