Hans Alberts Christentumskritik: Ein kritischer vergleich zwischen Alberts kritik und klassischen religionskritiken

In this article, it is argued that Hans Albert's criticism of Christianity is stronger than the logical positivist as well as the classical, e.g. Feuerbachian, criticism, since it rests on less questionable presuppositions. Other than those other forms of criticism, it does not presuppose an ontology or epistemology (respectively methodology) which is a priori hostile towards Christianity. Its strong feature is that it appears to be ontologically and epistemologically neutral, or, rather, relatively neutral compared to those other forms of criticism. Yet, closer scrutiny of Christian ontology reveals that it might imply epistemological and methodological consequences which are a priori ruled out by Albert's methodology. For example, it is well conceivable that Christian ontology implies a particular kind of cognitive certainty which is incompatible with Albert's insistence on a principled fallibilism. Thus, the feature which makes Albert's criticism stick out from those other forms of criticism, i.e., its relative neutrality, is jeopardized. In particular, the argument proceeds as following: In ch. I, the theoretical background of Popperianism is provided, in ch. II, Albert's application of Popperianism for the purposes of criticizing Christian (existentialist) theology is sketched, in ch. III, the strength of Albert's criticism is compared with the strength of the logical positivist and classical criticisms of Christianity, in ch. IV, Albert's criticism is criticized with the help of two theological tenets, in ch. V, an alternative to Albert's principled fallibilism is sketched that retains the idea of criticism without being a priori hostile to theology, in ch. VI, reasons are provided as to why Albert's criticism should not be discarded off-hand from the theological side