Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American and Western European countries. Such institutional and organizational differences might shape firms’ operational environment in general and the type of competition in product and labor markets in particular. The purpose of this paper is to identify and quantify industry differences in product and labor market imperfections in Chile and France. Design/methodology/approach – The authors rely on two extensions of Hall’s econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins by nesting three labor market settings (LMS) (perfect competition (PC) or right-to-manage bargaining, efficient bargaining (EB) and monopsony). Using an unbalanc...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings, this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometr...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings, this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometr...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Purpose – Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Lat...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin America...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, efficie...
Allowing for three labor market settings, this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometr...