Taiwan’s Security Calculus of Cross-­Strait Migration

Migration across the Taiwan Strait is relatively insignificant by its scale but it is indeed indisputably politically sensitive. Given the long-term political separation and military rivalry across the Taiwan Strait in the past six decades while both sides of the Taiwan Strait nevertheless intensively engaged each other economically, commercially and culturally, a social trend of cross-Strait migration inevitably results. There are various interpretations on such a demographic development which has raised security concerns, which are in turn creating a biased judiciary arrangement on the migration activities. What are the factors behind the security calculus of cross-Strait migration? How can the security calculus justify its arguments and subsequently maintain unequal treatments with respect to cross-Strait immigrants? Are the rationales for maintaining a tight grip on cross-Strait migration in line with the political ideal proclaimed by the political factions in Taiwan still sensible? What is the potential for the trend of cross-Strait migration affecting the security calculus in the future? On the other hand, for the migration from Taiwan to Mainland China, how influential can it be on the security decision-making process of the Beijing leadership? Is there any impact possibly caused by cross-Strait migration – and is it essentially overstated? Or alternatively, is the overstated influence potentially caused by cross-Strait migration an intentionally staged political myth? What are the substantial impacts actually ever achieved by cross-Strait migration on the security dimension? What is the self-fulfilled conviction of cross-Strait migration? For all the inquiries noted above, the author of this paper would like to scrutinize the truth and separate it from numerous myths ever advocated by the different factions in Taiwan politics. A sound and neutral judgment to tell the exact influences likely enacted by cross-Strait migration would ensure no misunderstanding and neither the intentional tarnish will serve as a good basis for cross-Strait policy formulation