Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution offers some (for now) concluding thoughts. It considers to which extent the original criticisms of the use of value pluralism by Spicer and Wagenaar can be maintained and which nuances should be added. Next, it discusses the use of philosophical concepts such as value pluralism for understanding administrative practice and developing administrative theory. It concludes this use can be considerable, provided such concepts are treated with sufficient carefulness
There has been a resurgence of interest in values in recent public administration research, based on...
In this chapter, I consider the claim for pluralism commonly advanced in political philosophy as a c...
I suggest that there are two main views that can be found in Professor Schwarzschild\u27s paper. The...
Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution offers some (for now) con...
Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution offers some (for now) con...
In philosophical ethics, value pluralism is the idea, often associated with Isaiah Berlin, that ther...
A response to Overeem and Verhoef’s criticism of value pluralism, arguing that my value pluralist ap...
A response to Overeem and Verhoef’s criticism of value pluralism, arguing that my value pluralist ap...
In their critique of Spicer’s and Wagenaar’s account of value pluralism (VP), Talisse, Overeem, and ...
‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values ...
In current debates on public values too often the assumption is made that unitary conceptions exist ...
The name ‘pluralism’ frequently rears its head in political philosophy, but theorists often ...
The problem of value pluralism permeates modern politicalphilosophy. Its presence can be felt even w...
There has been a resurgence of interest in values in recent public administration research, based on...
In this chapter, I consider the claim for pluralism commonly advanced in political philosophy as a c...
I suggest that there are two main views that can be found in Professor Schwarzschild\u27s paper. The...
Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution offers some (for now) con...
Taking stock of the DSF debate on value pluralism, this final contribution offers some (for now) con...
In philosophical ethics, value pluralism is the idea, often associated with Isaiah Berlin, that ther...
A response to Overeem and Verhoef’s criticism of value pluralism, arguing that my value pluralist ap...
A response to Overeem and Verhoef’s criticism of value pluralism, arguing that my value pluralist ap...
In their critique of Spicer’s and Wagenaar’s account of value pluralism (VP), Talisse, Overeem, and ...
‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values ...
In current debates on public values too often the assumption is made that unitary conceptions exist ...
The name ‘pluralism’ frequently rears its head in political philosophy, but theorists often ...
The problem of value pluralism permeates modern politicalphilosophy. Its presence can be felt even w...
There has been a resurgence of interest in values in recent public administration research, based on...
In this chapter, I consider the claim for pluralism commonly advanced in political philosophy as a c...
I suggest that there are two main views that can be found in Professor Schwarzschild\u27s paper. The...