The Internal Inconsistency of the Late Wittgenstein’s Viewpoint

In spite of all Wittgenstein’s efforts in making the internal consistency of his late viewpoint, a precise survey shows that it suffers from some inconsistencies. One of the cases of the internal and external inconsistencies, according to the interpretation of Cavell and Kripke, is the skeptic reading of the late Wittgenstein’s view point. Wittgenstein believes that skepticism has clearly no meaning.\ud According to him a skeptic should not principally try to express his/her skepticism through language. If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either. Doubting everything is no more a doubt. Besides, Wittgenstein’s viewpoint is itself an approach to skepticism. Here, I am going to give an analysis of this inconsistency. Giving an alternative realistic reading, it shows that how this internal inconsistency is manifest.\ud The essay is going then to deal with the concept of "forms of life", one of the fundamental concepts used by Wittgenstein. In this case, the internal inconsistency of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language will be shown as well