CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: A STATE OF THE ART

Extant research have for long identified that corporate governance has the potential to affect both financial performance and the opportunistic behavior of managers. Studies on the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance do not often assess the possibility that reported earnings can be misrepresented by managers with the scope of achieving various objectives. This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management practices. According to prior empirical studies in the field, corporate governance can reduce the extent of manipulative practices and increase the quality of financial reporting. As stated above, this study examined prior research investigating different corporate governance mechanisms that can have negative impact on earnings management practices. In this regard the legal system and the effects of takeover were examined as external mechanisms of corporate governance on manipulative behavior of managers. Internal mechanisms of corporate governance were also assessed. Board independence was found to enhance certain monitoring behaviors of managers while an audit committee can oversee the internal control for financial reporting and the quality of financial information. This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by providing detailed reviews of different corporate governance mechanisms on the most documented practice of creative accounting: earnings management. Limits of the current research are explored as well as the scope for future research