In traditional public good experiments participants receive an endowment from the experimenter that can be invested in a public good or kept in a private account. In this paper we present an experimental environment where participants can invest time during five days to contribute to a public good. Participants can make contributions to a linear public good by logging into a web application and performing virtual actions. We compared four treatments, with different group sizes and information of (relative) performance of other groups. We find that information feedback about performance of other groups has a small positive effect if we control for various attributes of the groups. Moreover, we find a significant effect of the contributions o...
Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring the motivat...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
In this paper we study the effect of social influence in the voluntary provision of public goods in ...
abstract: In traditional public good experiments participants receive an endowment from the experime...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods g...
In this paper we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad exper...
We use a public good experiment to study how in-group cooperation is affected by payoff-irrelevant i...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. Th...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
There are many contexts where an "everybody else is doing it" attitude is relevant. We evaluate the ...
Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring the motivat...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
In this paper we study the effect of social influence in the voluntary provision of public goods in ...
abstract: In traditional public good experiments participants receive an endowment from the experime...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods g...
In this paper we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad exper...
We use a public good experiment to study how in-group cooperation is affected by payoff-irrelevant i...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pur...
A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. Th...
In this paper we study the effects of providing additional feedback about individual contributions a...
There are many contexts where an "everybody else is doing it" attitude is relevant. We evaluate the ...
Similar to Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring the motivat...
Repeated one-shot public good experiments commonly tell participants only oftheir group's total cont...
In this paper we study the effect of social influence in the voluntary provision of public goods in ...