In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-v...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which...
Abstract We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which posse...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions, each of wh...
The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this...
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the ...
The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this ...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of c...
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egal...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
In this paper we study a family of efficient, symmetric and linear values for TU-games, described by...
The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-v...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which...
Abstract We derive an explicit formula for a marginalist and efficient value for TU game which posse...
It is proved that Young's axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and symme...
Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of solutions, each of wh...
The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this...
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the ...
The Owen value is a modification of the Shapley value for games with a coalition structure. In this ...
It is proved that Young’s [4] axiomatization for the Shapley value by marginalism, efficiency, and s...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of c...
One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egal...
By Hart and Mas-Colell's axiomatization, it is known that the Shapley value for TU-games is fully ch...
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness proper...
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In t...
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