Formula over Function? From Algorithms to Values in Judicial Evaluation

<p>This paper discusses the forms and effects of the &lsquo;invasion&rsquo; of the &lsquo;temples of the law&rsquo; by new economic and managerial forms of performance evaluation. While traditional judicial evaluation focused on how to select and promote individual judges and on the legal quality of the single case, new quantitative methods and formulas are being introduced to assess efficiency, productivity and timeliness of judges and courts. Building on two case studies, from Spain and the Netherlands, the paper illustrates two contrasting approaches to judicial performance evaluation. On the one hand individual judges' productivity is evaluated through quantitative data and mathematical algorithms: in the extreme case considered here, judge's remuneration was adjusted accordingly. On the other hand quantitative and qualitative data, collected by a variety of methods and theoretical frameworks, are used as the basis of a multi-layered negotiation process designed to find a synthesis between competing economic, legal and social values aimed at improving overall organizational performance. Considering the flaws of unidimensional measurement and evaluation systems and considering the incommensurability of the results of the multiple evaluative frameworks (economic, legal, sociological) required to overcome such flaws, the authors argue there is a need for political dialogue between relevant players in order to allocate the values appropriate to judicial evaluation.</p> <hr /><p>Este art&iacute;culo analiza las formas y efectos de la &ldquo;invasi&oacute;n&rdquo; de los &ldquo;templos de la ley&rdquo; por nuevas formas econ&oacute;micas y de gesti&oacute;n como la evaluaci&oacute;n del rendimiento. Mientras que la evaluaci&oacute;n judicial tradicional se ha centrado en la forma de seleccionar y promocionar a jueces individuales, y en la calidad jur&iacute;dica de un caso individual, hoy en d&iacute;a se est&aacute;n introduciendo nuevos m&eacute;todos cuantitativos y f&oacute;rmulas para determinar la eficiencia, productividad y oportunidad de jueces y tribunales. A partir de dos estudios de caso de Espa&ntilde;a y los Pa&iacute;ses Bajos, el art&iacute;culo ilustra dos enfoques opuestos de la evaluaci&oacute;n del rendimiento judicial. Por un lado la productividad de jueces individuales se eval&uacute;a a trav&eacute;s de datos cuantitativos y algoritmos matem&aacute;ticos: en el caso extremo que se considera aqu&iacute;, la remuneraci&oacute;n del juez se ajust&oacute; en base a la evaluaci&oacute;n realizada. Por otro lado, se utilizan datos cuantitativos y cualitativos, recogidos mediante diversos m&eacute;todos y marcos te&oacute;ricos, como base de un proceso de negociaci&oacute;n en m&uacute;ltiples niveles, dise&ntilde;ado para encontrar una s&iacute;ntesis entre valores econ&oacute;micos, legales y sociales, destinados a mejorar el rendimiento general de la organizaci&oacute;n. Teniendo en cuenta los defectos de los sistemas de medici&oacute;n y evaluaci&oacute;n unidimensionales, y considerando la inconmensurabilidad de los resultados de los marcos de evaluaci&oacute;n m&uacute;ltiples (econ&oacute;micos, jur&iacute;dicos, sociol&oacute;gicos) que se requieren para superar esos defectos, los autores sostienen que hay una necesidad de di&aacute;logo pol&iacute;tico entre los actores implicados para asignar valores adecuados a la evaluaci&oacute;n judicial.</p> <p><strong>DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN</strong>: <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533902" target="_blank">http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533902</a>