Normative Power vs. Political Interest: EU Aid Selectivity beyond the European Consensus on Development, 2008-13

markdownabstract__Abstract__ This paper focuses on the ‘governance turn’ in the development policies of the European Union, represented in particular by the adoption of the ‘European Consensus on Development’ in 2005. The main assumption inherent in the EU approach to development is that the quality of governance in developing countries is a crucial (co-) determinant of development outcomes. The analysis concerns the allocation of funds (over €50 billion during the 2007-13 period) through the EU’s main policy instruments: the European Development Fund, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, and the Development Cooperation Instrument. The paper attempts to establish whether any dominant explanation, or combination of explanations, given in the literature on development assistance, is able to account for the allocation of those parts of the funds that are meant to be spent on governance reform. Three explanatory models of development assistance are tested, revolving around notions of normative power Europe, donor interest and recipient need. The findings of the empirical analyses emphasise the role of donor-interest variables, but show that recipient needs play a (seemingly subordinate) role in decisions on EU aid allocation. Normative frameworks appear to take a back seat to both political donor interests and recipient needs